Tag Archives: Public private partnerships

Addendum to the Pocahontas Parkway Post

I omitted from the original draft of the “Lessons from the Pocahontas Parkway Fiasco” one of the most important lessons learned. Having appended it to  the original post, I reproduce it here for the benefit of those who might otherwise miss it:

Lesson No. 4: Public-private partnerships create transparency. As a publicly traded company, Transurban must use Generally Accepted Accounting Procedures and report material write-offs like the Pocahontas Parkway. There is no such accounting or accountability for non-tolled state projects, whose accounting is opaque and inaccessible to outsiders.

For purposes of comparison, consider Rt. 288, an untolled section of the Richmond metropolitan beltway built entirely with state dollars — including many tens of millions from the General Fund — just a few years later. Rt. 288, too, was touted for its “economic development” benefits. Has it lived up to expectations in light of the real estate crash? Do traffic counts meet projections? Is there even any way to measure the success or failure of the project? No, there is not. The public is left in total ignorance, decision makers are not held accountable, and critical questions never get asked.

— JAB

Lessons from the Pocahontas Parkway Fiasco

Pocahontas Parkway where it crosses the James River

by James A. Bacon

Transurban, the majority investor in the Pocahontas Parkway (Route 895) has learned the hard way that human settlement patterns hit a major inflection point during the 2007-2008 recession. Unlike most planners and politicians in Virginia, whose policy prescriptions presume that nothing fundamental has changed, the Australian infrastructure company has taken a $181 million write-off, effectively reducing its equity investment in the project to zero.

Said Transurban CEO Chris Lynch:

The Pocahontas investment was made in 2006 on the expectation of significant housing and other development along the corridor resulting in growing traffic volumes and revenues. That development, due to specific issues in the local area and the continuing difficult macro-economic environment, has not yet manifested and is now expected to take longer to eventuate, resulting in a significantly reduced population of potential toll paying customers.

Based on revised traffic forecasts, Transurban now believes Pocahontas’ future cash flows will be significantly impaired relative to the original forecasts.

The 8.8-mile highway, which creates a southeastern bypass for the Richmond metropolitan region, was promoted as an economic development project and opened in 2002. Toll revenues did not live up to forecasts, however, and the project was close to defeasing on its bonds. Transurban took over in 2006, recapitalized the project and began operating the toll road. Now it, too, has lost its shirt.

The significance of this announcement cannot be over-stated.

Lesson No. 1: Beware transportation projects that are justified on the basis of anticipated economic development. I’m talking to you, Loudoun County supervisors, as you prepare to approve the new financing structure for the Rail-to-Dulles project! I’m talking to you, members of the Commonwealth Transportation Board (CTB), which just approved a subordinated $80 million loan for the U.S. 460 Connector in the expectation of a Panama Canal-sparked port boom! The hoped-for traffic may not materialize.

Lesson No. 2: Beware all transportation projects built to serve the metropolitan periphery. There ain’t no more growth heading out there any time soon! The limited development that is taking place is shifting closer to the urban core. It’s re-development, really, recycling aging neighborhoods and commercial areas into walkable, mixed-use communities for which there is considerable pent-up demand. There is very little demand for conventional development on the metropolitan periphery.

Corollary to Lesson No. 2: Beware all major real estate projects built on the metropolitan periphery. I’m talking to you, CTB members, who just approved an $80 million loan to fund transportation elements of a $2 billion mixed-use mega-project in Loudoun County.

Lesson No. 3: Let the private sector shoulder the risk of speculative transportation projects. I bear Transurban no ill will, but I’m really glad that it’s Transurban taking the hit and not Virginia taxpayers. The road never should have been built in the first place. But if the state is bound and determined to get speculative roads built, then the deals should be structured so that private-sector partners assume the risk and pocket the reward. The Commonwealth of Virginia should not be in the business of making speculative infrastructure deals.

Lesson No. 4: Public-private partnerships create transparency. As a publicly traded company, Transurban must use Generally Accepted Accounting Procedures and report material write-offs like the Pocahontas Parkway. There is no such accounting or accountability for non-tolled state projects, whose accounting is opaque and inaccessible to outsiders.

For purposes of comparison, consider Rt. 288, an untolled section of the Richmond metropolitan beltway built entirely with state dollars — including many tens of millions from the General Fund — just a few years later. Rt. 288, too, was touted for its “economic development” benefits. Has it lived up to expectations in light of the real estate crash? Do traffic counts meet projections? Is there even any way to measure the success or failure of the project? No, there is not. The public is left in total ignorance, decision makers are not held accountable, and critical questions never get asked.

The Idea List

The recently published “pipeline” of 22 public-private partnership proposals does not represent a formal McDonnell administration transportation agenda. Think of it more as an inventory of ideas worth checking out.

Traffic management center in Northern Va.

by James A. Bacon

Of all the 22 public-private partnership ideas listed in a recently issued McDonnell administration document, the one that gets Tony Kinn the most stoked is a proposal to consolidate Virginia’s five regional traffic operations centers. His aspiration, says Kinn, director of the Office for Transportation Public Private Partnerships (OTP3), is to create the best traffic management system in the United States, if not the world.

Traffic operations centers do the mundane work of tracking and clearing traffic accidents, dispatching aid to stranded motorists and updating signs regarding traffic conditions. According to the Daily Press, the Hampton Roads facility in Hampton Roads, with a network of 276 closed-circuit cameras, handled more than 70,000 incidents last year and assisted 40,000 roadside motorists. And that’s just one of five around the state. The centers are run by contractors operating under four different contracts using different software platforms. The state has received 32 proposals from companies responding to a solicitation to merge them.

One advantage of a unified system, says Kinn, is that if one center goes down, others could take up the slack. Then there are the improvements that no one has thought of yet. Kinn is looking for innovation. A private-sector operator might test a new concept in one center and, if successful, roll it out to the others. Other states have dabbled with privatizing their centers, he says, but Virginia wants to take traffic operations to the next level.

Consolidation of Virginia’s traffic operations centers is one of eight ideas that have reached “candidate” status in the McDonnell administration’s P3 prospect list. The pipeline of possible projects also includes 14 projects in the “conceptual” stage. If a conceptual project survives the first cut, it goes through a more rigorous analysis as a “candidate.” Says Kinn: “All of these projects go through a high-level screening process to make sure the feasibility is there. “Does it fit the needs of the commonwealth? Can we afford it? Does it provide benefits?”

Smart Growth groups have sounded the alarm over several projects in the list, particularly a proposed North-South Corridor in Northern Virginia, as well as projects well past the “candidate” stage, such as the U.S. 460 Connector, a project estimated at $1.5 billion to $2 billion that would link Suffolk and Petersburg with an Interstate-grade highway. The McDonnell administration has “hijacked good transportation planning and prioritization in Virginia,” Stewart Schwartz, executive director of the Coalition for Smarter Growth, has said. The P3 projects are approved outside the normal process for distributing road and highway construction dollars, which gives the administration unprecedented leeway to push its own pet projects.

Kinn responds that the list was devised after extensive consultation with Metropolitan Planning Organizations and local government officials around the state, and that “candidate” projects will be elevated to actively pursued projects only after extensive local consultation. “We’re going to go to the people, and the people will have to come to us, and we’ll have to work together.”

In a Friday interview, Kinn fleshed out the thinking behind some of the projects in the pipeline.

Interstate 95 Corridor improvements. The McDonnell administration has obtained authority from the Federal Highway Administration to place tolls on I-95 south of Fredericksburg for the purpose of raising funds to make improvements to the interstate corridor. The idea here is to examine the potential for leveraging the revenue flow by means of a P3. The administration is not presupposing that a public-private partnership is a good idea, Kinn says. It is simply examining the option. “What else can we bring to the corridor?”

Interstate 64 HOV lane conversions. I-64 in Hampton Roads has under-utilized HOV lanes. Does it make sense to convert them to HOT lanes like those under construction on the Capital Beltway, in which cars are charged a toll for using a congestion-free lane but car poolers still get to use it for free? The pertinent questions, says Kinn: “Is it feasible? Can we afford it?”

Port of Richmond. APM Terminals has submitted an unsolicited bid to take over management of the Port of Virginia terminals in a deal potentially worth $3 billion to $4 billion in payments to the Commonwealth over 48 years. Says Kinn: “The Panama Canal is going to create a huge influx of business. We are sitting on the threshold of an opportunity for major business growth. … APM has submitted a proposal — we want other proposals to come in.”

Hampton Roads crossings improvements. A “third crossing” between Norfolk and the Peninsula has been a top priority of Hampton Roads planners for many years. The McDonnell administration wants to see if these projects are feasible using a P3 model.

NoVa North-South Corridor. The idea of building a north-south corridor linking Interstate 66 and Route 7 in Northern Virginia is “in the very preliminary stage,” says Kinn. The administration wants to see if P3s can be used to “do that in a profitable and efficient way.” Continue reading.

McDonnell Team Ponders 22 Public Private Partnerships

HOT lanes under construction on the 495 Beltway

by James A. Bacon

The McDonnell administration has announced a draft list of projects to be pursued by the Office of Transportation Public-Private Partnerships (OTP3). Eight projects  deemed formal “candidates” for consideration range from corridor improvements along Interstate 95 to the conversion of HOV lanes into HOT lanes in Hampton Roads. Fourteen “conceptual” projects vary from rest area enhancements and cell tower opportunities to Dulles Metro rail station air rights and Wallops Island visitor & support facilities.

“The past two years have seen the McDonnell administration take several proactive steps to meet Virginia’s transportation challenges including streamlining the PPTA implementation guidelines and creation of the OTP3 to focus on the identification, development and delivery of P3 projects across all modes of transportation in Virginia,” said Transportation Secretary Sean Connaughton in a prepared statement. “The OTP3 has been charged with creating an environment that encourages private investment and proactively identifies, assesses and implements the Commonwealth’s priority transportation projects.”

Said OTP3 Director Tony Kinn: “The pipeline is a significant step forward and reinforces why Virginia continues to be viewed as a national leader in public-private partnerships.”

However, the list did not win universal plaudits.

“We believe that the PPTA program has hijacked good transportation planning and prioritization in Virginia,” said Stewart Schwartz, executive director of the Coalition for Smarter Growth in a press release issued yesterday. “A small group of officials including the Secretary of Transportation have too much power to divert tax subsidies to private contractors for a list of projects that they alone develop. Are these mega-projects the right approaches for these corridors?  Are they where we really need transportation investments?”

Smart Growth groups identified the U.S. 460 Connector project and a proposed NOVA North-South Corridor as particularly worrisome, the former because the state is promising $750 million in state and Virginia Port Authority funds and the latter because it would advance a sprawl-inducing outer beltway around the Washington region.

“We are very concerned about the diversion of public dollars to private priorities,” said Chris Miller, President of the Piedmont Environmental Council. “I fear there is a rush to commit the last remaining transportation dollars to projects that fail to address the concerns of the public about the poor state of existing local road networks across the Commonwealth.”

Virginian-Pilot reporter Debbie Messina interviewed Connaughton about converting HOV to HOT lanes and other proposals affecting Hampton Roads.

“We need to try to get more through-put with the existing capacity,” Connaughton said. He added that building more lanes may also be considered. …

It’s no surprise that the list also includes widening I-64 between Newport News and Richmond, and expanding Hampton Roads water crossings, which is offered as a package of projects that would include the Hampton Roads Bridge-Tunnel and the Patriots Crossing/Third Crossing.

“It’s quite clear to us that when you look at the Hampton Roads crossings, you have to look at them as a complete system and develop them either incrementally or with a total approach,” Connaughton said. Tackling them individually provides only marginal improvements, he added.

I don’t have time today for anything more than this quick-and-dirty response but I will follow up with a closer analysis of the list.

Commonwealth Lines up Talent for Infrastructure Deals

An important story that I (and everyone else) missed… The Office of Transportation Public-Private Partnerships (OTP3) announced earlier this month the selection of its team of consultants to help in negotiations with complex P3 deals. (See the press release.)

Developing a bench of outside consultants is critical as the Commonwealth pursues partnerships to build billions of dollars worth of mega-transportation projects. Private infrastructure-investment firms hire top financial, legal and engineering talent to support their deal making, allowing them to run circles around career public-sector employees not trained in deal financing, risk management, traffic modeling and other arcane issues.

The outside expertise won’t come cheap but it should allow Virginia to cut better deals on multi-billion dollar P3 deals, potentially saving hundreds of millions of dollars over the life of the projects, often lasting 50 years or longer, and obviating hidden risks.

The outside teams include:

  • Halcrow, a cH2M Hill company (engineering)
  • Infrastructure Management Group (project finance)
  • KPMG (infrastructure finance)
  • Mercator Advisors (capital markets expertise)
  • Public Financial Management (financial advisory services)
  • Reynolds, Smith and Hill (infrastructure consulting)
  • CDM Smith (transportation consulting)

— JAB

Connecting the Dots on the 460 Connector

Map credit: VDOT.

So, I was digging into the economic and financial assumptions of the U.S. 460 Connector project, and I was reading the public-private partnership proposal put forth by 460 Partners, a consortium led by Richmond-based Moreland Property Group that includes infrastructure giants like Skanska USA and Lane Construction Corp…

Like the proposals advanced by two competing groups, 460 Partners states that there is no way to charge enough tolls to pay for the estimated $1.8 billion project. But unlike the others, 460 Partners asks for no direct public subsidy (other than $52 million for pre-development expenses and right-of-way acquisition that would be repaid).

Instead, the group proposed creating a regional economic development authority to coordinate marketing efforts under the brand of “Virginia’s Gateway Corridor,” which would carry with it a set of incentives “specifically targeted towards manufacturing, exports and warehouse and distribution type companies.” That marketing group would promote industrial and logistics development along the U.S. 460 corridor. And the expense of the highway project not covered by tolls would be recouped by “receiving a portion of the economic benefits created within the Virginia’s Gateway Corridor area,” based on metrics such as jobs created, sales tax revenue or capital investment.

Where had I heard those ideas before? Oh, yes! The McDonnell administration attempted to craft legislation that would embody both ideas, or, at least, variants of both ideas — both of which I had already blogged about.

Instead of creating “Virginia’s Gateway Corridor,” HB 1183 would create the Route 460 Corridor Interstate 86 Connector Economic Development Zone.” And, as originally submitted, it would have provided up to $50 million tax credits over two years to companies involved in maritime commerce or the import/export of manufacturing products. An amended version version of the bill has passed both the state Senate and the House of Delegates.

The governor’s omnibus transportation bill also provided for the creation of Transportation Improvement Districts (TID) consisting of territory within a five-mile radius of a transportation infrastructure project. Twenty-five percent of any growth in state General Fund tax revenues would have been transferred to TID funds, and the Commonwealth Transportation Board could allocate the money to projects in its Six-Year Improvement Program — including, presumably, the project that accounted for the revenue growth. That’s pretty close to what 460 Partners had in mind. However, the provision did not make it into the final version of the bill passed by the House and Senate.

Coincidence or not? I spoke to Brad Rodgers, president of 460 Partners, to find out. His consortium wasn’t involved with the drafting of the legislation, he said, but “I’d like to think [the legislation] was inspired by our proposal. The concept [for Virginia’s Gateway Corridor] was almost verbatim what we laid out.”

Rodgers did not speculate how the defeat of the Transportation Improvement District idea would affect the chances that the 460 Partners proposal would be selected. Nor did he know when the McDonnell administration would make its decision. The project time line has been delayed, he said, due to the “hullabaloo” over the Midtown-Downtown Tunnel project in which Hampton Roads politicians are demanding the state contribute more to the project to buy down toll rates there. He suspects that administration officials are looking for “more clarity” before moving on to the U.S. 460 project.

Midtown Meltdown

Norfolk Midtown Tunnel. Photo credit: VDOT

by James A. Bacon

The controversy over tolls on the $2.1 billion Midtown Tunnel/Downtown Tunnel project in Hampton Roads is spreading statewide as transportation advocates in other parts of Virginia ponder the implications of what it means for them. In a missive distributed yesterday Robert Chase, president of the Northern Virginia Transportation Alliance, warned that one “rumored” scenario under consideration by House-Senate conferees would be to renege on the $2.1 billion public-private partnership agreement with Elizabeth River Crossings (ERC), even if it meant triggering multimillion-dollar penalties.

Hampton Roads legislators are up in arms over the deal, which would slap tolls on users of the two tunnels and the Martin Luther King Expressway later this year in order to finance major improvements that aren’t scheduled to be complete for two years. Two weeks ago, the Virginian-Pilot reported, Del. Chris Jones, R-Suffolk, was researching how the contract could be terminated as an option of “last resort.”

If Chase is correct, Jones’ idea has morphed from a research project into an option under consideration by House and Senate budget conferees in Richmond. Jones, as it happens, is one of the six House conferees, as is Johnny Joannou, D-Portsmouth, whose district is at ground-zero of the controversy. Under the Jones scenario, writes Chase, the state “would legislatively scrap the $2.1 billion Hampton Roads Midtown-Downtown Tunnel PPTA contract and mandate that only a new Midtown Tunnel be built entirely with state funding through over $1 billion in federal GARVEE financing.”

Needless to say, that idea won’t play well in Northern Virginia, or anywhere else for that matter. Conferees are weighing the idea of providing an additional $300 million, plus $150 million already agreed upon, to defray the cost of the Rail-to-Dulles METRO rail project in Northern Virginia, but half or more of that project financing still will be paid by commuters on the Dulles Toll Road. It’s an open question how NoVa lawmakers will cotton to an arrangement that extracts $4 tolls from Dulles Toll Road commuters for a rail service they aren’t even using while Norfolk commuters get a new tunnel for free.

Notes Chase:

Scrapping the PPTA deal would mean breaking a legally binding contract with the consortium, incurring financial penalties  and totally circumventing the Commonwealth Transportation Board/state and local planning and approval processes. Not a real private-sector confidence builder for a state with virtually no construction dollars desperate to attract private sector investment. …

Virginia has already committed $400 million to the Downtown/Midtown/MLK Extension project to buy down tolls. To provide the total $1 billion (and allow Hampton Road residents a toll-free trip) the Commonwealth would have to add another $600 million in GARVEE funds or essentially all of the $1.2 billion in authorized GARVEE bond funds for the next 10-12 years to a single Hampton Roads project. (GARVEE bonds are repaid from future federal revenues meaning that about $100 million/year in future federal revenues will go to a single Hampton Roads project as opposed to being leveraged across many throughout the state.)

Transportation officials say that this would most likely kill Northern Virginia’s I-95 Express HOT Lanes project for which GARVEES are targeted and potentially several others including the Route 7/Belmont Ridge Road Interchange and the Leesburg Bypass/Sycolin Road interchange.

In sum, scrapping the ERC contract would derail the McDonnell administration’s entire transportation grand strategy, which is based upon leveraging the borrowed dollars through public private partnerships. Accordingly, the chances of the governor going along with the Jones scenario are just about zero. I would conjecture that Jones doesn’t really want to un-do the ERC deal, he’s just using the prospect of disaster as leverage to extract enough money from the state to offset tolls until the tunnels are built.

Two lines of argument would support such a bid. First, it is entirely unreasonable by any standard to ask people to pay tolls for transportation improvements they are not using. (Admittedly, that argument didn’t work for Dulles Toll Road commuters, so it may not be a strong one.) Second, if the state is forking out up to $450 million for the Rail-to-Dulles to provide toll road relief, it’s hard to argue that it can’t afford a measley $100 million or so for Hampton Roads.

Whatever happens, Virginia has reached a sad state of affairs. Billions of dollars of bond proceeds are sloshing around uncommitted. The monies are not subject to the usual transportation formulas which, though flawed, at least ensure that funds are distributed around the state in a manner roughly approximating population and need. The criteria for allocating bond monies, it appears, will be he who screams the loudest gets the most money. Political considerations will supplant economic considerations, and the results will be sub-par.

Welcome to the New Dominion.

Update: Here’s another reason why the Jones scenario of cutting the cost by building just one tunnel won’t work: The improvements to the Midtown Tunnel, Downtown Tunnel and Martin Luther King Expressway are designed to work as a network. The MLK Expressway will funnel a lot of drivers off the Interstate to the two tunnels, according to my source. The plan is to provide up-to-date info about driving conditions at both tunnels to commuters on the MLK, by signs or other means, to steer them to the least congested facility. Building the  components of the plan one by one won’t deliver the same congestion-mitigation benefits.

Virginia Toll Projects and “Loss Aversion”

Kahneman's "loss aversion" schematic: The value of the loss is greater than the value of a comparable gain.

— James A. Bacon

In his book, “Thinking, Fast and Slow,” psychologist and Nobel Prize winner in economics Daniel Kahneman describes the phenomena of “loss aversion” and “reference points.” These deeply embedded cognitive quirks, which had survival value for hunter-gatherers, pose dilemmas for politicians in complex modern societies who try to change the status quo. The McDonnell administration’s plan to ameliorate traffic congestion in Hampton Roads is a case in point.

Loss aversion is the phenomenon in which people experience the loss of a thing with greater intensity than they experience the gain of a comparable thing. Thus, people will experience more anguish from the loss of $100 than pleasure in the gain of $100. Gains and losses are judged in relation to a reference point, which often is the status quo (but sometimes can be a goal to be achieved in the future). When there is a departure from the status quo, losers feel their pain more intensely than the winners.

These principles are well established through numerous psychological experiments conducted over several decades. There is nothing controversial about them. Now, let’s apply them to the McDonnell administration decision to pay for roughly $2 billion to make improvements to the Midtown Tunnel, Downtown  and Martin Luther King Boulevard in Norfolk and Portsmouth.

The tunnels were paid for originally by tolls, but the tolls came down a couple of decades ago, and the citizens of Hampton Roads have enjoyed the status quo of using them for free. Within half a year, Elizabeth River Crossings, the public-private partner in charge of expanding the tunnel capacity and collecting the tolls, will start charging tolls — more than $3 per day for a two-way trip — before the improvements are even made.

Not surprisingly, this has caused an outcry among Hampton Roads commuters. (I’ll defer for a later discussion the issue of whether or not people had ample warning that the tolls were coming and had sufficient opportunity to let their opinions be known.) The McDonnell administration response is that, yes, people will have to pay tolls, but the project will eliminate the half-hour congestion they experience each time they cross the Elizabeth River, and that by any rational calculation, saving an hour in stop-and-go traffic is well worth $3 or $4 in tolls.  (See Transportation Secretary Sean Connaughton’s remarks in “E-Z as Pie? Not Really?“).

From the perspective of  purely economic calculation, Connaughton’s argument is impeccable. But, as Kahneman points out, humans are not always economically rational creatures. The anticipation of paying that toll causes greater grief for many than the anticipation of spending less time stuck in traffic promises relief. As a result, the citizenry is up in arms and Gov. Bob McDonnell has a big problem on his hands.

Now, let’s compare the public reaction in Norfolk to the reaction in Northern Virginia, where people soon will begin paying HOT lane tolls on the Capital Beltway. Northern Virginians are far less upset. Why? Because the tolls are being used to add new lanes. People who place a premium on their time can pay to use the new lanes and avoid congestion. They have an option they did not have before. Those who don’t wish to pay the money can continue using the same old, congested lanes. While they devoutly may wish that money would fall out of the sky and pay for the new lanes so everyone could use them for free, their situation remains the same. They do not perceive themselves as losing anything. They do not get agitated. McDonnell does not have a problem on his hands.

There is a very important political lesson to be learned here as the McDonnell administration forges ahead with a series of high-profile public-private partnerships and other toll projects. Toll projects like the Interstate 95 HOT lane, which creates new capacity and new options for drivers without imposing tolls on roads that now are used for free, will meet relatively little political resistance. By contrast, the prospect of paying higher tolls on the Dulles Toll Road to pay for the Rail-to-Dulles project is causing an uproar. Predictably, the administration’s proposal to toll I-95 in order to raise money to pay for improvements in the corridor likely will raise a clamor as well.

You can argue economic logic all you want, but people who perceive themselves as losing something will gripe and bellyache. The politically astute path is to select toll projects that pay for themselves by creating new choices for drivers, not imposing tolls where there were none before. To put it more simply, toll projects must be structured as win-win arrangements to gain popular favor.

E-Z as Pie? Not Really.

Brace yourself for a slew of new toll roads in Virginia. E-ZPass will make it a breeze to pay the tolls, but it won’t ease the suspicion that people in “other parts of the state” are getting a sweeter deal.

by James A. Bacon

Between the 495 Express Lanes project and the Downtown/Midtown Tunnel, Virginians will be paying a lot more in tolls by the end of the year. The Virginia Department of Transportation estimates that 400,000 new drivers will enroll in the E-ZPass electronic-payment system, compared to 900,000 presently, and Transportation Secretary Sean Connaughton wants to make sure that VDOT can accommodate the surge.

Virginia already allows motorists to set up E-ZPass accounts and order the transponders online. But VDOT hopes to supplement that distribution with a retail distribution network that includes the Division of Motor Vehicles, big-box stores and other outlets.

Hampton Roads drivers are expected to start paying tolls on the Midtown Tunnel, Downtown Tunnel and Martin Luther King Boulevard by the third quarter this year, while Northern Virginians will require the transponders to use the tolled HOT lanes on the Capital Beltway by the end of the year. Never before has VDOT had to distribute so many transponders in such a short time frame. “It will be a significant challenge to get that many transponders to the public,” said Virginia Highway Commissioner Gregory A. Whirley at a meeting of the Commonwealth Transportation Board today.

Connaughton expressed concern that VDOT does not yet have vendor contracts in place to deliver 400,000 transponders nor the retail network to distribute them. Having the electronic payment system in place is critical for a smooth launch of the multibillion-dollar public-private partnerships in Hampton Roads and Northern Virginia, he said. “If we don’t get this right, it will be a black mark.” He told VDOT officials that he expects monthly updates on E-ZPass at future meetings.

“It’s all underway,” John Lawson, VDOT’s chief financial officer, assured him.

VDOT will get help from its private-sector partners, Transurban-Fluor in Northern Virginia and Elizabeth River Crossings in Hampton Roads. Both public-private partnership (P3) operators would prefer to collect their tolls electronically rather than resort to other means such as tracking down motorists on the basis of license-plate images captured by video cameras. The administration costs for E-ZPass are far lower than the alternatives, which means lower costs for drivers and less hassle for the franchise operators.

Transburban-Fluor plans a major roll-out when the HOT/HOV lanes open for business in December, said Jennifer Aument, vice president-corporate relations for Transurban USA. 495 Express Lanes will have to educate drivers about new traffic patterns, who gets to use the express lane for free (buses, vans, carpools), who has to pay, and how to sign up for the transponders. The partnership expects to unleash a promotional campaign that includes ads in the Washington Post, 100 delivery trucks acting as mobile billboards, festival promotions and meetings with targeted stakeholders.  The company has developed the graphics for fliers and other collateral material and has developed a core message, “It’s time to change lanes.” Of course, she added, the roll-out will be Tweeted.

495 Express Lanes hopes to generate 400,000 customer interactions by March 2013 and to convert them into 100,000 transponder sign-ups.

Likewise, Elizabeth River Crossing (ERC) has created a tolling strategy and marketing plan, which it has submitted to VDOT for review, said Greg Woodsmall, interim CEO of the partnership. ERC has a tougher job than Transurban and Fluor, however. No one will be forced to pay the HOT lane tolls on the Beltway; drivers can continue using the old Beltway lanes at no cost. By contrast, commuters using the Norfolk-to-Portsmouth tunnels will start paying tolls for tunnels that they are accustomed to using for free — before the improvements are even completed. Hundreds of citizens gathered in Portsmouth recently to protest the tolls, and scores offered to join as plaintiffs in a lawsuit expected to be filed by next week.

Some 10% to 15% of Hampton Roads drivers already have E-ZPass. ERC’s goal is to get that number to 50% when the tolls are put in place, and eventually to 90%, said Woodsmall. Reaching the 50% goal will require distributing 80,000 transponders. Toll payers will be required to pay VDOT $35 up-front, which includes the cost of the transponder and a credit toward use of the tolled facilities. When the credit is used up, VDOT will draw from the driver’s bank account and/or credit card. “It’s a tough sell to charge for an advance payment,” acknowledged Woodsmall. ERC will offer an alternative — paying for each use of the facilities in a “pay by plate” arrangement. But that entails a lot more administrative work, and the charge can be three times the transponder fee, or nearly $5.

Discussion of the tolling technology stimulated a variety of comments. Dana Martin, the Salem transportation district representative, said that the “photo enforcement” of the Hampton Roads tolls would unfairly punish drivers from outside the region — in Charlottesville or Lynchburg, say — who have no tolls and no reason to acquire a transponder. Why should they have to pay three times as much as locals do?

That inspired a response from Shep Miller, an urban at-large representative from Norfolk, who said, “At least you don’t have to pay every day just to get to work!” Miller elaborated in later remarks, saying that paying $900 a year in tolls to get to work represents a genuine hardship for someone making $15,000 a year.

Connaughton leaped into the fray, asking, “What’s the situation you have today?” Commuters spend a half an hour daily stuck in traffic at the two Norfolk-to-Portsmouth tunnels, he said. His implication was that paying the tolls was preferable to sitting idle in traffic.

Miller retorted that when the state fixes “other peoples’ problems” in other parts of the state, it doesn’t slap tolls on the projects. Other CTB members joined in, decrying how different regions of the state are treated differently when it comes to paying tolls. Then Jim Rich, Culpeper district representative, quipped that the state was welcome to take back the $244 million committed to the Charlottesville Bypass — which he opposed — to buy down tolls in Northern Virginia and Norfolk.

In the end, Miller agreed that the McDonnell administration has no choice but to create toll-driven projects in a political environment in which Virginia legislators are unwilling to raise the motor fuels tax, or even to adjust it for inflation. Said he: “The problem is that previous administrations did nothing for so long, there is no alternative.”

Update: Here is Debbie Messina’s story in the Virginian-Pilot.

Thinking about P3s

Ron Utt, a Virginia-based Heritage Foundation scholar, and William G. Reinhardt, publisher of Public Works Financing, have offered a balanced appraisal, from a conservative perspective, of public-private partnerships (P3s) as a solution for America’s transportation woes.

They cite Virginia’s successes with the Capital Beltway HOT lanes and Hampton Roads tunnels in their essay, “Can Public-Private Partnerships Fill the Transportation Funding Gap?

But Utt and Reinhardt acknowledge that there is stiff public resistance to the tolls required to pay for multibillion-dollar improvements.

Policymakers should recognize that P3s are not the solution to the transportation infrastructure investment gap that threatens to undermine commerce in the United States. There are too few financially viable P3 projects to meet the national need for new highway capacity and to modernize existing roads. No amount of enabling legislation will bring private investors into projects that are not financeable, and very few highways could support themselves on tolls alone. Thus, some combination of gas taxes, sales taxes, fees, and appropriations of state funds is necessary to make a creditworthy public–private partnership. …

P3s have demonstrated the ability to raise substantial sums of money for major infrastructure projects, especially to add needed capacity in congested corridors. Experience has also demonstrated that P3 projects can be complicated and time-consuming to create and that not every transportation project is amenable to this approach. As a consequence, other innovative and traditional finance solutions will be needed to meet current and future infrastructure spending plans.

Those are all worthy points but I would append one more critical question: How do we ensure that P3s are economically justified? As Utt and Reinhardt point out, few projects can support themselves on the basis of toll revenues alone. Most P3s require public subsidies to buy down the price of the tolls. If the demand doesn’t exist to support the improvement, or if private-sector players aren’t willing to assume the risk that toll revenues may not materialize, should the project be built at all? I have yet to see a set of clearly articulated principles by which to judge when a public subsidy of a P3 project is warranted.

— JAB

CBO Opines on Pros and Cons of P3s

by James A. Bacon

Public-private partnerships have advantages and disadvantages as a strategy for building and maintaining the nation’s roads and highways, concludes a recently published Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report, “Using Public-Private Partnerships to Carry Out Highway Projects.

The CBO found tentatively that partnerships have built highways “slightly less expensively and slightly more quickly” compared to the traditional public-sector approach. The speed-up in construction time is most evident in larger projects valued at $100 million or more. But the number of studies supporting that conclusion is relatively small and results regarding one project are difficult to apply to others.

Another finding is that private-sector management also can bring about a reduction in operational costs, although firm conclusions are clouded in the two studies cited by the impact of the recession and associated reduction in traffic. Private-sector managers might choose more effective procedures and schedules for maintenance, the study suggested. “In many cases, smaller, more regular repairs are a more cost-effective approach to road maintenance than are larger, irregular repairs, but they may be less common when a road is under public control because of states’ and localities’ budgeting practices.”

Public-private partnerships (P3s) offer pros and cons in financing. Public entities can tap tax-free municipal bonds; private-sector investors can use depreciation to lower their tax exposure. But private financing come with the expectation of a future return, the ultimate source of which is either taxes or tolls. The primary advantage of private financing is that it makes funds available in states or localities that “have chosen to restrict their spending by imposing legal constraints or budgetary limits on themselves.”

One other important attribute of P3s, notes the study, is the opportunity to contractually define and allocate risk. Under the traditional approach to road building, government assumes most of the risk associated with cost overruns, construction delays and, in the case of toll projects, shortfalls in toll revenues. In P3s, the private-sector partner generally assumes the risk for cost overruns and construction delays. But, after toll revenues in early projects fall short of projections, private partners have been seeking revenue guarantees from the public partner.

A drawback of P3s, says the study, is the loss of public control. Contracts typically turn toll-setting authority over to the private partner. Higher tolls are the likely result, “an outcome that may conflict with other public-sector goals.”

The study provides a useful discussion of P3 pros and cons, but it overlooks a number of important considerations.

An advantage of P3s is that projects tend to be more transparent. More information about a road project’s costs, revenues and risks are made public. The public partner can monitor performance and financial metrics and hold the private partner  more accountable than it could hold its own bureaucracy.

On the other hand, P3s reduce the opportunity for meaningful public input. Much of the negotiation between government and the private sector necessarily takes place behind closed doors. Once terms and conditions are reached, it is exceedingly difficult to renegotiate them if the public doesn’t like them. The result is typically a fait accompli.

Public Private Partnership Laws Need a New Look

Norfolk MidTown Tunnel. Photo credit: Virginian-Pilot.

The Virginian-Pilot has published a polished version of a blog post I wrote last month. In case you missed the original, here it is.  — JAB

While Virginia’s Public Private Partnership Act may be experiencing growing pains as projects from the Midtown and Downtown tunnels to HOT lanes on Interstate 95 see the light of day and invite public scrutiny, there is little doubt that PPPs, or P3s, are the wave of the future.

Indeed, the United States is something of a laggard in embracing this financing tool, which draws upon private-sector capital and management to build roads and other infrastructure. Europe has roughly five times the P3 investment as the U.S. Even Latin America exceeds the U.S. as a market for this type of project.

However, P3s are getting more attention in the United States as resistance to higher taxes starves federal and state governments of funds to ameliorate congestion and promote economic development.

Two recent reports, one from the libertarian-leaning Reason Foundation and the other from the center-left Brookings Institution, are a sign that P3s are gaining legitimacy as a transportation-funding option.

In Reason’s “Risk and Rewards of Public-Private Partnerships,” author Baruch Feigenbaum writes that PPPs have five major advantages. They deliver needed transportation infrastructure sooner, raise large new sources of capital, shift risk from taxpayers to investors, provide a business-like approach and enable innovation. “PPPs can be utilized in most types of projects and are most successful in states with strong enabling legislation.”

Imilia Istrate and Roberto Puentes at Brookings write in “Moving Forward on Public Private Partnerships” that P3s are complex contracts, and negotiating them is not a task for amateurs and part-timers. They suggest that states develop “public private partnership units,” entities within the government that develop the technical and financial expertise to evaluate, negotiate and monitor P3 projects. It is encouraging to see that the paper specifically cites the Office of Transportation Public-Private Partnerships in Virginia as one of only three examples of a genuine “public-private partnership unit” among the 50 states.

Virginians should take pride in the state’s recognition as a leader in implementing P3s, but the commonwealth’s enabling law, which was written in 1995 and amended in 2005, still may need massaging. As I reported in “Promises and Pitfalls” on dev.baconsrebellion.com, there is an inherent tension between inviting public input and protecting the integrity of the complex negotiations between the state and the private-sector concessionaire.

Citizens have a right to know how these mega-projects will affect them before deals are signed, and they should have some right of appeal if the terms are onerous. Yet openness and transparency must be tempered by the reality that it would be difficult to complete a transaction if the public were involved at every turn, especially if key negotiating points were politicized.

A related problem is the project selection. The most fundamental question we need to ask ourselves is, “Should this road, bridge or tunnel even be built in the first place?” It is of little comfort to know that a P3 can bring in a project cheaper and faster if we’re building infrastructure in a location that cannot be economically justified.

In Virginia, P3s circumvent the normal process for approving transportation projects. The Commonwealth Transportation Board, which sets priorities for traditionally funded projects, is informed of major P3 developments, but its approval is not required.

The McDonnell administration will have $1.5 billion in state funds to allocate to P3 contracts, which can commit the state to concessions lasting 50 to 80 years, cost citizens billions of dollars in tolls and impose financial penalties should the state undertake other projects, even decades from now, that might cut into toll revenue. Once a project advances beyond the concept stage, no forum exists for the public to question, debate or comment upon major terms and conditions.

By drawing attention to the problems inherent in the P3 enabling legislation, I do not mean to single out Gov. Bob McDonnell for criticism. The governor is working within the rules created by previous administrations.

But he is pursuing P3s more aggressively than his predecessors, and the flaws in the law are manifesting themselves on his watch. I’m not sure how we strike the right balance between transparency and confidentiality, but we need to do a better job.

Upon reflection, I would add one more point. Another advantage of P3s is that they rely upon toll revenues, which conform to the bedrock principle that those who use and/or benefit (from higher land values) from a transportation project are the ones who ought to pay for it. In an ideal world, P3s would require no state money — they would be entirely supported through tolls and/or capture of increased property values. In an ideal world, there would be no doubt that the project is economically justified. In the real world, P3s always have a state contribution. The greater the state subsidy, the greater the cause for skepticism that a project is economically justified and the greater the reason to suspect that project is being undertaken for the benefit of special interests and not the public. Still, P3s provide a level of transparency into the economics of a transportation project that we don’t get from conventional funding methods.

Perfecting P3s Still Takes Work

Graphic credit: Brookings Institution. (Click on chart for more legible image.)

by James A. Bacon

While Virginia’s Public Private Partnership Act may be experiencing growing pains as more projects see the light of day and invite public scrutiny (see “The Promise and Pitfalls of P3s“), there is little doubt that PPPs, or P3s, are the wave of the future. Indeed, the United States is something of a laggard in embracing this mechanism, which draws upon private-sector capital and management to build roads and other infrastructure. Europe has roughly five times the P3 investment as the U.S. Even Latin America has availed itself of this option more than the U.S. has.

However, P3s are getting more attention in the United States as resistance to higher taxes starves federal and state government of funds to ramp up more construction projects.  Two very recent reports, one from the libertarian-leaning Reason Foundation and the other from the center-left Brookings Institution, are a sign that P3s are gaining legitimacy as a transportation-funding option.

Reasons’ “Risk and Rewards of Public-Private Partnerships” argues that the dynamics of P3s are well understood now that dozens have them have been implemented around the world. PPPs have five major advantages, writes author Baruch Feigenbaum. They (1) deliver needed transportation infrastructure sooner; (2) raise large new sources of capital; (3) shift risk from taxpayers to investors; (4) provide a business-like approach, (5) and enable innovation. “PPPs can be utilized in most types of projects and are most successful in states with strong enabling legislation.”

Imilia Istrate and Roberto Puentes at Brookings make another important point in their paper, “Moving Forward on Public Private Partnerships.” P3s are complex contracts, and negotiating them is not a task best left to amateurs and part-timers. The authors suggest that states develop “public private partnership units,” entities within the government that develop the technical and financial expertise to evaluate, negotiate and monitor P3 projects. It is encouraging to see that the paper specifically cites the the Office of Transportation Public-Private Partnerships in Virginia as one of only three examples of a genuine “public-private partnership unit” among the 50 states.

Virginians should take pride in the state’s recognition as a leader in implementing P3s, but the commonwealth’s enabling law still may need massaging. As I reported in “Promises and Pitfalls,” there is an inherent tension between inviting public input on the one hand and protecting the integrity of the very complex negotiations between the state and the private-sector concessionaire on the other. Citizens have a right to know how these mega-projects will affect them before deals are signed, and they should have some right of of appeal if the terms are onerous.  Yet openness and transparency must be tempered by the reality that it would be  impossible to ever complete a transaction if the public were involved at every turn and if key negotiating points were politicized.

A related problem is the project selection. The most fundamental question we need to ask ourselves is, “Should this project even be built in the first place?” It is of little comfort to know that a P3 can bring in a project cheaper and faster if we’re building the wrong road/bridge/rail project in the wrong location. In Virginia, the P3 projection circumvents the normal process for approving transportation projects. The Commonwealth Transportation Board is informed of major developments, but its consent is not required. The McDonnell administration is in the process of committing $1.5 billion in state funds to P3s and committing the state to 50- to 80-year concessions, all with toll-backed financing that will cost citizens billions of dollars more, and it does not appear to be accountable to anyone. No avenue exists for appealing unpopular projects.

I’m not singling out the McDonnell administration for blame here, by the way. The problems are inherent in the legislation, not the individuals in charge of carrying it out. And I’m not sure how we fix the problems. But they do need addressing.

The Promise and Pitfalls of P3s

Norfolk view of the MidTown Tunnel. Photo credit: Virginia Department of Transportation

The $2.1 billion Midtown-Downtown Tunnel project will alleviate some of the worst traffic congestion in Hampton Roads. But the deal raises questions about transparency and accountability in Virginia’s public-private partnership law.

By James A. Bacon

Last week state officials and their private-sector partners took the podium at the Governor’s Transportation Conference in downtown Norfolk to describe the $2.1 billion Midtown-Downtown Tunnel project that had received the final go-ahead only days before. Chris Guthkelch, Elizabeth River Crossings (ERC) project director, described the engineering feat of moving 1.5 million cubic feet of sediment and depositing eleven massive sections of tube-tunnel, barged down from Baltimore, onto the river floor so they aligned perfectly. Dennis Heuer, Hampton Roads district engineer for the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT), explained how upgrading the tunnels linking Norfolk and Portsmouth would reduce congestion, improve safety and boost regional productivity by between $174 million to $254 million annually.

But across the river in Portsmouth, details of the massive public-private partnership were not being received very well. Local officials expressed outrage at project financing that would impose tolls of $1.59 for cars during off-peak hours and considerably more for trucks and cars during peak hours. In future years, tolls will escalate at the annual rate of 3.5% or the Consumer Price Index, whichever is higher. Adding insult to injury, ERC will begin collecting tolls in 2012, five years before the project is even complete and the public experiences any benefit from it.

Addressing a crowd outside City Hall, Portsmouth Mayor Kenny Wright vowed to roll back the tolls. He called upon other cities in South Hampton Roads to join the effort. The state might have signed a comprehensive agreement, locking in the arrangement for 58 years, but Wright had only begun to fight. “This thing is far from over,” he said. “It is never too late, even with a signed contract, to negotiate how the tolls will be implemented.”

Public-private partnerships like the Midtown-Downtown Tunnel are incurring closer scrutiny now that the McDonnell administration has announced a series of new projects and promised a “pipeline” of other deals in 2012. As conventional sources of road-construction funds are eroded by inflation and mounting maintenance needs, McDonnell has turned to debt – his administration will borrow $4 billion for road construction – and P3s, as the public-private partnerships are known, to fill the gap. He is counting on the P3s to attract billions of dollars of toll-backed private investment to build projects the state never could afford otherwise.

In early December, the administration announced a series of major deals in quick succession. First, news broke of the $2.1 billion Midtown-Downtown Tunnel agreement. The next day, the governor announced an agreement in principle for a $940 million HOT lanes project on Interstate 95. The day after, word came that the state would invest $124 million to advance the Coalfields Expressway. Meanwhile, the newly formed Office of Transportation Public Private Partnerships (OTP3) is actively working on a deal to upgrade U.S. 460 between Petersburg and Suffolk to Interstate standards, a project that also will require significant state funding. The OTP3 is expected to release a list of other projects under consideration next month.

But even as the McDonnell administration charges ahead, making good on the governor’s campaign promise to “get Virginia moving,” critics are getting more vocal. While the critique of individual projects may differ, depending on details, several common themes are emerging:

  • The P3 enabling legislation provides for little accountability. Citizens can’t see critical details of a transaction until the deal is already done, and there is no effective appeal.
  • Concessions take the form of long-term agreements – 58 years in the case of the Midtown-Downtown Tunnel, 73 years for the I-95 HOT lanes – that effectively lock in transportation policy for decades to come.
  • Some contracts contain clauses that either protect private-sector partners from competing projects or compensate them for lost revenue from future public investments, including mass transit service.
  • P3 projects are suitable only for mega-projects that generate revenue from tolls or, possibly, special tax districts. By circumventing the usual process of review and approval by the Commonwealth Transportation Board for the expenditure of state money, projects jump to the head of the line and lay claim to scarce state dollars that could be more effectively spent elsewhere.

Transparency vs. Confidentiality

“I’m furious. The price of the tolls is too high and the governor signed this deal without consulting the mayors of the cities affected. We haven’t had a chance to weigh in and it’s not fair.”
— Portsmouth Mayor Kenny Wright

An inherent difficulty in crafting a public-private partnership law is the need to strike a balance between transparency and public involvement on the one hand and the confidentiality required to negotiate complex transactions on the other. McDonnell administration officials maintain that current law makes reasonable trade-offs.

“Our function is to deliver a completed project to the people of the commonwealth,” says Tony Kinn, the McDonnell administration’s point man on transportation public-private partnerships. “There are a lot of checks and balances.”

Those checks and balances can be seen in the process by which the Midtown-Downtown Tunnel reached final approval. VDOT solicited conceptual proposals in May 2008. When Elizabeth River Crossings submitted a proposal in September, VDOT promptly posted it for public inspection. An Independent Review Panel (IRP) held five meetings, including two public hearings, between February and June 2009 and recommended that the proposal be kicked back to VDOT for more work. During that evaluation phase, says Dwight L. Farmer, director of the Hampton Roads Metropolitan Planning Organization and member of the 12-person panel, the proposals were an “open book.”

In January 2010 VDOT and ERC executed an interim agreement to do more detailed work. Those deliberations were not open to the public. Still, as discussions progressed, VDOT released important details. In May 2010, then-acting VDOT Commissioner Gregory Whirley made a presentation to the Commonwealth Transportation Board that contained a project estimate of $1.9 billion. He also revealed that in the base case tolls would be $2.17 for cars with transponders in off-peak hours, but expressed the goal of buying down the tolls with subsidies to $1.50 per car in off-peak hours. Those numbers proved reasonably close to the figures contained in the final agreement executed a year-and-a-half later. However, many important elements, such as the length of the concession, the size of the state contribution and the toll price escalators had yet to be worked out.

In November 2010, VDOT also delivered a “Hampton Roads legislative briefing.” (Although there is a link on the VDOT website to the presentation, the document is not functioning at the moment. The link displays an error message.)

In January 2011, VDOT and ERC entered into “comprehensive agreement negotiations.” Those talks were highly confidential. A half-year later, in July 2011, however, discussions had progressed to the point where the new P3 czar, Tony Kinn, could describe “major business terms” to the Commonwealth Transportation Board. He provided information about toll rates, the toll escalation provision, the duration of the concession, the size of the state contribution and other key terms and conditions.

Throughout the process, VDOT posted studies, press releases, presentations and other documents on a Midtown-Downtown Tunnel website nested within the VDOT website. Content includes a project timeline,  procurement and environmental schedules, 14 different technical studies, seven press releases, links to Virginian-Pilot articles, a newsletter (with only one edition),  presentations made at four public meetings, minutes of the Independent Review Panel, a document library and answers to FAQs.

“The question is,” says Farmer, the MPO official, “when do you re-engage the public?” There is no easy answer. The process must respect the proprietary nature of the proposals that companies submit to VDOT, he says. Businesses can spend millions of dollars fleshing out their ideas. “You can’t reveal to your competitors what you’re thinking,” he says. Furthermore, negotiations can be protracted and contentious. It would be counter-productive to conduct delicate talks in the public arena.

Those are legitimate points, critics say. But the result is that public input effectively ceases after the Independent Review Panel. Although the CTB was informed of major developments as they played out, the statewide board has no authority to veto the project. Once McDonnell announced the comprehensive agreement, which runs 160 pages plus dozens of exhibits, the transaction was done. If someone has a problem with the contract, there is no appeal. Unless the state is willing to pay significant penalties, there is no opening the deal for renegotiation.

Experience has shown, says Trip Pollard, an attorney with the Southern Environmental Law Center, that the public-private partnership act “shifts power from the CTB and the legislature to VDOT.” The law, he contends, empowers the governor of Virginia to commit to long-term, multibillion-dollar contracts with minimal accountability or oversight. And that should worry people.

Tolls, Competition and Risk

A project like the Midtown-Downtown Tunnel will define Hampton Roads’ transportation future for the next six decades. No one disputes the desperate need for some kind of improvement. Roughly 38,000 vehicles per day pass through the narrow MidTown Tunnel and travelers routinely spend a half hour in bumper-to-bumper traffic during rush hour. Addressing the bottlenecks at the Midtown Tunnel, the Downtown Tunnel and Martin Luther King Boulevard, an inter-related set of projects, is critical, says Kinn. “The benefit of those projects is huge.” The state does not have the money. The public-private partnership gets the job done.

But does Elizabeth River Crossings offer the best long-term solution for the region?

That’s hard to say because the deal locks terms and conditions into place for 58 years. The project addresses real needs today, but no one knows what the state’s transportation needs will be 20 years from now, much less 40 or 60 years from now. No one knows what new technologies, economic trends or land use patterns might transform the transportation landscape. One could argue that a more flexible, more adaptable, arrangement would better serve the region in the future.

But not only will the deal lock in tolls for the next two or three generations, it will lock in escalating tolls. Hampton Roadsters will start out paying $1.59 for cars during off-peak hours. After years of escalating at a minimum rate of 3.5% annually, tolls will climb to $12 by 2075.

One can argue that the tolls aren’t so bad. VDOT estimates conservatively that the tolls will save drivers 15 minutes each way, a total of a half hour for a round trip. Assuming drivers value their time around $16 an hour on average (the figures used by the Texas Transportation Institute in its Urban Mobility Report) that represents a time savings valued at $8. Thus, $3.18 in tolls ($3.68 during rush hour) buys $8 in time savings. “As the economy improves,” says Kinn, “those terms will lessen.”

The contract also limits the state’s ability to make other improvements that might compete for, or siphon off, toll revenue. ERC can file for compensation if VDOT undertakes initiatives such as new bridges that divert traffic from the tunnels.

Kinn stresses that the contract does not contain a non-compete clause. The state can make any improvements it wants. However, he concedes, certain state actions could trigger “compensation events.” If after detailed study it can be shown that the state damaged ERC’s revenue stream, the concessionaire can submit to the state for compensation.

Another sticking point for regional Hampton Roads officials is the fact that the tolls won’t go just to pay for new construction but to address tens of millions of dollars in backlogged maintenance needs the state should have addressed years ago as well as maintenance going forward. In effect, Hampton Roads motorists will be paying for maintenance twice – once through the motor fuels tax, the revenue source that pays for maintenance across the state, and again through tolls.

That’s true, says Kinn, but VDOT is offsetting much of the double-taxation effect by contributing $362 million in state dollars to the project and buying down tolls.

Yet another objection is that the public has no way to judge whether VDOT drove a hard bargain. ERC will contribute $318 million in equity and borrow the rest. It is not known from public documents what profit margins ERC expects to earn. Is it the same rate as, say, a regulated electric utility? Or will ROI run higher on the grounds that the company is taking greater risks that traffic volumes and revenue might not materialize? There is no requirement in the Public Private Partnership Act for letting the public know.

Similar concerns apply to other public-private partnerships around the state.

In a draft white paper he has circulated, Pollard, the SELC attorney, raises other issues. P3s circumvent the environmental review process by advancing a project before alternatives have been evaluated, he says. Requirements for competitive bidding are inadequate, he adds: It’s too easy for the company proposing a project to establish a sole-source arrangement. Also, he says, projects can lead to more driving, sprawl and environmental damage. “Most PPTA projects built or proposed thus far,” he writes, “have been highway construction that will subsidize sprawl and increase motor vehicle dependence, destroying open space and increasing air and water pollution.”

Pollard argues that the Public Private Partnership Act needs to be amended. Projects should be limited to those already contained in state transportation plans, he says, not ideas dreamed up by a private-sector player looking for business. Among other changes he seeks: The public should be allowed to comment before a comprehensive agreement is signed, and the Commonwealth Transportation Board should be required to sign off.

“Experience with PPTA projects and proposals,” writes Pollard, “indicates that the statute is seriously flawed and raises significant doubts about how effectively it serves the public interest.”

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This article was made possible by a sponsorship of the Piedmont Environmental Council.

State Seals $2.1 Billion Midtown Tunnel Deal

Google map shows location of major improvements in the Midtown Tunnel deal. (Click on map for larger image.)

by James A. Bacon

The McDonnell administration has entered into a public-private partnership agreement with Elizabeth River Crossings to rehabilitate the Midtown and Downtown tunnels between Norfolk and Portsmouth and to extend the Martin Luther King Freeway. Construction on the $2.1 billion project is expected to begin next year.

Of all the mega-projects under development by the McDonnell administration, this arguably offers the most clear-cut economic return on investment. The commonwealth will contribute $362 million to attract $1.7 billion in private investment, which will be repaid by means of higher tolls ranging initially from $1.59 to $1.84 per car for the tunnels and up to $1 for the MLK freeway extension.

That’s a big hit to motorists who now use the facilities for free. But the two tunnels are two of the worst transportation bottlenecks in Hampton Roads. In a prepared statement released this morning, Virginia Highway Commissioner Gregory Whirley estimated that the average round-trip user will save 30 minutes a day when the project is created. The improvements also will increase evacuation capacity in the event of a hurricane.

The agreement has been under negotiation for five months between VDOT, the new Office of Transportation Public-Private Partnerships and ERC, a joint venture between Skanska Infrastructure Development and the Macquarie Group. ERC will finance, build, operate and maintain the facilities for a 58-year concession period, and will assume risk for delivering the project on a performance-based, fixed-price, fixed data contract that protects taxpayers and users from cost overruns and delays.

The agreement calls for a slightly smaller financial contribution from the state, $362 million, than the $395 million envisioned only a few months ago. VDOT attributed the difference to lower-than-projected interest rates, buttressing the McDonnell administration’s argument that it makes sense to borrow borrowing more money now in order to take advantage of lower construction costs and interest rates in the post-recessionary economic environment.

“The Midtown Tunnel project has been at the top of the region’s priorities for many years,” said Transportation Secretary Sean T. Connaughton. “The state’s use of a public-private partnership structure will enable VDOT to attract approximately $1.7 billion in private investment to a project that yields tangible long-term benefits to the region and the state.”

Key components of the project include:

  • Doubling the capacity of the Midtown Tunnel by adding a new two-lane tunnel under the Elizabeth River
  • Increasing transit service between Portsmouth and Norfolk
  • Rehabilitating the existing Midtown Tunnel and both Downtown tunnels
  • Extending the Martin Luther King Freeway from London Boulevard to I-264, with an interchange at High Street in Portsmouth
  • Modifying the interchange at Brambleton Avenue/Hampton Boulevard in Norfolk

ERC will provide financing through a $422 million TIFIA loan, and approximately $1.3 billion through equity, debt and revenue from operations. The state contribution will be used to buy down the cost of the tolls.

The press release made no note of how rapidly tolls are projected to rise or what oversight the state will exercise over future increases.