|
Dead
End
Virginia's
corporate recruitment strategy still delivers
results. That's the problem. By neglecting home-grown
entrepreneurial companies, Virginia is
falling short of its economic potential.
It's hard
to argue with success. The Old Dominion has one of the best
"economic development" track records of
any of the 50 states. Virginia consistently recruits
more than its share of out-of-state corporate investment,
and it consistently scores among the top states in
the United States to do business. Indeed, Forbes.com
has ranked the state as the very best place
two years running.
With
kudos like that, it would be easy to get complacent.
But the Virginia Economic Development Partnership,
the state's lead economic development organization, is
continually refining its strategy and honing its
competitive edge. For instance, VEDP
maintains one of the most sophisticated geographic
information systems of any economic development
organization in the country.
"Data-driven, analytically driven strategies
are where the action is," says VEDP Research Director Rob McClintock.
Besides
tracking industrial-era assets like Interstate
highways, railroad spurs, water lanes and industrial
properties, VEDP keeps tabs of broadband
connectivity, workforce skill sets and a host of
other details. The VEDP both makes the data
accessible over the Internet and displays it on a giant
interactive screen at its Richmond headquarters to
wow prospects. "We have over 300 layers of
data," McClintock
says. "We're always adding new ones,"
Virginia
is at the top of the corporate recruitment game, an
economic development model I refer to as "Economy
2.0." A strong program to attract outside
investment remains an essential piece of any state's or
region's efforts to build a stronger economy. But there are limits to what economic
developers can accomplish in their traditional roles
as facilitators of corporate real estate deals. As
economic growth becomes increasingly driven by human
capital and knowledge creation, corporate
recruitment alone is no longer sufficient to propel
Virginia communities any higher in the ranks of the most
prosperous and livable places in the United States.
Virginia's
metro areas and smaller communities are evolving in fits
and starts toward a more advanced economic model --
stimulating the creation of new businesses built around
intellectual property -- a paradigm that I call
"Economy 3.0." But progress is uneven at best.
And there are danger signs on the radar screen: Rising
housing costs, soaring energy prices and increasing
traffic congestion are undermining the ability of
Virginia communities, especially in fast-growth regions,
to maintain a high quality of life. That makes it
increasingly difficult to lure the high-impact
scientists, artists and entrepreneurs who contribute
disproportionately to wealth creation. There are few
signs that any region in Virginia is moving
toward an "Economy 4.0" paradigm that
confronts those critical challenges.
As
I noted in the first edition of the series, "Peak
Performance in a Flat World," Virginia's
"Economy 2.0" corporate recruitment
strategy delivered great results in the 1970s
and early 1980s, then lost steam. The chart I
published in that article is so important that I
reproduce it here:
Compared
to the nation as a whole, Virginia tread water through the late 1980s and
the 1990s,
creating jobs and expanding the tax base, but making
no progress in boosting relative incomes as it had done
for so many years before.
In
the current decade, Virginia appears to have broken
out of the doldrums. Income growth has made strong
gains compared to national averages. A critical
question, however, is whether Virginia's gains are
attributable mainly to the national response to 9/11
-- dumping a monsoon of federal funds onto Northern
Virginia's and Hampton Roads' defense/homeland
security sector -- or to a deeper improvement in
economic competitiveness.
As
the table below clearly shows, the greatest income
gains were concentrated in Hampton Roads and,
secondarily, the Washington metro area, which
includes Northern Virginia. Much of that
improvement, we can infer, resulted from federal
largesse.
The
Post-9/11 Surge
|
(Per
capita income in Virginia MSAs
compared
to national average)
|
|
2001 |
2005 |
Gain |
Hampton
Roads |
91 |
96 |
+5 |
Blacksburg-Christiansburg-Radford |
68 |
72 |
+4 |
Washington
Metro |
138 |
141 |
+3 |
Danville |
72 |
75 |
+3 |
Virginia |
106 |
109 |
+3 |
Richmond |
104 |
106 |
+2 |
Roanoke |
93 |
95 |
+2 |
Non-metro
areas |
73 |
74 |
+1 |
Charlottesville |
102 |
103 |
+1 |
Harrisonburg |
76 |
77 |
+1 |
Kingsport-Bristol |
78 |
79 |
+1 |
Lynchburg |
83 |
84 |
+1 |
Winchester |
87 |
87 |
+0 |
Explanation:
The national average is 100. Virginia's score of
106 in 2001 indicates that per capita incomes
statewide were 106 percent of the national
average, or six percent higher. Virginia's gain of
"+3" means the state gained three
percentage points over the four-year period.
Source:
Bureau
of Economic Analysis |
But
Danville and Blacksburg/Christiansburg showed comparable improvement during the same period,
reflecting the long-term, bipartisan commitment of
Virginia's political leadership to turn around the
fortunes of Virginia's ailing mill-town economies.
Indeed, nearly every Virginia MSA showed at least modest
improvement compared to national averages. Economic
progress, then, has not been confined to just one or two
corners of the state.
Whether
Virginia can sustain the remarkable gains of the past
seven years, however, is questionable. Not only are
Northern Virginia and Hampton Roads municipalities choking on
growth, the political tide that made possible the
post-9/11 surge is receding. While
Republicans in Congress and the White House were happy to concentrate federal IT spending in the
Washington region, Democrats may well take a
different approach.
"The
state needs to prepare for the exodus of
[government] services contracts when the Democrats
take power," cautions Pete Jobse, CEO of the
Center for Innovative Technology. "The
Democrats tend to look at government expenditures
and funding and look for ways to spread it around
the country. If the Department of Education needs a
consolidated data center, it doesn't necessarily
have to be here [in Virginia]. Someone in
Congress may say, 'I want this in New Orleans or
West Virginia.'"
When
I started researching this segment of "Economy
4.0," I started with the supposition that the
old corporate- recruitment strategy had largely run
its course. I anticipated that two trends -- the
hyper-productivity of the manufacturing sector and
the out-sourcing of entire industries to China,
India and other fast-developing countries -- had cut
deeply into the number of economic development
projects that Virginia could successfully compete
for. Happily, I found out that I was wrong. (I may
have to go back and revise some of my statements I
wrote earlier in this series!) There still may be
some life left in the old economic recruitment
model.
The
chart below shows the continued success of Virginia's
corporate recruitment efforts through the mid-2000s. The
level of capital investment for projects notable enough
to warrant VEDP press releases in 2004 and 2005 even
kept pace with the go-go years of the Internet bubble. (A
different, more all-encompassing database
shows substantially the same trend.)
Still
Alive and Kicking
(Jobs
and investment announced by
the
Virginia Economic Development Partnership) |
Year
|
Investment
|
Jobs
|
Incentives
|
2007*
|
$1,099,426,667
|
3,613
|
$38,366,667
|
2006
|
874,860,000
|
5,849
|
47,062,500
|
2005
|
2,653,850,000
|
12,964
|
41,827,000
|
2004
|
2,508,375,000
|
16,544
|
29,395,000
|
2003
|
1,613,460,000
|
10,522
|
17,007,500
|
2002
|
947,600,000
|
7,491
|
16,015,000
|
2001
|
1,441,010,000
|
5,417
|
30,269,000
|
2000
|
2,349,350,000
|
21,627
|
22,861,000
|
1999
|
2,427,080,000
|
24,544
|
14,107,000
|
1998
|
923,200,000
|
19,690
|
9,750,000
|
1997 |
1,130,650,000
|
10,590
|
7,380,000
|
*
2007 figures are annualized from nine months
of data.
Source:
Virginia Economic Development Partnership press
releases. This is a compilation of the most
significant economic development deals in
Virginia, nearly all of which the VEDP was
involved in. To see a complete list of the
announced deals, along with key data, click
here. |
The
past two years may pose a cause for concern, however:
Corporate investment has declined to the level of the
2001 recession even while the economy, though battered
by the housing crunch, is still growing. Whether this
represents a temporary dip or a more fundamental shift
in capital investment flows into the state is a matter
that bears watching.
Another
trend visible in the VEDP data is worth noting: While
corporate investment has held up, job
creation has declined sharply this decade. Traditional
economic development strategies aren't delivering the
job growth they once did.
"It's
the classic substitution of capital for labor,"
comments McClintock. By investing more capital, corporations
need less labor. While fewer jobs are created, the new
jobs pay better. Says McClintock: "There are fewer
jobs, but they require more brainpower."
In
a state with one of the lowest unemployment rates in the
country, that trend actually is positive. With major
metropolitan areas experiencing labor shortages, there
are only small geographic pockets where the workforce is
underutilized. As I argued in the second edition of this
series, "A
Bug in the Ointment," creating jobs for the
sake of jobs is senseless, especially in places where they can be
filled only by importing outside workers and
straining roads and services already buckling under the
weight of growth.
Fewer
new jobs, higher incomes -- that is absolutely a step in
the right direction.
As
encouraging as the VEDP numbers are, they leave a lot of
money on the table. Investment by large, established
corporations represents only a fraction of the total
capital spending in the economy. Over the 10 years
tracked in the chart below, traditional economic
development deals accounted for only 10 percent of the
total capital investment in Virginia's economy.
Virginia
Business Investment:
The
Big Picture
(in
billions of dollars) |
Year |
Est.
Total Investment |
E.D. Investment |
%
E.D. Investment |
2006 |
$38.40 |
$2.24 |
5.8% |
2005 |
35.03 |
3.67 |
10.5% |
2004 |
31.34 |
3.44 |
11.0% |
2003 |
29.95 |
3.94 |
13.2% |
2002 |
28.94 |
1.98 |
6.8% |
2001 |
31.81 |
2.93 |
9.2% |
2000 |
32.40 |
4.38 |
13.5% |
1999 |
29.61 |
3.11 |
10.5% |
1998 |
27.17 |
2.09 |
7.7% |
1997 |
24.70 |
2.39 |
9.7% |
Definitions:
"Total
Investment"
Virginia Business Investment is an estimate of
all non-residential investment, including
structures, equipment and software, in the
state of Virginia. For details on how I
derived this estimate, click here.
E.D.
Investment indicates the anticipated
investment in all economic development deals
(corporate expansions and relocations) announced
that year.
%
E.D. Investment is an estimate of the
percentage of total business investment in
Virginia that can be attributed to economic
development deals (corporate expansions and
relocations). |
Admittedly,
the 10 percent figure understates the impact of the
economic development deals. First of all -- I think
I am correct in stating this -- the "total
investment" number covers a lot of replacement
spending for depreciated buildings, equipment and
software. Secondly, economic development deals
generate a significant multiplier effect in the
retail and service economies, creating a cascade of
follow-up investment in the region.
Still,
there is a whole world of economic activity -- the
start-up and growth of new businesses -- that the
VEDP figures fail to capture. The Census Bureau
publishes a census that tracks the churning,
flailing netherworld of business start-ups. A
healthy economy creates far more new businesses than
it loses each year. A truly dynamic economy provides
the means for a fraction of those new businesses to
mature into the fast-growth, wealth-creating
companies that MIT economist David Burch refers to
as "gazelles."
Judging
by a one-year snapshot of 2003-2004, Virginia excels at
new business creation. The ability to generate new
enterprises is not limited just to Northern Virginia, it
applies across the board. In the chart below, I rank the
50 states by the rate at which they created new
businesses, splicing in comparable numbers for
Virginia's Metropolitan Statistical Areas (highlighted
in pale yellow).
Business
Dynamism |
(business
births and deaths, 2003-2004) |
|
Births |
Deaths |
Change |
%
Change |
Florida |
65,983 |
48,429 |
17,554 |
4.4 |
Nevada |
7,852 |
5,971 |
1,881 |
4.1 |
Charlottesville |
558 |
382 |
176 |
3.7 |
Utah |
7,912 |
6,086 |
1,826 |
3.6 |
Idaho |
4,640 |
3,581 |
1,059 |
3.1 |
Richmond |
3,263 |
2,470 |
793 |
3.0 |
Staunton |
263 |
191 |
72 |
2.9 |
Virginia |
19,669 |
15,138 |
4,531 |
2.8 |
Hampton
Roads |
3,821 |
2,910 |
911 |
2.8 |
Washington
Metro |
14,173 |
11,460 |
2,713 |
2.8 |
Montana |
3,648 |
2,860 |
788 |
2.7 |
Arizona |
14,740 |
12,009 |
2,731 |
2.6 |
Delaware |
2,682 |
2,160 |
522 |
2.4 |
Georgia |
24,198 |
19,826 |
4,372 |
2.4 |
Rhode
Island |
2,864 |
2,234 |
630 |
2.4 |
Harrisonburg |
254 |
194 |
60 |
2.3 |
Lynchburg |
581 |
459 |
122 |
2.3 |
Missouri |
16,421 |
13,503 |
2,918 |
2.2 |
Washington |
18,315 |
15,470 |
2,845 |
1.9 |
Wyoming |
1,913 |
1,593 |
320 |
1.9 |
Maryland |
13,302 |
11,154 |
2,148 |
1.8 |
Alaska |
1,963 |
1,686 |
277 |
1.7 |
Colorado |
16,771 |
14,690 |
2,081 |
1.7 |
Hawaii |
2,926 |
2,440 |
486 |
1.7 |
Oregon |
10,774 |
9,190 |
1,584 |
1.7 |
Minnesota |
13,967 |
11,915 |
2,052 |
1.6 |
North
Carolina |
21,261 |
18,288 |
2,973 |
1.6 |
South
Carolina |
10,111 |
8,656 |
1,455 |
1.6 |
South
Dakota |
2,202 |
1,862 |
340 |
1.6 |
New
Hampshire |
3,685 |
3,161 |
524 |
1.5 |
North
Dakota |
1,660 |
1,390 |
270 |
1.5 |
United
States |
748,656 |
658,238 |
90,418 |
1.4 |
New
Mexico |
4,493 |
3,974 |
519 |
1.3 |
Texas |
52,915 |
47,394 |
5,521 |
1.3 |
Roanoke |
769 |
668 |
101 |
1.3 |
New
York |
52,129 |
46,631 |
5,498 |
1.2 |
Oklahoma |
8,334 |
7,421 |
913 |
1.2 |
Tennessee |
12,730 |
11,260 |
1,470 |
1.2 |
Arkansas |
6,305 |
5,665 |
640 |
1.1 |
Danville |
189 |
167 |
22 |
1.0 |
California |
91,201 |
83,731 |
7,470 |
1.0 |
Connecticut |
8,024 |
7,215 |
809 |
1.0 |
Indiana |
13,321 |
11,988 |
1,333 |
1.0 |
Maine |
3,651 |
3,289 |
362 |
1.0 |
Vermont |
1,845 |
1,643 |
202 |
1.0 |
Wisconsin |
11,744 |
10,521 |
1,223 |
1.0 |
Illinois |
28,907 |
26,492 |
2,415 |
0.9 |
West
Virginia |
3,558 |
3,236 |
322 |
0.9 |
Alabama |
9,564 |
8,803 |
761 |
0.8 |
Kansas |
6,854 |
6,307 |
547 |
0.8 |
Louisiana |
9,340 |
8,556 |
784 |
0.8 |
Mississippi |
5,668 |
5,202 |
466 |
0.8 |
Kentucky |
8,232 |
7,645 |
587 |
0.7 |
Pennsylvania |
25,364 |
23,431 |
1,933 |
0.7 |
Nebraska |
4,235 |
3,978 |
257 |
0.6 |
New
Jersey |
24,099 |
23,111 |
988 |
0.5 |
Iowa |
6,495 |
6,217 |
278 |
0.4 |
Blacksburg |
255 |
246 |
9 |
0.3 |
Ohio |
22,254 |
21,847 |
407 |
0.2 |
Michigan |
20,758 |
20,836 |
-78 |
0.0 |
D.C. |
1,665 |
1,734 |
-69 |
-0.4 |
Massachusetts |
15,512 |
16,819 |
-1,307 |
-0.8 |
Source:
Bureau
of the Census. |
It's
important not to generalize on the basis of one year's
figures. Still, the table demonstrates that a lot of
activity is occurring at a level where economic
developers cannot perceive or influence it.
What
we don't know about these businesses is this: What is
the number designing lasers or cancer-fighting drugs vs.
the number repairing dented auto bodies or hauling
freight? In tech-savvy Northern Virginia, what is the
number creating wealth-generating intellectual property
vs. the number deploying technology developed elsewhere?
Where
Virginia appears to fall far short of the leading
technology states is in identifying promising companies
with wealth-creating potential and supplying them with the funding, managerial talent
and business connections to transform them into
gazelles. Among the nation's leading technology centers,
the "D.C. metroplex" is a venture capital
laggard -- but at least it registers on the national
radar screen. MoneyTree doesn't even bother to break out
early stage financing in downstate Virginia; it just
lumps the Rest of Virginia with the D.C. metroplex,
which includes Washington, D.C., and Maryland. Here are
the venture financing numbers for the 2Q of 2007 as
compiled by Pricewaterhousecoopers
MoneyTree:
The
D.C. area lags Silicon Valley, Boston, San Diego, Los
Angeles and New York metro areas by wide margins. Adding
insult to the Old Dominion's injury, businesses north of
the Potomac snagged the lion's share of the Metroplex
dollars: Virginia enterprises raised only $127
million of the region's $272 million in venture capital
in the second quarter of 2007.
To
the best of my knowledge, no one systematically collects
data illuminating the entrepreneurial, knowledge- based
characteristics of Virginia's economy -- no one in
Virginia, that is. As is happens, the Massachusetts
Technology Collaborative does collect the
data(1). That's because the business
and academic community in the Bay State is serous about preserving its competitive leadership in
technology innovation.
The
MTC includes Virginia in its list of 10 peer LTSs
(leading technology states) along with Massachusetts,
California, New York, Minnesota, Illinois, Pennsylvania,
New Jersey, North Carolina and Connecticut. In its 10th
Index of the Massachusetts Economy, MTC tracks the
performance of six technology-intensive industry
clusters, patents issued, sponsored university research,
R&D as a percentage of gross state product, business
formation, venture capital investment, SBIR awards, and
the size and skills of state workforces.
The
MTC study reveals some remarkable factoids about
Virginia's economic competitiveness in the knowledge
economy that most Virginians don't know. For instance:
As the old saying says,
"Know thyself." Apparently, Virginia is
wandering around clueless. Policy makers don't track the
metrics of the state's entrepreneurial, knowledge-based
economy. If they don't have a clear idea of what's
happening, how can they formulate a coherent Economy 3.0
strategy, much less a 4.0 strategy?
It's
not as if Virginia's economic developers aren't
paying attention. They are acutely aware that Virginia cannot
take its prosperity for granted, and they know full well
that the rules of economic development are changing.
Conversant with the latest theories, they can rap
about industry cluster analysis and reel off their
latest "creative class" initiatives.
In
my home town of Richmond, for instance, the Greater
Richmond Partnership has supported the Creative
Change Center, a networking and support center for
Richmond's creative class, and underwritten
publication of "WORK" magazine, which
highlights business and artistic creativity in the
region. Similarly, the Fairfax County Economic
Development Authority has expanded its mandate from
recruiting corporations to helping corporations
recruit employees. A survey released last month
highlighted a "creativity gap" between the
kind of work employees are looking for and the kind
of work that employers are willing to provide.
Meanwhile,
the VEDP is reaching out and collaborating with a
variety of non-traditional players like
universities, especially those with research
strengths that complement one of the four
industry clusters -- advanced manufacturing,
services and security, transportation &
logistics, and science & research -- that the
state is targeting.
But
economic developers can't create the Economy 3.0
economic development model, much less the Economy
4.0 paradigm by themselves. As a
profession, economic developers are trained to close corporate real
estate deals, not nurture new business enterprises.
As organizations, economic development groups are structured to
recruit new business, not recruit members of the creative class
or help build world-class research institutions. With
economic development funding not a state or regional
priority,
neither the VEDP nor Virginia's regional groups have
the resources to branch out very far beyond their core
mission.
What
Virginia needs, and has been unable to create(2), are
over-arching regional institutions that coordinate and prioritize
activities that take place in separate spheres:
-
Building
institutions of knowledge creation, including
schools, colleges, universities and research
institutes.
-
Designing
more livable communities -- more affordable housing,
more attractive transportation options, lower energy
costs, a cleaner environment -- that are attractive
to the high-impact scientists, artists and
entrepreneurial innovators who contribute
disproportionately to economic growth.
-
Investing
in "hard" infrastructure spending (roads,
water, sewer, broadband) and "soft"
infrastructure spending (incubators, networking
organizations, environmental projects, museums and
cultural facilities).
"The
VEDP is all about attracting new entities,
generating large-scale job announcements," says
CIT's Jobse. That's an indispensable function, he
adds, but it's not sufficient to vault Virginia to
economic leadership. Corporate recruitment, he adds,
"is
a game that every state plays. You have to play that
game. But for me, the issue isn't whom do we attract
from Maryland to Virginia? The question is, how do I
grow something organically?"
Home-grown
businesses create more wealth locally, Jobse argues.
Further, home-grown businesses are rooted in the
community, embedded in relationships of trust with
investors, partners and service providers that make
them less likely to skip off to another state -- or
to another country. "If you grow a company
locally, and it's successful, you have a guarantee
it will stay here at least seven to 15
years."
For
the most part, Virginia's political and civic
leaders treat "economic development" as
what it has always been: the pursuit of corporate
expansions. Although there is more dialogue than in
the past between economic developers, educators,
researchers, community planners and angel/venture
financiers, the key players
in the Economy 4.0 paradigm remain stuck in their
silos. Casual conversations at cocktail receptions
have yet to translate into much formal
collaboration.
Economic
developers see the need for change, but they can't do the heavy lifting by themselves. If Virginia is
to move to the next level of productivity,
innovation and wealth creation, change must come
from the broader community.
--
October 1, 2007
End
Notes
(1).
The stated purpose of the MTC is to catalyze the
growth of "knowledge- and technology-based
industries that comprise the state's Innovation
Economy and in promoting the development and use of
renewable energy technologies. It is also working
with major healthcare organizations to implement
e-health solutions that save lives and reduce
costs."
(2).
The Hampton Roads Partnership comes the closest. It
defines itself as "a
public-private nonprofit committed to pursuing
regional competitiveness for Hampton Roads in a
dynamic global economy." Its priorities
include:
A
– Standard of living.
B – Ability to create, attract and retain jobs.
C – Overall quality of jobs.
D – Ability to attract and retain people.
Read
the Partnership's 2004
strategic plan.
While
the plan does a superb job of articulating
integrated, "Economy 4.0" priorities, as a practical
matter, the big-dollar transportation initiatives
backed by the organization benefit primarily the
tourism and port/maritime industries, not the
knowledge-creating industries of the future.
|