The second most important thing to understand about the great victory at the Vienna / Fairfax / GMU METRO station is that it is just 22 years late. The most important thing is that there is still time to make amends, but it will just cost a lot more.
In the early 1970s, the 1960s decision to end the Orange Line at what became known as Vienna / Fairfax GMU was reconfirmed. This decision and the reconfirmation was based on the fact that there were nearly 800 acres of vacant and underutilized land here and the alternative in Tysons Corner was “all built out.”
Since then Tysons Corner has intensified by a factor of 4 and adding METRO or some other shared-vehicle system to make it functional will cost billions.
In the 70s and early 80s the Fairfax “comprehensive plan” provided incentives for land assembly to create transit oriented development (long before the term TOD was coined) so that the capacity on the Orange line could be used in both directions in peak periods.
Public action reduced the available vacant land to 100 +/- acres by the time the Orange Line got under construction beyond Ballston. Subdivision Recycling projects for the METRO West site and others surfaced as the opening of the station neared. To thwart the Virginia Center plan on still vacant land, the countyโs “comprehensive plan” was amended to strip out the incentives for parcel consolidation. Project after project with METRO supporting patterns and densities of land-use were turned down by the County.
The main players on the public side for this activity were former county supervisor and now Virginia Delegate Jim Scott and former county supervisor, county board chairperson and recently appointed Secretary of the Commonwealth Kate Hanley.
But for their efforts there would already be the sort of development that the market documents is in the most demand. The Orange line would be carrying more people in the off peak direction, it would be taking in more revenue and would come closer to being part of a functional shared-vehicle system.
Hundreds of acres now must be recycled at great cost and disruption to evolve a real METRO oriented urban enclave.
There is a silver lining: 45 +/- acres of land in public ownership lies at the heart of this area and is being wasted in road rights-of-way, surface parking and deck parking with no urban uses on the top. To make matters worse there is no provision to add them without tearing down the garages.
This 45 acres could be decked over and at modest density, replace the employment uses at AOl and World Com and Wal*Mart-in-the-Weeds in Loudoun County and with the adjacent 400 +/- acres within one half mile of the METRO platform, create a village-scale station-area urban agglomeration with a relative balanced of jobs / housing / services / recreation / amenity.
It would have cost so much less to do it right the first time. We would have saved thousands of acres of Countryside and provided the sort of places the market demonstrates that people want to live, work and play.
Will METRO West perform as advertised? We will all have to wait and see. The current project has one hand tied behind its back by the pattern of land use on the rest of the 800 acres that were part of the original reason to put the METRO station in this location.
Any analysis of the project will be hamstrung by the failure to create a comprehensive plan for the station area and to develop an intelligent vocabulary to describe the organic components of the station-area settlement pattern. See “Words Matter” and our Dec 2005 / Jan 2006 three part series on Vocabulary at db4.dev.baconsrebellion.com
There are three overarching lessons from this experience to date:
The loss from the scrapping of an intelligent plan to capitalize on the METRO potential at Vienna / Fairfax / GMU that evolved from the late 60s to the early 80s can never be fully recovered.
The lost of opportunity due to the refusal of the public agencies (especially between 25 and 20 years ago) to allow the market to reflect the potential of METRO access effects not just Fairfax County but the entire Virginia portion of the National Capital Subregion.
The loss of potential public revenue due to the failure to create public-private partnerships to assure public benefit from the public expenditure on the METRO would pay for much of the needed public infrastructure and services needed to support an urban enclave.
The record shows there were many of us who spoke out on these public agency failures at the time.
EMR


