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OVERVIEW
The future of civilization as we know it depends upon evolving a fundamentally different human settlement pattern. A first step is to create a broad citizen understanding of the importance of human settlement patterns (aka pattern and density of land use). A critical part of that effort is coming to grips with the relationship between human settlement patterns and transport systems, especially shared-vehicle (aka transit) systems.
In this context, the following report examines METRO, its future and the future of transport and mobility the National Capital Subregion. This document is an expanded version of a "discussion draft" circulated in December 1998 under the same title. The current version reflects input from a range of perspectives represented by those who reviewed the prior "discussion draft." This report is based on principles articulated in the forthcoming book
The Shape of the Future: Citizens Handbook for Understanding and Prospering in New Urban Regions and reflects research sponsored by clients concerned with mobility, access and quality of life in the Washington-Baltimore New Urban Region.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Mobility is a critical regional issue impacting economic prosperity, social stability and environmental sustainability. That mobility is at or near the top of citizens' list of concerns was reflected in the signs, promises and positions of politicians during the 1998 Fall elections and since that time. Now that the election results have been tabulated, it is time to examine the reality of the Region's mobility needs and the potential strategies that can be employed to avoid the transport gridlock which is projected.
The future viability of the National Capital Subregion depends upon building on the transport system that exists and making it much better. Of all the transport options now in operation, only METRO rail offers the possibility of making a significant contribution to the improvement of future regional mobility and access. This is because it has the power to positively change the human settlement pattern throughout the Region. The recent discussion of "induced traffic" in the I-270 Corridor and recent data from the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments tells a simple story. Building new or widened expressways and beltways will not improve the Subregion's mobility or its citizens access to the goods, services and places necessary to create a quality life.
This report documents the importance of METRO in solving the National Capital Region's transport crisis. It summarizes the issues that citizens must understand and address if there is to be a comprehensive strategy to improve regional mobility and access.
NOTE: Throughout this report "METRO" is used to describe the 100+ mile "heavy rail" transit system operated by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA). WMATA also operates a bus system and other services. The terms "shared-vehicle system," "transit system," and "mass transit system" are used interchangeably to describe public mobility systems including guideways, vehicles and operating facilities.
I. METRO IS THE LYNCHPIN OF SUBREGIONAL MOBILITY
Part I takes a fresh look at METRO, the "heavy rail" shared-vehicle (aka transit) system created to serve the National Capital Subregion. The importance, strengths and weaknesses of the system are articulated.
II. USING THE CURRENT ARRAY OF SUGGESTED METRO ENHANCEMENTS AS A WAY TO VISUALIZE FUTURE MOBILITY OPTIONS
Part II surveys some of the proposals to expand, extend and modify METRO and offers insight into how some of these proposals could be improved by applying an understanding of functional human settlement patterns.
III. EXCESS CAPACITY AND WASTEFUL SUBSIDY
Part III articulates the core reason why most of the proposals for METRO enhancement will not be realized. No matter how attractive or politically popular, many of the proposals cannot be achieved over the next half century, unless there are fundamental changes in the Region's projected population, economic activity and/or system subsidy.
IV. THE EXAMINATION OF NEW SHARED-VEHICLE SYSTEMS TO SERVE THE SUBREGION
Part IV briefly surveys the characteristics of new shared-vehicle innovations that may be applied to overcome the mismatch between the existing mobility systems, the existing human settlement patterns and the future need to create a prosperous, stable and sustainable region.
V. RETHINKING MORE THAN JUST METRO AND OTHER SHARED-VEHICLE SYSTEMS
Part V raises issues related to mobility and access beyond METRO and shared-vehicle systems. These topics need to be addressed in the context of a comprehensive review of METRO.
I. METRO IS THE LYNCH PIN IN SUBREGIONAL MOBILITY
METRO rail is the only existing transport resource with unused capacity of a sufficient scale to positively impact regional mobility in the short term. In the long run, METRO and other shared-vehicle systems (aka transit) are the only feasible way to provide effective and efficient mobility and access in a large, prosperous New Urban Region.
Rethinking METRO is critical because:
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METRO has the potential of making a significant contribution to regional mobility.
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There is a clear need to better utilize the $10-billion capital investment in the existing METRO system.
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There must be better service to justify the current $300-million a year WMATA subsidy.
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There needs to a rational basis to support the multi-billion dollar additional capital reinvestment that will be needed to keep the METRO tracks, trains, computers, escalators and other components of the system working.
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There are currently a plethora of politically driven proposals to expand and reconfigure METRO that have the potential to result in escalating subsidies and decreasing functionality for METRO well into the 22nd century.
All these current, critical issues make rethinking METRO the lynch pin of the subregion's transport future. In fact, a more efficient use of METRO and other shared-vehicle systems is the only effective weapon to use in attacking the region-wide transport gridlock predicted by the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments [MWCOG] and others.
Perhaps most important, many of the basic assumptions upon which the METRO system was designed especially those related to human settlement pattern were shortsighted, wrong or are now obsolete. These basic parameters need to be recycled along with aging track, cars, computers, escalators and other infrastructure.
Reevaluating all of the mobility options other shared-vehicle systems, air travel, roadways and highways must be part of the comprehensive review of the entire METRO system and its role in the National Capital Subregion. A well-functioning METRO can better feed commuter and high-speed interregional rail systems and help relieve the overburdened highway/expressway system. Improved ground transportation can cut the demand for short-haul air travel and thus reduce noise and pollution from aircraft.
Some Key Facts About METRO
Comprehensive rethinking of transport starts with understanding critical issues pertaining to the existing METRO rail system:
1. METRO is now woefully underutilized.
This is documented by the fact that most of the trains leave most of the stations most of the time essentially empty. While some trains are crowded at some times of the day, this overall assessment of capacity utilization is empirically correct.
2. METRO's underutilization is primarily caused by a mal-distribution of land uses in the station areas. There is an imbalance between demand for METRO use and capacity of the METRO trains. The root cause of that imbalance is the distribution and concentration of land uses (aka trip demand) in the METRO rail station areas.
The mid-60s commitment to land-use patterns and densities that would have supported the federal investment in METRO has been abandoned by state, municipal and federal district governance agencies. Human settlement patterns have agglomerated in the Subregion as if METRO was a pork-barrel happenstance, not a regional mobility strategy.
3. Vacant and underutilized land around METRO stations (aka METRO station areas) have the capacity to meet all the foreseeable future demand for new employment land uses in the Region.
The MWCOG Joint Cooperative Forecast 6a suggests that between the year 2000 and 2020 there will be 824,900 new jobs in the National Capital Region. That sounds like a lot, and it does portend significant economic expansion.
It may not be feasible or even desirable for all this new development to be located in close proximity to METRO stations. However, it is important to understand that at Rosslyn-Ballston Corridor densities, the projected new workers could be accommodated by one 10-acre site located at each of the 75 existing stations now served by the $10-billion METRO system. There are 220 acres of land within one-third mile of each METRO station. Less than five percent of this land could meet the total theoretical land demand for all new employment uses. Seen from a regional perspective, the Region's employment projections are very manageable using the potential capacity of the existing METRO system with no expansion of the urban area.
4. In addition to providing the land needed for new employment, METRO station areas have the land capacity to accommodate the future residential and service development potential in the Subregion. Looking beyond jobs and considering the full walking radius of transit stations (one-half mile or 500+ acres), the growth absorption capacity of METRO station areas is impressive. There are over 100 stations on the currently-approved METRO system. There is enough vacant and severely underutilized land within one-half mile of these stations, if developed at Rosslyn/Ballston Corridor densities, to serve all the future employment, residential and service needs projected by MWCOG to the year 2020. In round figures, that projection is 900,000+/- jobs and 550,000+/- households between now and the year 2020.
As with the employment/tax-base land uses under 3. above, it may not be feasible or desirable to place all new development in the station areas. The point is that it is theoretically possible with no expansion of the urban area and no extension of METRO lines. In Part III., there is a discussion of the market for METRO-related development. How the potential for METRO-supporting development is optimized must be the subject of detailed analysis.
5. METRO-related density does not need to be "high" density as in "Manhattan is high density." METRO-supporting density does not require that everyone who rides METRO must live and/or work in skyscrapers. When many hear "transit-supporting density," they think skyscrapers. Rosslyn-Ballston density as planned by Arlington County is close to optimum for a transit system of METRO's capacity. The Rosslyn-Ballston Corridor is not Manhattan .
In fact, METRO-supporting density is made up of just the sorts of buildings and uses that are now being built all across the Region. The Region need not build different buildings, but instead must intelligently locate the ones already being build. Transport dysfunction results from many causes but inappropriate locational choice is a primary one.
New urban land uses are now being scattered in non-viable locations across the Subregion. Development projects located outside METRO station areas do not support METRO ridership since they do not place trip demand near METRO system capacity. Scattered land uses in outlying areas also do not support the creation of viable communities since the origins and destinations of these trips make it difficult for citizens to assemble a quality life.
6. METRO stations and METRO riders are walled off from the places transit riders want to go. A quick look at an air photo of METRO stations confirms that most station areas are surrounded and constrained by acres of asphalt in surface parking lots and surface highways. The Region has spent $10 billion in capital costs and spends $300 million in subsidy every year to provide citizens with prime access to parking lots and highway rights-of-way at many stations.
This station isolation exacerbates the fact that the station architects failed to give high enough priority to putting the METRO car door as close to where riders want to be as possible. Poor station and station-area designs create barriers between the METRO car door and the places riders originate from and where they want to go. Citizens want access to jobs, housing, stores, day care, cafes, parks and play fields not to parking lots or across lane after lane of roads filled with cars and trucks going to places unrelated to the METRO system or its riders.
Running METRO down the I-66 median and building stations between uncovered traffic lanes and adjacent to surface parking lots and transit-only parking garages is a classic example of misuse of the METRO investment and capacity.
From the empirical facts outlined in these six points, it can be easily deduced that the problems related to METRO are not solved by more or longer METRO lines, but by better land use at the existing and planned/committed stations.
The talk of expansion and reconfiguration of METRO must be considered in light of the fact that the Subregion is projected to grow at about one percent a year. Even at much higher rates of growth, there would not be enough market for METRO-related development to fully utilize the existing and committed system, much less extensions and expansions. This topic is further explored in Part III.
Limitations of METRO Expansion and Capacity
There is a second set of realities having to do with METRO capacity and configuration that exacerbates the solution to the Region's mobility needs. These conditions make the better utilization of METRO more complex. They also require fundamental rethinking of all the mobility parameters for the Region as a whole.
1. Some parts of the METRO system are overused. Overcrowding of some segments of both the Orange and the Red Lines discourage not only daily use but also long-term decisions to locate jobs, housing, services and recreation venues near METRO stations.
The Orange Line serving the Rosslyn-Ballston Corridor in Arlington County is heavily utilized during peak hours in the peak direction. This condition exists in spite of the fact that the Corridor is presently less that one-half "built out." The Corridor now has over 30-million square feet of office and other employment space. Arlington County's plans call for over 80-million square feet of these uses. Although less than half built out, the METRO line serving it is crowded during peak hours. This crowding discourages METRO-related development. It is also true that the Orange Line does not yet serve a high percentage of the work-related trips generated in the Rosslyn-Ballston Corridor. This is due to the scattered location of the "home" end of the "home-to-work" and "work-to-home" trips.
2. There are critical design shortcomings in the current METRO system.
A good example is again, the Orange Line in Virginia. The crowding on the Orange Line in the Rosslyn-Ballston Corridor is, in part, the result of this line having been designed to operate at only one-half capacity because the Orange Line must share tracks and tunnel through the Federal District with the Blue Line.
If the Orange Line were divided and a new leg created to serve the Washington-Dulles Airport/Dulles Toll Road Corridor, this new portion would operate at only one-quarter the theoretical line capacity of the METRO system. This is a fundamental flaw in the system design. Additionally, with the Orange Line extension to Dulles Airport in place, the Orange Line along I-66 now terminating at Vienna/Fairfax, instead of operating at one-half capacity as it does currently, would operate at only one-quarter capacity.
3. There is a practical, physical limit to the expansion of METRO.
The third METRO ridership-related problem that is a function of the current design has to do with time and distance. The extension of METRO to Washington Dulles Airport is the most logical and longest-championed METRO extension of the original 103-mile system. If the Dulles extension were to function as METRO currently operates, a rider would have to sit through a butt-numbing, 24-station stops to get from the airport to the South Capitol Station. During most of the 24-hour period, a taxi ride would win hands down with respect to time and convenience. This is why transit ridership to Chicago's O'Hare and Atlanta's Hartsfield Airports does not approach the ridership of interregional arrivals in Munich, Paris or London.
These three points when taken with the first six key facts strongly suggest the need for a fundamental rethinking of the entire regional transport system, including the design and function of METRO.
Viewed from a systemic perspective, METRO does not match the subregion it is intended to serve. It did not match the regional projections at the time it was designed, and the municipal, state and federal agency decisions and market forces have evolved a regional human settlement pattern over the past three decades that does not match the METRO system that was constructed.
Applying the laws of physics, psychology and economics to the METRO system places a limit on the length of a transit line on which all trains stop at all stations. The system capacity and efficient function of METRO dictate a location and distribution of station-area land uses vastly different than now exist.
Either the METRO system must be fundamentally restructured, or it needs to be supported by new station area land-use patterns and densities and by a system of shared-vehicle services that meet the needs of those parts of the Region not now served.
II. USING THE CURRENT ARRAY OF SUGGESTED METRO ENHANCEMENTS AS A WAY TO VISUALIZE FUTURE MOBILITY OPTIONS
One way to visualize the ideas that might prove useful in reexamining METRO is to consider some of the current proposals to augment METRO. Discussion of concepts in this Part is not an endorsement of specific projects nor does omission suggest rejection. The merits of all proposals must be considered in a comprehensive regional context.
There are a number of plans for improving the function of the METRO system such as implementation of the Purple Line, the Turquoise Line and connecting the urban nodes missed by METRO with something that might be called a "Gold Line." These concepts are in addition to the proposals for radial extensions. The plans sketched out in this section may not all be feasible, but they help articulate the range of options that should be considered.
One of the primary reasons to take a comprehensive look at METRO at this point is to create a regional approach to mobility before billions of dollars more are spent on METRO expansions as well as expressways and bridges that would be unnecessary under a comprehensive new plan.
1. A Purple Line around the Beltway. Among the most frequently suggested changes in METRO is the development of a "Purple Line." This would be a new METRO line that would generally follow the alignment of the Beltway. Since both Maryland and Virginia DOTs are looking at the future of the Beltway, it is very appropriate to look at this issue.
The first phase of the current VDOT study of the Beltway in Virginia indicated that transit service would carry more passengers for less money than adding automobile lanes to the Beltway. For reasons unrelated to improving the Region's mobility, shared-vehicle systems have, for the present, been dropped from consideration in the on-going Beltway studies by
VDOT.
Most of the advocates of a Purple Line focus on the Maryland segment of the Beltway. Public agencies in Maryland have studied a number of Purple Line alignments inside, on and outside the Beltway. The current Maryland DOT Beltway studies include transit options. The problems with Purple Line configurations include:
Neighborhood opposition to any above-ground tracks
Cost of underground tracks
Potential opposition to METRO-related development in every new station area
The solution may be to put the track in or over the Beltway and locate the stations in areas already polluted by Beltway noise and interchange congestion.
Critics suggest it would be inappropriate to put the capacity of a METRO Line right on top of the capacity of the existing (or expanded) Beltway. In some contexts, overlaying a METRO line on an existing expressway is not desirable and could be counterproductive. For example, it was much more intelligent for Arlington County to route METRO through what became the Rosslyn-Ballston Corridor than to put it in the median of I-66. This is usually the case unless a large platform is built over the roadway to support 220 +/- acres of prime METRO-served land uses at each station.
The approach taken by Arlington County but not by the City of Falls Church or Fairfax County was to put the METRO line under Wilson and Clarendon Boulevards and Fairfax Drive . In this way, they were able to provide the new transport capacity necessary to support the redevelopment of first generation "sub"urban strip development through the post Civil War crossroads of Rosslyn, Courthouse, Clarendon and Ballston. These nodes attracted much of the pre-Tysons Corner retail and business activity in the inner "sub"urban areas of Virginia.
While this routing strategy made sense in the Arlington County context, that may not be the case for the area to be served by the Purple Line. The primary problem with the development of land use adjacent to METRO stations is opposition from those living near the site. Transit-related land use is, however, necessary to support the ridership of the METRO trains. The noise and fumes from the at-grade Beltway has already blighted the area immediately adjacent to the right-of-way. Noise and air pollution plus local street congestion are problems in the areas around Beltway interchanges. Under these conditions, the "solution" may well be to put the METRO tracks in the Beltway alignment and to locate the station and station-area development but not the track between station areas on platforms.
With a platform strategy, each of the major arterials, expressways and METRO crossings would be supported by a station on a large platform (220 acres +/-) over the Beltway. The METRO-related development would take place on the platform. This would provide for a direct interconnection with activities on the radial road system, as well as with the radial METRO lines at New Carrollton, Greenbelt , Forest Glen, Grosvenor, Tysons Corner, Dunn Loring/Merrifield, Van Dorn, Eisenhower Avenue , Branch Avenue and for any Blue Line extension beyond Addison Road .
By burying the Beltway under a platform, the noise pollution created by the Beltway could be muffled. The adjacent neighborhoods and villages might be more receptive to METRO-related development in trade for getting rid of some of the noise pollution from the Beltway and the neighborhood traffic from the beltway interchanges. A comprehensive plan that serves regional needs might coalesce citizen and enterprise support that offset NIMBYism. As Chicago architect Daniel Burnham suggested: "Make no small plans." Small plans do not have the power to generate regional support.
There may be a place to test the platform strategy. The configurations which have been discussed over the last 40 years for the METRO extension along the Dulles Corridor have focused on tracks and stations in the median. More recently, there has been consideration of a "detour" out of the median at Tysons Corner and Reston. This makes sense only if one wants to fundamentally reconfigure existing development in Tysons Corner and on one side or the other of the Dulles Toll Road through Reston . Perhaps a better alternative for one of the Tysons Corner stations and for some or all of the Reston stations would be to apply the platform solution. This idea has been articulated and championed by citizens and professionals in Reston . The platform design in the Dulles Corridor could be a prototype for the Purple Line along the Beltway.
2. The Turquoise Line to improve the Orange and Blue Lines and to serve Columbia Pike and Baileys Crossroads. The Turquoise Line was first suggested in 1984. It could be implemented with a lesser effort and a relatively small cost compared to the Purple Line. The Turquoise Line would double the capacity of the Orange Line from West Falls Church to Courthouse providing needed capacity in the Rosslyn-Ballston Corridor. In addition, it would utilize the track capacity on the Blue Line between Rosslyn and the Pentagon and provide METRO service along Columbia Pike to Baileys Crossroads.
3. The Gold Line in the urban core. In the urban core, the site most frequently pointed out as being in need of improved shared-vehicle service is Georgetown. What transport and access congestion related to Georgetown needs most is a "second Georgetown " in another part of the Federal Core. Such a retail/entertainment/recreation venue has been suggested for the 8th Street Corridor. As an alternative, a "second Georgetown" might be part of the revitalization of South Capitol Street proposed by the NCPC, or perhaps it could be an element of the comprehensive reconstruction of the New York Avenue Corridor. This "second Georgetown" would siphon off some of the hyper-activity that currently congests Georgetown. A "second Georgetown" would bring the Federal Core into a better balance with Old Town Alexandria, Chevy Chase Circle and other urbane retail/service/entertainment venues.
Even in this more sane subregional context, Georgetown would need better shared-vehicle service. This new facility in the urban core might create a "Gold Line" loop. Such a loop could tie together Georgetown; the Georgetown Waterfront; Foggy Bottom; the Mall with its monuments and Smithsonian facilities; the South Capitol revitalization; the Anacostia Waterfront; the Eastern Market; Capitol Hill; New York Avenue (including a second Georgetown-like venue); Union Station; North of Massachusetts (aka NOMA); Massachusetts Avenue (including Dupont Circle); Upper Georgetown and back to Georgetown. The Gold Line would interchange with all the existing METRO lines at many locations.
The Gold Line characteristics suggest a need for the development of a second shared-vehicle system serving the inner area of the National Capital Region. Alternatives are considered in Part IV.
4. Radial extensions of existing METRO lines.
A number of radial extensions have been proposed for METRO. Two extensions that have recently gotten considerable media and governance agency attention are:
Creating a "Y" and extending half of the present Orange Line to Tysons Corner, Reston , Washington Dulles International Airport and Eastern Loudoun County
The extension of the existing Orange Line from the current terminus at Vienna-Fairfax to Centreville via Fairfax Center.
Decades of discussions, over a dozen studies and the compelling logic of linking the best airport runways in the eastern United States with the National Capital by rail have resulted in ever more feasible concepts for METRO extension from West Falls Church to Washington Dulles International Airport via Tysons Corner, Reston, et. al. At least two private-sector teams are competing for the public subsidy to construct (and perhaps operate) the extensions to Dulles.
Ever increasing congestion and growing travel demand projections for trips in the I-66 Corridor (similar to the conditions in the I-270 Corridor) have energized efforts to extend METRO out I-66.
The phasing-in of station-area density with a "first bus and then rail service" strategy for the Dulles Corridor is compelling to some. Linking the employment and service land uses at Tysons Corner to the METRO system is a desirable goal.
The current schemes to achieve these goals have not been developed in a regional context. When they are evaluated in this context, they will be found to be lacking in a critical ingredient market for station-area development. This is a very significant problem and is addressed in following section.
III. EXCESS CAPACITY AND WASTEFUL SUBSIDY
As attractive as ideas for better and expanded service may be, these proposals collectively dramatize an overarching problem facing the Subregion. In sum, these new proposals create much more capacity for new METRO-related development than there is any conceivable demand given current growth projections for the next five decades.
The proposed new METRO lines and METRO extensions discussed above would add a huge potential development envelope for which there is no foreseeable station-area market. Without METRO-supported station area land uses, these projects would exacerbate the existing off-peak direction capacity problem outlined in Part I. There is no conceivable source of the needed ridership to utilize the resulting METRO system capacity created by these proposals.
It is
probable that, as part of a comprehensive Region-wide review, METRO-related development could be allocated among existing, committed and some new station areas. Given the existing conditions, it is foolhardy to assume that it is prudent to "build it and they will come." A full understanding of future station-area support for METRO is necessary before funding is allocated. Just as it proved to be inappropriate to assume 1.5 million square feet of new office development each year for 30 years to support the Virginia Route 28 improvement bonds, so would it be for any current METRO extension or expansion proposals.
For instance, applying the "platform station strategy" (outlined for the Purple Line in Part II above) to just eight of the Orange Line stations of the Dulles extension would adsorb twice the Round 6a 2020 employment projections for all of Fairfax County. Sorry, Fairfax Center, Merrifield, Springfield , Baileys Crossroads and Route One Corridor, there is no new development for you until after 2040.
These stations in fact would have the potential to adsorb all the employment demand for the northern part of Virginia to the year 2020 and over one-third of the demand for development in the entire National Capital Region for that timeframe.
Without the platform strategy or some other solution to get jobs, housing, services and recreation close to the transit vehicle doors, the METRO subsidy would skyrocket. Any substantial expansion of METRO under current plans would make the VA Route 28 bond fiasco look like penny ante.
The major problem with significant improvements or extensions of METRO and other shared-vehicle systems is that they collectively would result in a transport system for a regional population of 20- to 30-million inhabitants (i.e., Paris) not the 5.6-million projected in the National Capital Region by 2020.
In order to achieve functional patterns and densities of land use, such major expansions of shared-vehicle systems would require, four or five times the amount of new employment, service and residential uses anticipated in the next half century. For example, all the METRO system enhancements described in Part II would have the capacity to absorb all the new growth projected to occur between the Hudson River and the James River over the next 20 or 30 years.
The ideas for splitting and extending the Orange Line and other lines exacerbate the capacity-limiting flaw in the original radial-only METRO-system design. As noted above, there are potential solutions to the "half-line" problem, but most involve creating even more stations. More METRO stations mean there is more transit-served but unused station-area land. This translates to more empty METRO car seats and higher subsidies unless the capacity expansions and station-area land use is carefully balanced.
Without intelligent, transit-supporting land uses in the station areas, the total long-tern cost of METRO and other shared-vehicle systems is simply prohibitive. It is a scientific and economic certainty that no region can support the resultant cost of goods and services in the Global Marketplace. It is unlikely that any current or future nation-state or subcontinental trading coalition (i.e., NAFTA) will provide the subsidy necessary to offset a grossly inefficient mobility system in any given region.
The current crop of METRO expansions and extensions, absent an agreed-to regional plan for the allocation of future tax-base land uses, will exacerbate the continuing zero-sum-game inter-municipal and interstate political battles.
IV. THE EXAMINATION OF NEW SHARED-VEHICLE SYSTEMS TO SERVE THE SUBREGION
To this point, this report has examined the existing METRO system, recent and current proposals for METRO expansion and extension and the overarching economic constraint on massive METRO-system expansion. It does not take much deliberation to realize that it would be prudent to examine, in addition to fundamental METRO system improvements, a second or perhaps several shared-vehicle (aka transit) systems to support the basic METRO system.
There are inherent flaws in METRO's conceptual design. In addition, there are new forces that exist due to the growth of the Subregion over the past 30 years. These facts dictate that METRO as currently structured will not be able to meet many of the Region's mobility demands. At the same time, it is equally clear that a system of private automobiles cannot provide mobility and access in a region the scale of the National Capital Subregion. Through a fundamental change in METRO and support from new systems, there can be an efficient and effective shared-vehicle complex serving an urban agglomeration the size and complexity of the National Capital Subregion.
When one considers, as one must, the National Capital Subregion's siamese twin, the Baltimore Subregion, the case is even stronger. Together these two regions form a Consolidated Metropolitan Area that is the heart of the fifth largest New Urban Region in North America.
METRO was designed to carry workers and visitors to the core of a small urban region. That was the 1960s. The 21st century will find METRO in a very different context. Many of the unmet mobility needs are related not to regional core access but to community, village and neighborhood mobility and to what are called "sub"urb to "sub"urb or "cross-county" trips.
Urban regions like Vienna, Stockholm and Toronto have solved the need for multiple shared-vehicle systems to serve a complex region by optimizing the use of their 19th century systems ferries, trolleys, trams, streetcars and other conventional "light" systems.
In the Paris Region, the venerable Paris Metro system has been supplemented by a completely new heavy rail system called RER. This combination provides true regional system capacity. Regional mobility in Paris is also enhanced by interregional high-speed rail, as well as other systems. New York and London have added lines and express routes to expand the capacity of their rapid rail systems.
In considering a second system (or systems) for the National Capital Region, it would not be appropriate to reintroduce 19th century systems i.e., traditional light rail on a region-wide basis. Toronto , Stockholm and Vienna saved and now utilize older transport technology to help support the core Subway/Metro/Ubahn systems. This is not an option for the National Capital Region since its original shared-vehicle systems were scrapped in the 50s and 60s.
Based on the popularity of systems in smaller regions such as Portland , San Diego and elsewhere, it is frequently suggested that new "light rail" lines are the "answer" to the National Capital Region's shared-vehicle mobility needs. Twentieth century versions of multi-car trams are often called "conventional light rail transit systems." These "light-rail" systems generally operate at street level and have less platform capacity than "heavy rail" systems such as METRO.
In practice, many conventional light-rail systems do not provide enough platform capacity to support viable village-scale diversity at most stations. For this reason, there is not enough density nor a sufficient mix of land uses in the station area. This means there is not a critical mass of destinations which can be served by pedestrian trips. A significant part of the trip demand generated by station-area land uses must be amenable to service by pedestrian trips, or there is a need for an automobile. This defeats the purpose of shared-vehicle-
served station areas.
When the design capacity of a conventional light-rail system approaches that required to serve a station area with contemporary marketable land uses in a large, complex region, the "light" system is very often indistinguishable from a "heavy" system.
Conventional bus applications that serve "stops" or kiosks have not proven to be a viable substitute for a system with substantial fixed stations. Exclusive right-of-way bus systems function much like fixed-station (aka "rail") systems or morph into such systems as demonstrated by the experience in Seattle , Ottawa-Carlton and Curitiba .
Regardless of the type of guideway, no cost-effective conventional shared-vehicle system can serve a corridor with alpha community-scale densities of less than 10-persons per acre. Much of the urbanized area in the National Capital Region is now less than 10-persons per acre at the alpha community scale. This again focuses attention on the importance of METRO station area development and on the need to seek new innovations in shared-vehicle systems.
Beyond the conventional transit systems outlined above, there are new systems on the drawing boards that could be called "Advanced Rapid Transit" state of the "ART" as it were.
The core of an ART system is a small vehicle on a light, automated guideway that can be switched to bring passengers directly from origin to destination without intermediate stops.
A system with ART characteristics would allow rational shared-vehicle-system expansions to match demand capacity, both inside and outside the Beltway. It would allow for private investment in incremental additions to a comprehensive regional-serving, shared-vehicle system. ART systems are "light" in footprint or impact but can be anything from "very light" to "quite heavy" with respect to system carrying capacity and platform capacity.
New "light vehicle" ART systems are still in the design/ feasibility stage and there are questions yet to be answered. However, ART systems offer a number of important advantages over conventional systems. They provide a very feasible way to incrementally add new capacity as land uses change including the redevelopment of urban areas. In addition, ART systems can provide an easy way to implement transport on demand without a private vehicle (i.e., private car or taxi).
Enumeration of the attributes of ART systems is not an endorsement of a specific system but a suggestion that the attributes of ART systems make them worthy of careful consideration. Among the key characteristics to consider with respect to ART systems are:
1. A shared vehicle that goes "from where you are to where you want to be" with no intermediate stops.
2. Very low relative passenger-per-mile costs, greater safety and less noise as compared to conventional systems due to lower design speeds that still achieve shorter total trip times.
3. The flexibility of capacity expansion and contraction on a minute-by-minute basis can meet changing ridership demands with few empty seats. Conventional transit systems serve a "route." All the vehicles (trains or buses) go from one end of the route to the other end hauling any empty seats the entire distance. In an ART system, empty seats move only to marshal for anticipated demand.
4. Since all vehicles do not stop at every station, small, relatively inexpensive and widely-distributed "stations" bring passengers close to their destination even in lower density areas. At the same time, large destinations (i.e., a sports stadium) can have large, high-capacity stations on the same system.
5. Because of this variable character of stations, the station-area land uses can also vary. ART systems can be supported by station-area uses that are not economically feasible in METRO-station areas.
6. All shared vehicle systems, including METRO and ART offer advantages for those too young, too old or otherwise incapable of driving an automobile. ART systems can bring this service to a far wider range of patterns and densities of land use.
7. ART systems offer the potential of privately-owned vehicles running on the system. This would provide access to lower density human settlement patterns without extension of the automated guideway. This is what guideway-in-the-core bus systems do now, but small, light ART vehicles could efficiently support much lower densities.
8. Privacy can be provided if the user is willing to pay for it. This is similar to conventional HOT lanes and congestion pricing in core areas. Privacy (or is it "security" that is being called "privacy") could be provided at very low cost in off peak hours.
9. The reasons for avoiding light, energy efficient private vehicles (crashworthness in collisions with heavy SUVs) is illuminated with an automated
guideway.
10. ART systems provide a way to serve existing and new lower density areas that cannot be served effectively by conventional heavy rail, light rail, bus or other systems.
The biggest obstacle to ART systems is not design or concept: It is the winner-take-all competitive economic context of First World civilization. Big organizations make greater profits building and operating big, expensive (aka "heavy") systems. In a democracy, it is the role of citizens to evaluate the options and set the parameters for competitive provision of mobility and access. One potential strategy would be for a light ART system guideway to accommodate the vehicles of a number of different "automakers."
The ART-like systems that have been designed and tested to date are not end-all and be-all solutions. However, the tests do prove that the concepts are viable in a supportive market and regional context.
Bus systems like the Curitiba "tube station" concept that has been proposed for the Dulles Corridor, the guideway bus systems like Ottawa-Carlton and modern light rail may also play a role in a regional system.
Cable cars, inclines, gondolas, monorails and horizontal elevators might have a role on steep hills, traveling over parking lots, under runways and through recreation and entertainment venues. However, these shared-vehicle options are not as potentially effective in regional applications as systems that have ART characteristics.
Commuter rail (VRE and MARC) can play an important role so long as they support station-area land uses and do not just create an excuse for scattering urban housing across the very low density countryside.
Station-area design, system capacity and system operating characteristics are the most critical factors is selecting shared-vehicle systems. ART systems provide many options for creative station-area design, transit user safety and user comfort.
New communications and processing technology i.e., Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), can make a significant contribution but do not change basic function of shared-vehicle or private-vehicle systems.
The key, of course, is to first design the human settlement pattern to optimize economic, social and physical objectives of civilization (aka, quality of life) and then match the shared-vehicle systems to the desired pattern and density of land use. The other half of the equation is to maximize the use of existing systems primarily METRO in which there is already a huge investment.
V. RETHINKING MORE THAN JUST METRO AND OTHER SHARED-VEHICLE SYSTEMS
Effective regional transport requires intelligent regional planning and allocation of resources. These resources must be distributed in a way that meets the reality of the existing and planned future human settlement pattern in the Region.
One way to adsorb some of the excess capacity and relieve a major source of on-street congestion in urban cores would to be to add goods (mail, parcels and small quantity deliveries) to the METRO-system capacity. Parcel delivery is not the business it used to be, and congestion-based rates for parcels might just be the thing that gives the capital investment in shared vehicle systems something to do at night.
There are exciting mobility possibilities generated for both radial and circumferential METRO lines to carry not only people but also transport goods. Each of the interchanges between the Purple Line and the radial METRO lines or expressways could be a place for transferring goods from rail to short-haul low emissions delivery vehicles. Trucks that haul U.S. Mail, United Parcel and Federal Express, as well as most other deliveries upon which contemporary civilization now relies, could be downsized and made less polluting under a strategy that provides for rail distribution of goods in off peak hours.
While the Region is thinking about changes to the METRO system and other shared-vehicle systems, there should also be consideration of the related transportation needs.
Expansion of both Washington Dulles and BWI Airports are being planned with 21st century air-travel demands in mind. The billion-dollar mistake of expanding Reagan National Airport is now more broadly understood. The core of the National Capital Region will never be a world class place to live and work so long as there is a busy airport in the middle of it. Like Midway ( Chicago ) and Love ( Dallas ), National Airport is a dinosaur on life support awaiting an accident to pull the plug.
A high-capacity, shared-vehicle system to Washington-Dulles and BWI Airports could bring the travel time into a comparable range with the existing Reagan National. Interregional, high-speed ground transport could replace most short-haul air traffic. This shift in demand from air to ground would have significant beneficial energy and environmental consequences. The new terminal at National would make a splendid, next generation Air and Space Museum .
And then there are roadway and highway expressway needs to be considered. Obviously roads and highways will continue to be important. Most citizens will rely on rubber tires and private vehicles for the indefinite future. They will stay with automobiles that provide privacy and convenience as long as they can afford it. The first priority should be to improve the maintenance of the roadway/highway system that exists; the second should be to add facilities that improve and intelligently support the existing roadway/highway system and the shared-vehicle system.
There are many road improvements that should have been made in the 1960s which must be completed. These are not the infamous expressways that were taken off of municipal plans. These roadway and highway improvements many of them inside the Beltway have been on state and municipal plans since the early 1960s. These roadways would help provide the network to support circumferential and community-building mobility and access. Some of the most effective improvements are neighborhood-to-
neighborhood interconnections. The failure to build these improvements are a primary cause of the outward expansion/scatterization during the 70s, 80s and 90s.
The next important aspect of roadway and highway/expressway improvements must be to evolve a system for: (a) fairly allocating the cost of the road to the users and (b) equitably distributing the limited capacity during peak demand times through congestion pricing. High Occupancy Toll (HOT) lanes are only the first step in this process.
There may be the need for new roadways, new highways and perhaps even new transport corridors, but those should be provided only where a comprehensive, rational plan for sustainable human settlement pattern -
It must be kept in mind that it is a physical impossibility to provide mobility and access to an urban region as large as the National Capital Region with single-
occupant automobiles and parking lots. This fact is underscored by the current work by the MWCOG staff on accessibility measures.
The Subregion is considering the expenditure of billions on projects such as Dulles Corridor bus/rail and other METRO extensions and expansions, a wider draw-span Woodrow Wilson Bridge and a wider Beltway. Before action is take on these projects, much less new radial expressways and new highway corridors, there should be a comprehensive and thorough review of the Region's transportation needs and potential solutions. METRO is the most important element in this consideration.
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January 25, 1999
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