Why don’t we understand the reasons for the war with Iraq?

 

October 1973, the initiation of the Arab Oil Embargo, was a turning point in modern human activity on the planet. At no time in human history has the future been more clear. At no time have there been more educated citizens who have ignored an obvious “tipping point.”

 

We argue that many events since the Arab Oil Embargo are a result of the failure to understand the importance of October 1973. Among those events are:

 

• The 1990-1991 recession (See opening of Chapter 7 of The Shape of the Future)

• Gulf War I (1991)

• The Dot-com bust of 1998-2000

• The attacks of 11 September 2001

• Gulf War II (2003)

World Wars I and II started in Europe and were caused by the spacial distribution of coal, iron and thus steel. Creation of the European Union was an intelligent response. Korea and Viet Nam were wars driven by the spread of a tragically failed governance idea that imploded of its own weight. It was not match for capitalism as a reflection of human nature.

 

The Gulf wars are the result of auto-dependent settlement patterns – here in Virginia as elsewhere throughout the United States – that create a dangerous dependence upon Middle Eastern oil. Every decision impacting the Middle East since England and France carved up the region has been driven by competition for petroleum. The problems have been exacerbated by a fixation with the sanctity of the 19^th century nation-state.   

 

Why is the United States repeating in Iraq the same mistake made in Afghanistan?

 

Nation building in Afghanistan is, according to news reports, progressing very slowly, if at all. The process is very costly and there appear to be major hurdles ahead. Few Afghans have benefited much from more than a year’s worth of effort and money by the U.S. and its allies.

 

It would have been far smarter to start with a focus on viable components of human settlement rather than trying to smash together parts that do not fit into a contemporary nation-state. A reasonable approach in Afghanistan would have been to assign two-star generals to each of 15 regions rather than a general with four stars to the whole territory called Afghanistan. The strategy should have been to consider building a nation-state after there were functioning regions.

 

In the early 20^th century Great Britain and France made hash out of the Middle East by trying to create nation-states from medieval city-states, nomadic tribes and arbitrary straight lines in the sand. Afghanistan was a nation-state before the Soviet take-over only because it was so isolated from other nation-states and it had no resources that neighboring nation-states wanted.

 

If nation-states have a future, it will be as a voluntary union of economically, socially and physically viable (aka, functional) regions.

 

The evolution of the European Union, the continuing turmoil in the Middle East, the demise of the former Soviet Union and the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia provide ample lessons and perspectives on the importance of functional regionalism in nation-state building and maintenance.

 

Before the bombs started to fall on Baghdad, we suggested that there were already three zones in Iraq created by the no-fly edicts. We could have started there by refuting the legitimacy of the imaginary “nation-state” and the obvious disadvantage of central control from Baghdad over the Sunni Kurds to the north and the Shia Arabs to the south. 

 

We could have started to build functional regions in the north and the south. If Saddam had tried to intervene, what better provocation could there be for taking stern action? We could have pushed Saddam out of the role of “national” leader and he would have become just another war lord/gang leader with oil money.

 

At least in the short run -- say the next ten years plus or minus -- the US of A will “win” Gulf War II. However, official sources report we are planning to make the same “nation building” mistake in Iraq as we have in Afghanistan. This could turn a short-term victory into a long-term defeat.

 

Where do we go from here?

 

In the outline of an essay we started in London on the night of 12 September 2001 , we suggested:

• There is a difference between patriotism and jingoism, and

• There will not be an end to terrorism until we end the causes of terrorism.

There are two choices:

• A future controlled by Darth Vaders, or

• Human settlement patterns that create Alpha Communities within Sustainable New Urban Regions.

We won Gulf War I for the Gipper. We may well win Gulf War II for Dad. Now how about one for the rest of us?

 

-- March 24, 2003