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I.T.
Ship of the Desert
The
compromise information-technology plan worked out
by the Administration and the General Assembly doesn't
have to be sleek to advance procurement reform in
a harsh budget climate.
An
adage in politics defines a camel as a horse
designed by committee. The Warner administration
had a thoroughbred in
mind in January when it submitted a proposal to
reform information technology and
telecommunications in state government. But the
camel that emerged from the General Assembly may
be more appropriate for the Commonwealth's
revenue-parched future.
Gov.
Mark R. Warner and Secretary of Technology George
C. Newstrom made clear in their discussions of a
new technology strategy in September 2002 that
Virginia needed to change its
procurement and management strategies. Overlapping
systems meant inefficiencies and wasted tax
dollars. More sophisticated project management
required new training. Enterprise-wide solutions
across all agencies of state government in
critical areas such as security and privacy
demanded reform.
To
build bipartisan
support, the administration chose a tech-savvy
Chesterfield Republican, Del. Samuel A. Nixon, and
a Democrat from the Northern Virginia technology
corridor, Sen. Janet D. Howell, to patron the
reform legislation. The bill proposed
consolidating information technology workers into
a new Virginia Information Technologies Agency,
setting up a government Technology Investment
Board to prioritize large, critical
state projects, and designating the Secretary of
Technology as the state's chief information officer. The legislation reflected a review
and strategic planning process across executive
agencies that lasted nine months.
The
Joint Legislative Audit and Review Committee (JLARC)
concurrently came to similar conclusions about the
need for change after a two-year study of why and
how information technology projects had failed to
deliver in years past. Citing more than $75
million in failed projects and $28 million in
project overruns, JLARC noted that no one had
prioritized or coordinated information technology
investments across state government. Likewise, there was no
formal structure for evaluating multi-agency or
statewide systems. As a consequence, projects initiated in
isolation forfeited any opportunity to leverage
buying power or avoid duplication.
So,
using the JLARC report, veteran Sen. Walter A.
Stosch, R-Henrico, put together his own approach.
The Stosch bill called for leaving the existing
Departments of Information Technology and
Technology Planning in place, but establishing a
new office of project management. Stosch suggested
keeping information technology employees of
agencies reporting to the heads of the same
agencies. Instead, he called for an Information
Technology Investment Board including not only
government officials, but expert private citizens.
Most importantly, the bill created a chief
information officer for the Commonwealth, selected
by and reporting to the investment board, not to
the secretary of technology or the governor.
Enter
the camel. Forced to work quickly in its 45-day
session, bill patrons Nixon, Howell and Stosch
began searching almost immediately for a
compromise, in regular meetings
with administration officials and through
subcommittees of the Senate General Laws and House
Science & Technology Committees. Every public
meeting on the bills sparked numerous informal
private ones.
The
politics of other issues cut back and forth across
the discussions. What would be the relative power
of the executive branch going forward if the
governor were to be granted two terms in office?
How effective were annual legislative
reviews and appropriations for a complicated,
multiyear process? Expectations that the Commonwealth
could achieve $37.4 million in gross savings in
the first year ($23.4 million net) and up to $100
million in savings annually thereafter added to
the pressure. Launching a new "ship of the
desert" became a larger priority than the
exact shape of the ship.
Another
adage is that politics is the art of the possible.
Significant compromises were inevitable given the
urgency of the task, the brevity of the session
and the politics that required cooperation between
a governor of one party and a legislature
controlled by another, not to mention the residual
lack of trust left from budget battles between the
House of Delegates and Virginia Senate.
In
the final compromise approved by the General
Assembly, state government will consolidate most,
though not all, government information technology
workers in a new Virginia Information Technologies
Agency (VITA). The Departments of Information
Technology, Technology Planning and VIPNet
disappear. An Information Technology Investment
Board will be dominated by expert private
citizens, four appointed by the Governor and four
appointed by the General Assembly. But the board
also will include the secretary of technology
(another gubernatorial appointment) and,
ex-officio and without voting privileges, the
auditor of public accounts (an appointee of the
General Assembly).
Among
the duties of the Board is the hiring of an
independent chief information officer (CIO), who
also will serve as head of VITA. Finally, the bill
outlines an implementation schedule that stretches
out until January 1, 2005, full implementation of
all standards, policies, methodologies and
consolidation for the largest state agencies, such
as those in transportation and human services.
Some
businesses and groups did grumble about the
process, the results and the risk inherent in new,
unpredictable and political circumstances. The
appointment and operations of the investment board
could be complex. A CIO with executive functions
reporting to a citizen board instead of a duly
constituted officer of the Commonwealth could
leave her or him not just independent, but
isolated. Leaving information technology
professionals scattered across agencies despite
the consolidation of others could complicate and
possibly slow project management reforms. And some
in government still wonder about the
constitutionality of the governance and reporting
requirements.
But
the principals who worked out the compromise seem satisfied that the right
people can make the camel work. All are signaling
commitments to keep the compromise they put
together in place through the April 2 veto
session. Secretary of Technology Newstrom will
continue to serve as Commonwealth CIO until the
investment board is constituted and a new CIO can
be hired. By January 1, 2004 VITA is to have
consolidated network management, server and other
operational functions for state agencies with 100
or fewer information technology professionals. In
a little more than ten months, therefore, there
will be a positive track record to build trust and
confidence going forward.
Many,
of course, will keep their arms folded,
waiting for VITA to fail, or for a destructive
tug-of-war to break out between agencies or among
the CIO, governor and General Assembly. "Told
you so" always is one of the best ways to
pass the time in any election year. But most have
realized that the alternative to extend the record
of missed opportunities and failures of years past
was unacceptable. Besides, if one looks closely,
this camel not only manages the downside risk as
budget writers scan the horizon for a revenue
oasis, it also has permission to race ahead if
appropriate. It just has to set its own track.
--
March 3, 2003
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