Rethinking Afghanistan

By Peter Galuszka

On Feb. 15, 1989, I was standing amid reporters and people waving red flags and holding flowers at the northern end of a metal bridge linking Uzbekistan with Afghanistan. A row of Soviet BTR armored personnel carriers streamed home as their crews waved and smiled.

These were the last troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, where the nearly 10-year war had killed about 15,000 Soviet troops and 2 million civilians. The Soviet Foreign Ministry badly wanted foreign correspondents to record the last of the withdrawals.

They chartered a plane to take us from Moscow to Tashkent, the Uzbek capital. From there we went to a Soviet Air Force base where tough looking men loaded flares on the sides of gigantic cargo planes. They would shoot off the flares to distract U.S.-made Stinger missiles as they corkscrewed into Kabul.

Next on our trip was the small town of Termez where Russian helicopter gunships buzzed overhead. Near the bridge, was a parade ground covered with locals. I spoke with a teenage girl who said: “They’ve taken us out of school four times to practice this.”

The lesson was that Afghanistan is always going to be a remote quagmire. The British and Russian empires found that out in the 19th century and now the Americans are after a seemingly endless 18-year-long war that has left about 2,400 U.S. troops and more than 58,000 civilians dead.

This week, The Washington Post, is publishing a remarkable investigative series three years in the making that raises series questions about the U.S. effort. Clueless leaders knowing nothing about Afghanistan kept pushing action in the country over the course of three presidents.

The mission led to widespread corruption and waste as the CIA handed over bags full of money. Leaders said they wanted no nation building but that’s exactly what the U.S. tried and so far has failed to do.

The original idea had been to jump in with special forces and weed out Al Qaeda and their supporters after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. They largely succeeded but Washington kept on with more troops and assistance. The Post estimates that the war will cost $1 trillion.

What’s the Virginia angle? Plenty. Virginia-based firms have profited enormously from the war, especially those near the Pentagon. Leading the list are Lockheed Martin, DynCorp., BAE Systems, General Dynamics, CACI and many others.

According to defense industry expert Loren Thompson, Northern Virginia “is often described as a place where the Internet was invented but today it looks increasingly like the center of the global military-industrial complex.”

Over the past 20 years, many firms have moved to Northern Virginia because of its proximity to the Pentagon and CIA and due to the pro-business climate. By contrast, Thompson noted in a 2010 article in Forbes that “Maryland’s political climate is distinctly less supportive of defense contractors.”

This is not to say that defense contractors are evil. But it is important to take stock of just what the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan has meant and who profits from it.

History shows that Afghanistan can’t be converted to western democracy and capitalism and is best left alone unless there is a real threat.