Category Archives: Transportation

Government Fragmentation and Economic Growth

fragmentation

by James A. Bacon

What are the secrets of successful metropolitan regions? According to conventional economic-development thinking here in Virginia, success hinges upon the ability to maintain a positive business climate, a concept that encompasses everything from tax rates to the tort system, the transportation network to the education level of the workforce. But a new publication by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), “The Metropolitan Century,” identifies a critical variable rarely discussed in Virginia: the fragmentation of municipal governance.

Metropolitan regions characterized by higher levels of municipal fragmentation tend to experience lower economic growth rates than metros with less fragmentation, contends the OECD report, as seen in the chart above. Metropolitan regions run the gamut in the degree of fragmentation, from the United Kingdom with an average of 0.4 municipalities per 100,000 residents to the Czech Republic with an average of 2.43 per 100,000. All other things being equal, the report says, “For each doubling in the number of municipalities per 100,000 inhabitants within a metropolitan area, labour productivity in the metropolitan area decreases by 5-6%.”

(I would surmise that the number of municipalities in Virginia falls in the “moderately low” category. For example, the 1.7 million inhabitants of the Hampton Roads metropolitan area are governed by 16 jurisdictions, including two in North Carolina, or slightly less than 1.0 per 100,000 population.)

Fragmented government inhibits economic growth through its impact on transportation and land use, suggests the OECD report. The inability to plan regionally can result in “sub-optimal provision of transportation infrastructure” that falls short of its potential to provide the connectivity required by a productive, growing regional economy.

In the context of large urban agglomerations, land use planning and transport planning are often the fields where the need for co-ordination is greatest. … Housing and commercial developments need to be well connected to other parts of the urban agglomeration, and public transport in turn relies on a minimum population density to operate efficiently.

Integrating transport and land-use planning makes it easier to utilize value-capture tools for financing transportation infrastructure. “Public spending for infrastructure increases the price of adjacent land,” states the report. “Often, this price increase provides a publicly funded windfall profit to land owners or developers. Land-value capture tools aim at recapturing these windfalls from developers in order to (partially) fund the infrastructure investment.”

Echoing arguments that EM Risse made on this blog years ago, the OECD report observes that administrative borders in metropolitan areas have not evolved in concert with economic and social patterns.

While good governance structures are no guarantee for good policies, it is very difficult to design and implement good policies without them. … Administrative borders in metropolitan areas rarely correspond to these functional relations. Often, they are based on historical settlement patterns that no longer reflect human activities.

A few decades ago, there was a move in Virginia to consolidate cities and counties in order to achieve administrative efficiencies and economies of scale. There were some notable successes — Virginia Beach merged with Princess Anne County, Suffolk merged with Nansemond County — but the movement petered out.  The OECD report spelled out reasons for resistance to consolidation that apparently apply across the economically developed world:

Common reasons for the persistence of administrative borders are strong local identities and high costs of reforms, but also vested interests of politicians and residents. Even if policy makers try to reorganize local governments according to functional relations within urban agglomerations, it is often difficult to identify unambiguous boundaries between functionally integrated areas.

There doesn’t seem to be any appetite for consolidating local governments in Virginia, but the OECD report does suggest an alternate strategy: Identifying specific functions that can be transferred to regional authorities.

Would it be worth the effort to invest political capital in such endeavors? Take a look at the chart at the top of this post. The big dividing line in economic growth is between medium-low and medium-high fragmentation. Assuming Virginia metropolitan regions fall into the medium-low category — and I do confess that I do not know exactly what the dividing line is — there doesn’t seem to be much of a growth premium from consolidating our way into “low fragmentation” status. Indeed, I would argue that some competition between jurisdictions in a metropolitan area is a good thing — the ability of inhabitants to “vote with their feet” helps keep the politicians honest.

But that’s a shoot-from-the-hip reaction based upon one OECD chart. If Virginia is serious about positioning itself for economic prosperity in the years ahead, our governance structures, rooted in 19th-century settlement patterns, surely need to keep up with economic reality.

Resilience and Competitive Economic Advantage

Flooded Honda factory in Bangkok, 2011 -- what you might call a serious business continuity issue.

Flooded Honda factory in Bangkok, 2011 — what you might call a serious business continuity issue.

by James A. Bacon

If you were a manufacturing company contemplating an expansion to Hampton Roads, you would take into account traditional criteria such as proximity to customers and suppliers, access to a skilled workforce, transportation connections, prevailing wage levels, taxes and so on. But as corporations become increasingly sensitive to the issue of business continuity in the face of disruption or disaster, you also might consider the region’s vulnerability to flooding.

Outside of New Orleans, Hampton Roads is the lowest-lying metropolitan area in the country. It is notoriously prone to flooding now, and the region’s vulnerability will only get worse as the sea level rises. You may or may not believe the McAuliffe administration’s predictions that the sea level will be 1 1/2 feet higher by 2050, but the risk that the forecast might prove accurate would have to factor into your calculations. Logical questions would arise: Would flooding disrupt rail and highway access to your facility? Would it hamper the ability of employees to get to work?

Perhaps the most important question is this: Do state and local governments have a plan to cope with recurrent flooding that will likely only get worse in time? How resilient is the region — not just one particular jurisdiction but, given the connectedness of transportation arteries and commuter flows — the entire region?

The resiliency movement is gaining momentum around the country, driven mainly by worries about climate change. Whatever your views on that polarizing issue, however, there are sound reasons to engage in planning on how to make your community less vulnerable to natural or man-made catastrophes (see “The Non Global Warmist’s Case for Resiliency Planning.”) The fragility of Hampton Roads is obvious for all to see. But every community has vulnerabilities of some kind. The integrity of the electric grid and water supply, for instance, are things everyone should worry about.

Every community should know its risk profile. In Hampton Roads the big concern is flooding. Western towns and cities worry about forest fires. Plains localities lose sleep over tornadoes, while others fear blizzards or terrorist attacks.

The insurance industry pays close attention to some of those risks, which are reflected in insurance rates (unless government policy distorts the price signals by subsidizing rates, as it does with flood insurance.) But, as Cooper Martin, program director for the Sustainable Cities Institute, observed at the Resilient Virginia launch yesterday, insurance covers less than half of total losses. States and localities don’t have insurance for washed out roads and bridges, for instance. There’s no insurance policy that covers the aftermath of a forest fire when rain washes ash into the water supply. “Who pays for uninsured losses?” he asks.

Perhaps the most unappreciated risk of catastrophe is to is a region’s brand, Martin said. Increasingly, a willingness of communities to identify systemic risks, develop plans to deal with them and maintain the financial commitment to carry out the plans will be a big differentiating factor. Corporations that place a premium on business continuity will pay close attention.

Measuring Automobile Dependency

auto_dependency2

Rankings among 794 locations.

Fascinating data from Governing magazine comparing auto dependency of various municipalities around the United States: Arlington, Alexandria and the City of Richmond led the pack in Virginia as the least auto-dependent, with Norfolk, Lynchburg and Roanoke close behind.

There are two main variables affecting automobile dependency: income and availability of transportation alternatives.

autos_povertyIncome: Poorer communities, or those with large concentrations of poverty, tend to have more car-less households and fewer cars per family. These households are more likely to car pool or avail themselves of whatever non-car alternatives exist, typically municipal bus systems. As the Governing scatter chart to the left shows, there is a significant correlation between the poverty level and the vehicle-to-household ratio. Note: Governing identified Harrisonburg as an “outlier” having both a high poverty rate and high rate of auto ownership.

Transportation alternatives: Core urban jurisdictions have the best developed transportation alternatives. In Virginia, traditional cities (and Arlington County) tend to be highly walkable and have access to mass transit.

By way of comparison, New York has the lowest rate of auto dependency in the country — o.6 vehicles per household.

– JAB

The Self-Inflicted Infrastructure “Crisis”

Gravel roads look a whole lot better if you're paying for them yourself.

Gravel roads look a whole lot better if you’re paying for them yourself.

by James A. Bacon

We continually hear about an “infrastructure crisis” in the United States, a malady from which Virginia has not been spared. Talk of pot-holed streets, tottering bridges and crumbling highways invariably moves to talk about the need to spend more on infrastructure, which morphs into raising taxes — never by talk about paring back infrastructure that has outlived its economic usefulness.

However, there is a growing body of commentary suggesting that the problem may not be too little infrastructure but too much — too much of the wrong kind of infrastructure in the wrong place. The drum-bangers for more infrastructure spending ignore a fundamental reality: The more infrastructure you build, the more you have to maintain. The more maintain, the more you spend on maintenance. The more you spend on maintenance, the less there is to spend on new stuff.

Writing in New Geography, John Sanphillippo focuses on the disproportionate resources devoted to paving and maintaining subdivision roads in New Jersey. Based on his description, New Jersey should rename itself from “the Garden State” to “the Asphalt State.” The New Jersey Highway Trust Fund is near bankrupt, he writes. Unless the gas tax is raised, all revenue will go exclusively to debt service. And we thought we had problems in Virginia!

Consider the dynamics in the historic Water Witch subdivision near Sandy Hook. The Home Owners Association maintains gravel subdivision roads. Writes Sanphillippo:

When people believe their property tax money entitles them to certain things they often have high expectations. They tend to have a very different attitude when they know they’re going to be writing a check directly for the level of service they ask for. This difference in who pays for the roads leads to different outcomes.

Back in the late 1980’s I was privy to HOA meeting debates where some members demanded that the roads be paved. They were tired of the ruts, mud puddles, and problems of snow removal. The dirt roads were one of the things that had kept property values depressed for decades. So a consulting engineer was brought in and explained exactly what it would cost to pave the roads. It would be many millions of dollars divided by the forty-two homes in the community. That conversation came to a halt instantly. So much for paved roads at Water Witch. The compromise was to maintain the gravel roads to a slightly higher standard with annual adjustments that were far more cost effective.

When government pays for subdivision roads — or bridges, highways or mass transit — people tend not to care about cost. After all, someone else is paying for it. When confronted with the reality of paying themselves, they have a very different attitude.

Here in Virginia, people get frustrated by traffic congestion, which costs them considerable time and inconvenience. They demand that “government” fix the problem — just don’t raise their taxes. Someone else should pay. When it comes down to forking over their own money, people display a remarkably high tolerance for congestion. If they have to pay for it, they’ll usually opt to plug in their iPod and put up with an extra ten minutes of driving.

This reality — that people always want more of something if someone else is paying for it but will settle for less if they have to pay for it themselves — suggests that we should apply an acid test to transportation projects whenever possible: Can the project be paid for with tolls or user fees? If there’s enough demand, the project should be built. If the demand isn’t there, it shouldn’t be.

Questions we should be asking ourselves: Why should the public be asked to pay to maintain non-through subdivision roads? Why should the public be asked to pay for rural roads that carry barely any traffic? What percentage of Virginia’s maintenance spending is consumed by lightly traveled subdivision roads and country roads — and how many more miles of each do we continue to build year after year? In other words, how much of our infrastructure “crisis” is entirely self-inflicted?

U.S. 29… The Saga Continues

VDOT rendering of proposed Rio Road interchange

VDOT rendering of proposed Rio Road interchange

The battle over the Charlottesville Bypass may be over, but the battle over what to do instead is heating up. After pulling the plug on the super-controversial, $240 million bypass early last year, the McAuliffe administration dusted off a plan to upgrade the U.S. 29 commercial corridor north of Charlottesville by investing in a series of spot improvements, parallel roads and grade-separated interchanges. Now the community is up in arms over the proposal to put an $81 million grade-separated interchange at the intersection with Rio Road.

Last week, “hundreds” of citizens attended an open house meeting to voice their opposition to the interchange, which would eliminate a major bottleneck along the clogged commercial corridor, which also serves as a U.S. highway. (See WVIR’s coverage from last week.)

The most steadfast opposition comes from businesses located near the proposed interchange, whose access to major thoroughfares would be diminished by the new configuration of the Rio Road/U.S. 29 intersection. The businesses have been joined by citizens who worry that construction will cause detours and other inconveniences.

Clearly, there are no perfect, painless solutions. The concerns of those who will be negatively impacted by the project are legitimate. The question is whether those concerns should outweigh the general good stemming from the proposed package of improvements. U.S. 29 is, after all, a U.S. highway, whose primary function is to provide connectivity between cities, not to serve as a local main street.

From what I can glean from local media accounts, pieces of the $200 million corridor improvement package are uncontroversial — a $54 million extension of Berkmar Drive parallel to U.S. 29 and a $51 million widening of U.S. 29 between Hollymeade Town center and Polo Grounds Road. Both projects offer tangible benefits and should go forward.

Here’s the question: Could the $81 million allotted to the Rio Road interchange be invested usefully in other improvements? If so, would the economic return on investment — as measured by congestion mitigated and traffic accidents reduced — come close to the benefits of the Rio Road interchange? If so, perhaps the Virginia Department of Transportation should consider reallocating the funds to other projects. However, if the Rio Road project offers a demonstrably superior return on investment, then VDOT officials should not be dissuaded by the public opposition.

I don’t know the numbers, so I can’t make a judgment. But I do have faith in Philip Shucet, the former VDOT commissioner drafted by the McAuliffe administration to devise a reasonable solution to an intractable problem. If opponents want to make the case that the interchange shouldn’t be built, they should demonstrate how $81 million could be invested to greater effect elsewhere.

Update: Shucet responded to my suggestion that the Rio Road interchange could be hived off from the other improvements: “To make the Berkmar – Hillsdale parallel road network work, you have to grade-separate Rio.  It would be irresponsible to construct Berkmar and Hillsdale and somehow believe that it’s ok to wait and see how Rio fairs in the future. ”

The latest traffic numbers say 107,500 cars, a mix of local traffic and vehicles traveling through the region, will be traveling through the intersection by 2040. The grade-separated interchange (GSI) will allow the through traffic to pass through without conflicting with local traffic.

As for local business’ loss of roadway access, Shucet says, Albemarle Square will lose only one of four points of access, and Fashion Square only one of six. Furthermore, the construction plan limits disruption to 103 days.

– JAB

Smooth Ride Ahead for Uber, Lyft

Is that a smile I see under that Lyft mustache?

Is that a smile I see under that Lyft mustache?

It looks like Uber and Lyft will be a permanent part of the Virginia transportation landscape. Legislation essentially legalizing the two ride-for-hire companies has passed both houses of the General Assembly, and Governor Terry McAuliffe has indicated his willingness to sign the bill.

The legislation proposes entirely reasonable regulations that will allow the transportation-network companies (TNCs) to preserve their business models intact, while providing basic protections for riders. Companies must ensure that all drivers are at least 21 years old and properly licensed, and have been screened for criminal backgrounds and sex offenses. Drivers convicted of driving under the influence or other moving violations would be disqualified. Additionally, drivers are required to maintain an $1 million in liability insurance.

Far from putting a damper on the emerging industry, the regulations could legitimize Uber and Lyft in the minds of consumers. At the same time, the new rules are not so onerous that they would discourage competitors from entering the market. This is a victory for everyone.

“The legislation … provides the perfect balance of public safety measures while fostering innovation,” said Del. Tim Hugo, R-Centreville, a co-patron. “Improving transportation for Virginians takes more than just building infrastructure; it requires us to embrace new technology to better meet citizens’ transportation needs.”

Hugo has it exactly right.

There is more to Uber’s technology than apps that connect riders with drivers. Those apps can, and have been, readily replicated. The real secret sauce is Uber’s proprietary algorithms that tell the company how many cars to have on the road at a given point of time and where they should be positioned.

The next step. It is in society’s best interest for these ride-for-hire apps and algorithms to migrate to lower price-points. The end goal is for Uber, Lyft or other companies inspired by them to provide rides in vans or buses for just a couple of dollars. That will put them in competition with municipal bus companies, which carry a lot more political clout than the taxicab industry. That will be the true test.

– JAB

Transparency, CTB Autonomy Guide New Vision for Transportation Governance

aubrey_layne

Aubrey Layne. Photo credit: Daily News

by James A. Bacon

The Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) has a system for dispensing its approximately $2 billion a year in construction funding that is so blindingly complex that only a few people understand it. If I started explaining it to you in detail, I’d probably have to shoot you halfway through to put you out of your misery.

But I’ll give you a quickie overview so you can understand what the McAuliffe administration, working with Republican leaders in the General Assembly, is trying to accomplish by overhauling the funding formula. The end result, said Transportation Secretary Aubrey Layne in an interview yesterday with Bacon’s Rebellion, will be to transfer decision-making power from the executive branch to a more autonomous Commonwealth Transportation Board, allowing the CTB to function as the policy-setting group it was always meant to be.

Construction dollars come from two sources: state and federal. Roughly $900 million a year in state tax revenues goes into the Transportation Trust Fund. Before anything is spent on state construction projects, money is siphoned into the Highway Maintenance Operations Fund to make up for that fund’s perennial deficits. More money is sluiced away for revenue sharing with localities, and yet more for various administrative expenses. Whatever is left can be spent on construction.

Meanwhile, the $1.1 billion or so in federal highway dollars gets sliced and diced, with dollars peeled away to pay off GARVEE bonds, to maintain U.S. bridges and highways, and to fund miscellaneous programs dictated by Uncle Sam. Whatever is left can be spent on construction.

Thanks to the influx of new state tax dollars, there’s a fair amount of money available for construction these days. But as a practical matter, expenditures are so hemmed in by legislative formulas that the system has little flexibility. Under the 2012 transportation funding overhaul, available funds are to be divvied up as follows: 25% to bridges, 25% to pavement, 25% to high priority discretionary projects, 15% to public-private partnerships 5% to unpaved roads, and 5% to intelligent transportation systems. If there’s any money left over — which there isn’t, even with the 2012 tax increases — additional sums go to unpaved roads and to Interstate matches, and the remainder gets divvied up this way: 40% for primary roads (distributed to each of nine transportation districts), 30% for secondary roads (distributed to individual localities), and 30% to urban roads (cities and towns).

“It is a maze. It is opaque,” Layne said. It’s also inefficient.

As a practical matter, little money trickles down to the localities. It’s like the Colorado River  — so much water has been sucked out along the way that there’s only a rivulet by the time it reaches the ocean. By the time money seeps down to individual transportation districts and individual localities, the amounts are so small they take years to accumulate enough money to actually pay for anything. As a result, money just sits there and gets eroded by inflation.

Another problem with the system, said Layne, who served on the CTB before McAuliffe anointed him transportation secretary, is that the executive branch effectively made all the key decisions. “When we came into office, VDOT was working off ‘the Governor’s List.'” The Governor’s List, an informal entity of obscure origin, was a list of projects reflecting the governor’s priorities, which VDOT then submitted to the CTB. “Where we are today, the governor sets the table,” said Layne. “As a CTB member, it’s hard to rearrange the dishes.”

(During the McDonnell administration, CTB members asked some questions and then invariably approved the requests — usually unanimously. The role of CTB members, I argued in “Kings of the Road” two years ago was to lobby behind the scenes to get projects in their transportation districts accepted by the administration. The board itself exercised little oversight.)

Layne’s goal, and McAuliffe’s, is to restore transparency and CTB independence. To make the policy-making board more independent, the administration is backing legislation that would curtail the executive’s ability to remove CTB members except where there’s cause. This would eliminate a repeat of instances like when former Transportation Secretary Sean Connaughton demanded the resignation of CTB member Jim Rich, a vocal proponent of the administration’s Charlottesville Bypass project.

The proposed new funding formula would create transparency by simplifying the system, Layne said. A new 40/30/30 formula would replace the 25/25/25/15/5/5 formula and portions of the 40/30/30 formula cobbled onto it. The new allocation formula would distribute money as follows: Continue reading

More Tidbits on the U.S. 460 Story…

kilpatrick

Charlie Kilpatrick, Virginia Highway Commissioner

Aubrey Layne was acutely aware of the wetlands permitting issues afflicting the U.S. 460 highway project before assuming his position as Secretary of Transportation in January 2014. As chairman of the funding corporation that sold bonds to investors, he had had to disclose in September 2013 that the Virginia Department of Transportation had not yet acquired the necessary permits from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to build the 55-mile highway. That’s one reason why, when he took the McAuliffe administration cabinet post, he acted so quickly to shut down the project — he’d been stewing over the matter for four months.

In an article yesterday, the Richmond Times-Dispatch gave a pretty good account of the testimony Layne gave to the House Appropriations Committee. The story made clear that the “secretary’s office” — led by former Transportation Secretary Sean Connaughton — was largely responsible for the decisions that created the debacle, which cost Virginia taxpayers roughly $300 million for work that will never be done or needed. But the T-D overlooked what I considered to be a critical topic: What role, if any, did then-deputy highway commissioner Charlie Kilpatrick play in the debacle?

I was able to glean a few more details in an interview with Layne this afternoon when, among other topics, I pressed him on Kilpatrick’s role in the policy meltdown. In a post this morning, I noted that Kilpatrick had made a presentation about U.S. 460 to the Commonwealth Transportation Board in mid-2013 that omitted the crucial fact that the project had not obtained the needed wetlands permits. Assured that there was no problem, the CTB approved the project financing.

Since then, Kilpatrick has been elevated to Virginia Highway Commissioner.

Layne defended the actions of VDOT personnel during the McDonnell administration. On multiple occasions, he said, VDOT officials went to the “secretary’s office” with issues relating to the wetlands permit. “Every time,” he said, “they got orders to keep on going.”

Without getting into specifics, Layne said that Kilpatrick and VDOT did “balk” at times at what they were told to do. “There was some pushback.” But Connaughton was determined to advance the project, which was the top transportation priority of Governor Bob McDonnell. While Kilpatrick did not inform the CTB of all the relevant facts, Layne said, he was acting as instructed. Layne is confident that Kilpatrick was not driving the decision-making process and does not bear responsibility for one of the biggest managerial screw-ups in Virginia government history.

I belabor this point only because I argued this morning that it is important to ascertain Kilpatrick’s role in the U.S. 460 fiasco. McDonnell’s people are all gone, but Kilpatrick now serves as a senior official of the McAuliffe administration. Unless new information surfaces, I consider Layne’s comments to be the final word on the matter.

– JAB

Anticipating the Demise of the Parking Meter

pay_by_phoneAs the City of Charlottesville ponders an upgrade to its downtown parking technology (see “Paying for Onstreet Parking in Cville“), parking guru Bern Grush is looking two steps ahead and thinking about how municipalities should handle the inevitable demise of the parking meter.

At some point in the foreseeable future, parking will be managed in the greater majority of all these cities by all-digital means including phone, Web or in-vehicle, self-paying meters. Accompanying this will be a uniform enforcement approach that uses the license plate number to read parking credentials from the cloud. …

With the top two cell-pay providers in the US each claiming “hundreds” of cities as customers, the trend toward virtual parking meters, digital parking payment, and license plate-enabled parking (LEP) and enforcement credentials appears unstoppable. Many in our industry are increasingly seeing fully wireless parking payment management as the self-evident future.

But that does present a transition problem. Maintaining both parking meters and a wireless system is redundant and expensive. But switching prematurely to an all-digital system can alienate people not comfortable with the technology. Writing in Canadian Parker (flip to page 16) last year, Grush had a few suggestions on how to think about the switch-over.

– JAB

Inching Closer to Accountability on the U.S. 460 Fiasco

Aubrey Layne speaking to reporters yesterday. Photo credit: Richmond Times-Dispatch

Aubrey Layne speaking to reporters yesterday. Photo credit: Richmond Times-Dispatch

by James A. Bacon

In the year that he’s served as Secretary of Transportation, Aubrey J.  Layne Jr. has been reluctant to blame any individual or group of individuals for the U.S. 460 toll road fiasco. But he abandoned that reticence yesterday during a hearing of the House Appropriations Committee.

“All of the information was funneled through the secretary’s office, and they were clearly in charge,” Layne said, referring to the office of his predecessor Sean Connaughton. The McDonnell administration allowed “political and media” considerations to dominate its decision making when fast-tracking construction of the Interstate highway-quality connector between Petersburg and Suffolk, the Richmond Times-Dispatch quotes Layne as saying.

Layne was himself an avid supporter of the public-private partnership project, which then-Governor Bob McDonnell touted as economic development boon for Virginia ports and industrial development in Southeastern Virginia. But when when Governor Terry McAuliffe appointed him as transportation secretary last year, Layne discovered that the state had spent $300 million on the project without obtaining wetlands permits from the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and had little prospect of ever getting them. He promptly pulled the plug on the project.

A “Special Review of the U.S. Route 460 Corridor Improvements Project” ordered by Layne laid out in detail how the McDonnell administration and the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) had ample warning of the USACE’s wetlands concerns but pushed them aside to get construction started on the project before McDonnell’s term ended.

But the Special Review studiously ignored the question of who drove the decision-making process and who made the decision to omit critical information in the formal presentation to the CTB when seeking the board’s approval for project financing.  As I observed last April in “Feet-to-the-Fire Time for Layne, Kilpatrick,” there were three key individuals who could plausibly be held responsible — Transportation Secretary Connaughton, then-Virginia Highway Commissioner Greg Whirley, and then-Deputy Commissioner Charlie Kilpatrick, who actually delivered the presentation. Whirley retired and Connaughton moved on to become president of the Virginia Hospital and Healthcare Association, but Kilpatrick was elevated to Virginia Highway Commissioner.

The issue died in the media but members of the General Assembly apparently were in a mood for answers yesterday. Layne pointed to the “secretary’s office” without mentioning Connaughton by name. By omitting any mention of Kilpatrick, the implication is that he holds the highway commissioner blameless. (Connaughton did not respond to media queries.)

I harp on this matter while others ignore it not to flog Connaughton, whose current job has no bearing directly or indirectly on transportation policy, but to clear Kilpatrick. Back when I was actively covering transportation issues, I had the sense that Kilpatrick was widely liked and respected. But as the chief operations guy at VDOT at the time, he was neck deep in the U.S. 460 imbroglio. He was the one who delivered the misleading presentation to the CTB.

Now that Kilpatrick is Numero Uno, the public has the right to know: Did he have a hand in crafting U.S. 460 policy? Was he just carrying out orders? Did he privately express any reservations to Connaughton about fast-tracking the project? My hunch is that Kilpatrick was acting as the loyal trooper following direct orders when he omitted mention of the permitting issue in his CTB presentation. If I were a wagering man, I’d  bet that he did express private concerns to his higher-ups. But don’t know either of those things for a fact. If I were a state legislator, I would want to know for a fact. The full truth needs to come out, if only to clear the cloud over Kilpatrick’s head.