|
|
|
In
the gubernatorial election of 2001, the anger in
Northern Virginia over the perceived anti-NoVa bias
in Richmond bubbled to the surface. Democratic
candidate Mark Warner, a resident of Alexandria,
became the first gubernatorial candidate to agree to
sign legislation putting a Northern Virginia
regional transportation tax referendum on the
ballot. In 2000, then Republican Gov. Jim Gilmore
had vetoed a bill allowing individual NOVA
localities to conduct a referendum for the purpose
of imposing a local income tax for transportation
and education needs.
Warner took the "populist" position,
rejecting Gilmore's perceived top-down
obstructionism. Mark Earley, the Republican
candidate to succeed Gilmore, vacillated on the
referendum issue. He first backed the concept of
letting Northern Virginians have a vote, but
eventually switched and took Gilmore's hard line
saying he couldn't support any measure that might
lead to such a large tax increase.
Many normally Republican-leaning members of the
region's political/business establishment used this
flip-flop to justify their public support for
Democrat Warner, saying their area had the right to
decide its own destiny.
Boiling the politics of the issue down to its 2001
race essentials: To the Earley people, support for
the referendum issue was symbolic of Warner's tax
and spend liberalism; to us Warner people, support
for empowering citizens through direct democracy was
Jeffersonian conservatism in action.
Desperate to tack the "tax raiser" label
on Warner, but having been blocked so far, the
Earley campaign seized on the referendum issue as
the linchpin for negative TV attack ads. But the
electronic make believe failed to move voters, at
least in terms of how NoVa would vote between the
two candidates for Governor.
However -- and again, this is another key for my
analysis -- the results of the 2001 election in NOVA
have not been understood by Virginia's media.
Typical is the recent column by Jeff Schapiro for
the Richmond Times Dispatch, saying Warner's
position on the referendum won him the Governor's
Mansion by generating support in Northern Virginia.
Unfortunately, there is no empirical data to back up
this claim. My strategy analysis for the Warner
campaign, made months before the referendum battle,
predicted a big win in NoVa, exceeding by good
measure the Chuck Robb victory in the region during
his losing Senate race to George Allen. This
analysis was based on an evolutionary history of
Virginia elections, using a similar intuitive and
statistical review I had used to map Wilder's
strategy for his two big upsets.
On election night 2001, Warner's actual winning NoVa
margin was consistent with these projections, made
LONG BEFORE the referendum issue became the focal
point of the Northern Virginia campaign. However, it
was far smaller than the margin predicted in several
public opinion polls.
Thus, there is no statistical way to know whether
the actual Warner margin would have been far less
had there NOT been local tax option fight between
the candidates. But since the polls expected Earley
to lose far bigger in NoVa, the weight of the
evidence is that the pundits are still believing
their 2001 rhetoric a year later, having never
bothered to let the best data interfere with their
positions.
Indeed, the fact that Earley's anti-tax referendum
message may have done much better in NoVa than
predicted in the election polls was never mentioned
this past Tuesday by these same reporters and
pundits. But for those who want to understand
politics, not just pontificate, it bears
remembering, as this circumstance of polls badly
understating public opposition to local road tax
measures has now been repeated several times in
2002.
So the question must be asked: While NoVa residents
clearly resent the "Richmond Knows Best"
attitude of Mr. Earley, why didn't the issue produce
meaningful evidence of a sizable impact on the
actual vote in the general election? The polling
data for several years now says it should have, but
yet it hasn't. Why the disconnect?
At the time, what little thought I gave it led to
this tentative conclusion: The referendum issue, as
often happens with populist measures, operated more
as a protest vehicle than as a substantive issue
involving a definite vote on transportation policy.
Clearly, NOVA voters were angry over traffic
congestion and blamed Richmond for the maddening
problem. They were eager to find a way to make this
point.
But at the same time, the referendum operated on
other levels, with these different angles sometimes
in direct, confusing conflict with each other.
Candidate Mark Warner at least seemed to realize
that Richmond was part of the problem, not the
solution. This all sides could agree on. Yet it is
often forgotten that candidate Warner never said he
would vote for the tax increase. This strategy was
attacked as wishy-washy at the time. But I still
maintain it was the right approach.
I have not spoken to Governor Warner since
midsummer. So I don't have his take in Part 3,
entitled ANATOMY OF A DEFEAT.
But as I close this Part 2, we have brought the
discussion from a winter tropical vacation for
Governor Baliles in late 1988 all the way to the
summer of July, 2002. In my view, the ground beneath
the NoVa tax referendum started to shift on account
of what seemed a minor decision debated in the press
at the time but not mentioned in the post-election
analysis that I read.
Back in July 2002, the public polls showed the
referendum winning easily, the predicted landslide
margins unchanged since the Washington Post
polls taken during the campaign.
Then, suddenly, the resignation of Fairfax GOP Sen.
Warren Barry gave Virginia Democratic Party leaders
in NoVa visions of sugar plumps dancing in their
heads. They believed a special election, called for
August, would give them a chance to win another
Senate seat, narrowing the Party's margin deficit to
21-19. NoVa Democratic Senators had their
hand-picked candidate, she was pro-referendum. The
Republicans figured to be split after a tough
nomination battle, with the chance that an unknown
anti-referendum candidate named Ken Cuccinelli might
win. He was opposed by the business elite backing
the referendum and seen as easy to beat, especially
since Senator Barry could be counted to back the
Democrat in such a case.
Looking back from the post-November 5th perspective,
the debate over the Cuccinelli candidacy, and the
game theory analysis of whether or not to call a
special election, is a political case study one will
not get in Professor Sabato's class at UVA or from
Dr. Holsworth at VCU.
But it teaches a lot, and in this business, everyone
always has a lot to learn, whether they are right or
wrong, whether they win or lose.
Politics is just a learning experience until that
moment when you get your chance to play in the big
game. As they say, all the rest is foreplay.
-- November 18,
2002
|
