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PART
I of "The Problem with Cars"
demonstrated that primary reliance on
Autonomobiles yields settlement pattern
dysfunction.
Part
II showed recreation and entertainment venues
have much to teach about the use of
shared-vehicle systems to achieve Mobility and
Access. We found that from a
thoughtful consideration of recreation and
entertainment venues, citizens can come to
understand the limits of Mobility and Access
provided by the Autonomobile. They also can
learn why Agencies, Enterprises and Institutions
that have the mission and responsibility to make
citizens happy and safe should make
shared-vehicle systems the focus of Mobility and
Access to serve functional human settlement
patterns.
PART
III turns to a second way to examine the reality
of Autonomobiles. In this section, we examine
venues that exacerbate Autonomobile over-use.
The venues in question are facilities for mass
acquisition of retail goods - the familiar urban
land use called the “The Big Box.”
By
learning why customers are attracted to Big
Boxes, citizens can gain an understanding of the
forces driving ever more extensive use of
Autonomobiles. They can learn also why they need
to modify habits to limit intrusion of Big Boxes
into everyday life. Finally, citizens can
respond more intelligently when Big Boxes apply
to build nearby.
A
Place to Start: The Argument for More Big Boxes Big
Box stores such as the “super stores” of Wal*Mart,
Target, Sears, BJ’s, Sam’s Club, COSTCO and
others are found throughout the US of A. There
are about 40 of these venues - either free
standing or grouped in “Power Centers” - in
Fairfax County, Va., alone, and more are
proposed. (See End
Note Twenty-six.)
The
macro-economic context of the Big Box retail
is brilliantly described by Robert Reich
throughout "Supercapitalism: The
Transformation of Business, Democracy, and
Everyday Life." (See End
Note Twenty-seven.)
Big
Box chains must continually increase sales and
develop new stores to maintain the “growth”
that analysts and stockholders expect. An
expeditious way to come to understand the human
settlement pattern reality of Big Boxes and
their relationship to Autonomobiles is to
consider arguments for and against creating more
Big Boxes. There
are two free-standing Big Boxes in Greater
Warrenton Fauquier, Va. Another Big Box is on
the horizon. During 2007, discussion of the
proposal was the subject of many articles
letters to the editor in the Beta Community’s
MainStream Media. In one letter to The
Fauquier Times Democrat, a citizen who was
active in the anti-COSTCO campaign, stated that
“by a 9 to 1 margin,” citizens in the
vicinity (emphases added) of the proposed
COSTCO just off US Route 29 in New Baltimore are
opposed to the use. A news story in the same
issue of the same paper suggested that citizens
are not against “COSTCO per se” but against
COSTCO in that location. (See End
Note Twenty-eight and APPENDIX
ONE.) The
argument for and against more big boxes is the
same in almost every Big Box fight:
Conventional
Wisdom is that Big Boxes are not a bad land
uses per se, however, this Big Box is proposed
in a bad location. Let
us not try to fool one another: There are no
“good” locations for “Big Box” land
uses.
Big
Boxes are both: (a) generators of excessive,
unnecessary Autonomobile and truck traffic, and
(b) symptoms of over reliance on Autonomobiles
for Mobility and Access in the customer shed of
the facility.
A
Big Box store is not just a good use in a bad
location, it is an indication that
dysfunctional Autonomobile- dominated human
settlement patterns already exist in the area
surrounding the proposed site.
Applications
for a new Big Box indicate that the
corporation’s store location staff is betting
that the scatteration of urban land uses in the
customer shed will continue to grow worse. Many
applications for Big Boxes are outside the
logical location for the Clear Edge around the
Core of New Urban Regions and so these proposed
locations impact both the Urbanside and the
Countryside. There
is no way to provide for Automobile traffic
generated by Big Boxes and, at the same time
maintain either viable Countryside or quality
Urbanside. By
“viable Countryside” we mean places where
nonurban economic, social and physical
activities prosper. By
“quality Urbanside” we mean the patterns and
densities of urban land uses and open space that
have been proven in the marketplace to be the
most desirable when citizens have a choice and
where there is even a threshold attempt to
fairly allocate location-variable costs. The
reasons for this statement are obvious from the
prior two PARTs of this Backgrounder. It
should be noted that originally, in the mid- to
late-20th Century, Big Boxes were located near
small urban agglomerations in Urban Support
Regions (USRs). That market has been saturated.
In addition, many urban enclaves in USRs are
shrinking. On the other hand, New Urban Regions
are growing. The preferred target (pun intended
) for Big Box expansion is outside the logical
location for the Clear Edge. NB:
Retail outlets of Big Box Enterprises located in
the Zentra of Villages and Communities within
the Clear Edge around the Core of New Urban
Regions have recently been developed as the
“anchor” of “new urbanist” inspired
“mixed use” projects. This Backgrounder does
not address those venues. These facilities may
have limited or paid parking and may contribute
to functional settlement patterns at the
Neighborhood scale and Village scale. The
beneficial impact of these facilities is
addressed at the conclusion of this PART. Myth
and Perception The
reality of Big Boxes is much different than the
common perception supported by Big Box
advertising and public relations initiatives. For
their very existence, Big Boxes rely on a wide
range of direct and indirect subsidies. By
“subsidies” we mean intentional and
unintentional transfers of wealth from citizens
and Agencies to Big Box Enterprises. Before
examining these two spheres of subsidy, it is
important to state for the record:
Big
Box corporations are Enterprises - they are in
business to make money.
That
may seem so obvious that it is not worth
mentioning. On the other hand, the advertising
and public relations efforts of Big Box chains
lead some to act as if Big Boxes were
established as an eleemosynary service to
customers. Wal*Mart, the largest corporation in
the US of A, did not achieve that status by
giving away anything. Loss leaders are
calculated to induce more overall spending. Wal*Mart
and other Big Boxes achieved their size and
market dominance by shrewdly optimizing their
positions in the context created by consumer
proclivities and Agency controls, programs and
incentives. That is not “wrong,” it is just
fact. If
one can set aside the deceptive advertising and
public relations strategies that take advantage
of gullible customers and Agencies, Big Box
Enterprises are not Villains. Big Box
Enterprises are doing those things that will
make them the most money in the shortest time
within the context established by an
unenlightened consumer- driven market and the
Agency-established regulations, incentives and
programs. Big Box Enterprises, like all
Enterprises, are driven by powerful regional,
nation-state and global forces articulated by
Robert Reich. (See Again End
Note Twenty-seven.) Most
of the MainStream Media attention on Big Box’s
negative impact is focused on how Big Box
corporations treat employees, suppliers and
competitors. The legal actions and protests
against Wal*Mart and other Big Boxes are
bankrolled by Enterprises and Institutions that
are negatively impacted by Big Box actions -
unions, grocery chains, pharmacy chains, banking
and other interests. As
controversial, complex and “anti-social” as
some of the oft-discussed direct impacts of Big
Boxes are, to understand the human settlement
pattern impacts it is necessary to step back and
carefully consider the reality of Big Boxes as a
class. The following sections document how Big
Boxes generate and support Autonomobility and
thus create dysfunctional human settlement
patterns, a phenomenon that, in turn, has broad,
negative impact on society in general. In
"Supercapitalism," Robert Reich does
an excellent job of describing how and why Wal*Mart
and other Big Boxes have achieved market
dominance. He spotlights the pressure on Big Box
Enterprises to continually expand sales and
increase profits. Unfortunately, as noted in End
Note Twenty-Seven, Reich is silent
on the locational impacts of Big Boxes. It is
the locational ramifications of Big Boxes that
drive dysfunctional human settlement patterns
and Autonomobility. These are, in fact, the most
negative impacts of Big Boxes. Consumer
Subsidies The
first step is to understand the context and
realities of what we term “subsidies.” How
does a customer “subsidize” a retail outlet?
Consider the time, resources and energy that
customers expend in order to get to, get around
in and get out of Big Box stores. There are
other subsidies explored below, but first we
examine why customers provide subsidies. What
is done to confuse customers and maximize the
capture of consumer spending? The following is a
threshold survey of issues that shed light on
this question: Attracting
Buyers. The basic consumer attraction to Big
Boxes is driven by two deep-seated genetic
proclivities. Citizens desire to:
Clever
advertising and public relations translates
these proclivities into: “Come to our Big Box,
buy lots of stuff, save a lot of money and live
the good life.” The same genetic proclivities
drive Mass OverConsumption in general. Big Boxes
have made a science of taking advantage of these
proclivities. Wal*Mart advertises that shoppers
will “save money and live better.” That
couplet is hard to argue with, but can Big Boxes
really deliver on that promise?
Big
Box retail corporations understand human genetic
coding and play to them by claiming to provide
“bargains” in large packages. They hire the
best consumption psychologist money can buy and
when their theories only produce a better
product or better service and not more revenue,
they fire them.
The
mirage of “bargains” is a powerful
delusion. Citizens will put up with depressing
locations, congested access, ill designed,
confusing parking lots and poorly designed
building exteriors as well as drab and
uncomfortable building interiors to acquire
items that they believe are “bargains.”
(See End
Note Twenty-nine.)
The
Best-Deal-in-Town Illusion. Big Box chains
promote the idea of one-stop shopping and
bargains - “The Lowest Price, Always”;
“Nobody has lower prices, Nobody.” Anyone
who bothers to do careful comparison shopping
can find out for themselves that Big Boxes often
do not offer the best deal compared to
traditional stores in the same market. (See End
Note Thirty.)
If
the customer needs (or wants) one of the items
that is featured in this week’s advertising
that’s one thing. If, on the other hand, one
needs (or wants) one of the hundred thousand or
so other items that are carried in Big Boxes
they may or may not be getting the best quality,
the best choice or the best price. (See End
Note Thirty-one.)
One
can be assured that what they purchase at a Big
Box makes the most profit for the Enterprise or
attracts customers who buy other goods and
services that profit the corporation. That is
not bad per se, that is what Enterprises are in
business to do - make money. The problem is that
the location and function of the Big Box places
unrecognized monetary and time burdens on the
customer and on Agencies. All the while, Big Box
advertising suggests the customer is getting the
best price, selection and quality.
The
goal of Big Box chains is simple: Get as many
customers as possible to spend as much money
as possible. Multi-national Enterprises do not
make handsome profits by selling most items at
or near their cost – to repeat: Big Boxes
are not in business to provide “bargains.”
In
all cases the issue of getting a “bargain”
depends on how one does the mathematics.
Whether
or not what a customer buys in a Big Box is in
fact a bargain depends on the bottom line
after factoring in elements of the total cost.
To
have a complete picture, the equation must
include the value of one’s time and the cost
of travel. A calculation must also include the
service burden imposed by the scattered location
of the Big Box facilities on municipal, state
and federal Agencies.
Beyond
the Illusion of Bargains. Inventory
control, display and pricing strategies are
established to maximize sales and optimize
profits, not to provide convenience. Computers
allow Big Boxes to manipulate inventory and
price in ways that optimize the amount of profit
from all the products they sell, compensating
for loss leaders and other techniques that stimulate shopping. (See
End
Note Thirty-two.)
Big
Boxes and other chains use data-mining and
purchase- tracking techniques such as those
noted in End Note
Thirty-two. Unlike Amazon.com, however, they
may not tell you they have been following your
patterns. There is nothing intrinsically wrong
with these practices if the shopper is informed
of the scrutiny, and if, as a result of Big Box
data, mining the customer can acquire goods and
services that he / she wants and will use, it is
a benefit.
The
issue of what one needs, what one wants and
what one can afford frequently get confused by
push marketing as documented by the record
credit card debt carried by citizens in the US
of A and the growth of debt management
services.
This
debt would have translated into a record number
of bankruptcies but for recent changes in the
federal bankruptcy laws enacted to protect
creditors.
Beyond the pain of over spending,
there is the larger issue of the escalation of
the per capita and cumulative Mass
OverConsumption. (See the Backgrounder “A
New Metric for Citizen Well Being,” 10
December 2006.)
Inventory
manipulation goes beyond price to include the
amount of goods in a package and the variety of
goods available. Shelving and displays are
designed to make it look like there is a
splendid variety of goods for sale. You may have
noticed that newly “remodeled” Big Boxes and
grocery chains have more ambiance and larger
packages but fewer items and thus less real
choice. There are many items and package sizes
that were available in the last generation of
the same chain’s stores which no longer are.
A
primary objective of the recent store
“improvements” has been to eliminate those
items which sold only a limited number of
units and to sell larger packages of the
goods. A one pound box of granulated sugar is
now much harder to find, for example.
Big
Boxes steer the shopper towards larger quantity
packaging and thus generate a higher profit per
item. Large quantities are a good idea for big
Households but Households are getting smaller,
not bigger. Large quantities encourage
over-buying, spoilage and waste. They also
enable / encourage less frequent - but longer -
trips to retail service outlets. That means more
efficient Big Boxes but less efficient
Households.
The
variety of items available to the shopper has
narrowed to focus on those that make the most
profit and those that move off the shelves
fastest. By monitoring the competition, rival
Big Boxes can ensure that many stores offer the
same fast-moving, profitable items. The flip
side is that some products cannot be obtained no
matter where one looks. The availability of
specialty items via the Internet has exacerbated
this trend, making shopping more complex, more
costly and more time consuming.
Think
you are getting the best price or the best
choice? Do some careful comparison shopping and
check out reality for yourself. When calculating
the cost, be sure to include the value of your
time and the cost of travel.
Variations
on Basic Big Box Themes
It
is important to note that all Big Boxes are not
the same. Target tries to provide more
“design” and quality in their products than
Wal*Mart. COSTCO prides itself on paying higher
wages and offering more worker benefits than Wal*Mart.
As Reich points out in "Supercapitalism," when the
growth and profit at COSTCO does not meet
“expectations” the pressure builds to cut
those “frills.”
Wal*Mart,
the 800-pound gorilla of Big Boxes, is not
immune to pressures from customers and critics.
The most significant recent change at Wal*Mart
has been to wrap the corporate image in a mantle
of green. There is a fierce fight going over
whether this is just Greenwashing or if it
signals real change. (See End
Note Thirty-three.)
Have
you noticed how Big Boxes encourage customers to
“go green” and accompany this self-serving
moralizing with lists of “green” products to
buy? (See "Greed
in the Name of Green," at the Bacon's
Rebellion blog, 17 March 2008.)
Wal*Mart,
Home Depot, Lowe’s and others advertise
specials on energy-saving appliances and other
goods. They have an endless parade of ways for
customers to buy more so they can feel
“green.”
The
reality is that the scattered locations of large
retail outlets and the direct travel and
indirect inefficiencies of the settlement
patterns generated and supported by Big Boxes
consume far more energy and generate far more
pollution than all the green innovations in
their warehouses, trucks or stores -- and much,
much more than fluorescent bulbs they can sell
-- will save. And that doesn't even account for
the resources embedded in every product, or the
blister packaging that is required to hold down
the theft in large, impersonal stores with
small, underpaid staffs. The list is nearly
endless.
Now,
The Other Subsidies
In
addition to consumer subsidies, there is a
second category of subsidies - Agency subsidies
for Big Boxes and their distribution system.
These include roadways as well as direct and
indirect payments to stimulate “job growth”
and the cost of supplying social and economic
services for low-wage, Big Box workers. These
subsidies ultimately come out of citizens'
pockets in the form of taxes and fees -
municipal, state and federal.
Efficiency
of Operation. One hears that a major reason
Big Boxes can offer “bargains” is the
immense buying power of large chains. It is a
fact that the volume of Big Box purchases
creates leverage in the wholesale market. However, Big
Boxes would have that same buying power leverage
in China, South East Asia or Brazil if the chain
sold the same volume of goods from 10,000-square-foot
stores as they did from 200,000-square-foot
stores.
This
lynchpin of Big Box economics, often
overlooked, shows why location and scale are
so important.
One
also hears about Big Box’s efficient
warehousing and delivery system. This is where
the benefit of store size and store location
pays dividends for Wal*Mart and other Big
Boxes. It is far more efficient to distribute
to and operate one 200,000-square-foot store
than four 50,000- square-foot stores or twenty
10,000-square-foot stores.
The
trick is to get enough customers driving to a
single location to make a 200,000-square-foot
store feasible. The other side of the equation
is to get Agencies to foot the bill for
roadways, subsidize “job creation” at
warehouses and distribution centers, and
provide other support for the distribution
system.
Once
there are a lot of big stores that are “making
their numbers” and there is an efficient
distribution system, leveraging the suppliers
based on volume is a piece of cake. What is the
impact of this “efficiency”?
Study
after study has shown that the net Regional
impact of Big Box “efficiency” is to reduce
total employment in retail. That makes sense if
one gives the issue thought. Overall,
“efficiency” of operation means fewer and
lower paid employees. Retail trade is shifted
from relatively inefficient Neighborhood,
Village, Community and Regional retailers to
very efficient multi-national Big Box retailers.
(See End
Note Thirty-four.)
Big
Box Site Selection
Big
Box retail centers are located using Radial
Analysis. Large chains try to locate a new
store so that it has X Households, with at least
Y average disposable income within Z miles of
the new store. They also want to locate their
store away from potential competitors to limit
comparison shopping. This makes trip chaining
more difficult and engenders scatteration of
origins and destinations of travel. The bottom
line is demand for “beyond the Clear Edge”
store locations, as noted above.
Another
Big Box corporate goal is to acquire a site as
inexpensively as possible. It is axiomatic that
the asking price for a potential Big Box site is
determined in large part by the quality of
access. The site-selection strategy of Big Box
chains is to buy cheap sites with poor access
and find ways for others to improve the access
as suggested below. Also note that acquiring a
large, cheap site makes it less expensive to
provide parking. (See PART IV concerning Parking
subsidies.)
Big
Box chains and their agents taut the tax revenue
that the municipality and the state will reap
from taxes on sales and operation. The problem
is that the total tax revenues do not cover the
total costs. In addition, the revenues do not
flow to accounts that pay for the cost
generated. In the typical Big
Box, much of the tax and fee revenue goes to the
state but much of the cost and inconvenience
fall on the municipality and its citizens. (See End
Note Thirty-five.)
In
sum, Big Box site selection parameters lead to
scatteration, the driving force of dysfunctional
human settlement patterns. (For a future
discussion of this issue see the three-column
“Special Report” at Bacon’s Rebellion
that includes “Wild
Abandonment,” 8 September 2003; “Scatteration,”
22 September 2003; and “The
Myths that Blind Us,” 20 October 2003.)
Warehouse
and Distribution Subsidies
The
best location for a warehouse / distribution
facility for a Big Box Enterprise is within
half a day’s drive of the maximum number of
scattered Big Box retail locations. One of the
most frequent state-level Big Box subsidies is
support for “job development” at
“distribution centers.” The process works
like this: The Big Box agent finds a cheap site
in a remote location with access to an
Interstate access ramp and rail service. This
combination is not hard to find because the
parameters that determine the alignment of the
Interstate system between New Urban Regions are
similar to those that determine the location of
interRegional rail lines a century earlier. Big
Box agents then look for municipalities that
have job / tax base deficits and seek subsidies
from pandering governance practitioners at the
state and municipal levels for “job
creation.” Funds are used to pay for access,
site improvements and job training. Part IV will
explore a "portal to portal pay" to
address the issue.
Roadway
Subsidy for Big Boxes and for Big Box Chain
Distribution
The
biggest, most direct and easiest to understand
Agency subsidy for Big Boxes is roadway
improvements for individual stores as well as
for warehouse / distribution facilities. When
customers are attracted from long distances, the
impact is felt far from the Big Box site. When
Big Boxes are supplied by trucks traveling long
distances, the negative impact is distributed
over an even wider area. Making matters worse,
taxes and fees on long-haul trucks pay only
about 30 percent of the true roadway wear and
tear of “heavy goods” vehicles.
There
is not good data on the topic of travel to
acquire goods and services at Big Box facilities
but Stacy Mitchell in “Big Box Swindle: The
True Cost of Mega-Retailers and the Fight for
America’s Independent Businesses” cited in
End Notes 28, 32 and 34 point out that travel
for “shopping” has increased dramatically
since the advent of Big Boxes. This is
especially true or locations outside the Clear
Edges in New Urban Regions and Urban Support
Regions.
Learning
from Wal*Mart and Other Big Boxes
So,
what can be learned from Big Boxes that will
inform citizens about Autonomobility? First
citizens can learn to be forearmed with respect
to Big Box applications. There are no “good”
locations for Big Boxes.
More
important is to understand the futility of
zoning and other regulatory approaches. Big Box
regulation by municipal governments is a classic
example of closing the barn door after the horse
is gone. By the time there is pressure for
municipal governments to regulate Big Boxes, the
corporation has already decided that market and
other conditions exist to make the site an
attractive location for a Big Box in the middle
of a big parking lot. (See End
Note Thirty-six.)
A
Big Box store application is an indication
that dysfunctional distribution of origins and
destinations of travel demand already exist.
It also means that the Big Box chain staff has
found a cheap site with X Households, with Y
average disposable income within Z miles of
the site.
Serious
interest in “regulating” the Big Box - as
opposed to welcoming the Big Box with open arms
as a “generator of new jobs and a service to
residents” - occurs when the municipal
jurisdiction is about to reach the “Tipping
Point” outlined in “Burned
Out,” 10 July 2006, a Bacon’s
Rebellion column. (See End
Note Thirty-seven and APPENDIX ONE.)
The
“Burned Out” column focuses on the
transition from a municipal government’s
“pro-development / tax base growth”
orientation to “concern for the impact of
development.” Rejection of a Big Box
application is a clear indicator that the
municipal government is ready to consider
proposals for land use changes that will result
in functional settlement patterns.
The
question is: Will there still be the resources
left to do it right and create Balance? This is especially
important since it now requires “redoing”
what should have been done in the first place.
Alternatives
to the Big Box
The
solution to limiting the impact of Big Boxes is
not regulation. The solution is creating
functional human settlement patterns consisting
of Balanced Communities – and Balanced,
organic components of Communities – both
inside the Clear Edge (the Urbanside) and
outside the Clear Edge (the Countryside). When
those conditions exist, the Big Box problem goes
away. Big Box chains have no interest in
locating a typical one-story warehouse store
surrounded by parking lots in the Zentrum of an
Alpha Village or an Alpha Community. As
suggested earlier, the Big Box Enterprise may,
with a fundamentally different facility
configuration, contribute to the evolution of
functional human settlement patterns.
The
first step is to create a level playing field
by getting rid of single-use, segregated
zoning restrictions and create a process to
support evolution of a Balanced (Alpha)
Community.
As
Alpha components evolve, Enterprises will open
retail outlets that sell the same or similar
goods but from smaller stores convenient to
residents. They will be located in
Neighborhood-, Village- and Community-scale
Zentra. These places support shared-vehicle
systems and the total cost of goods and services
will be lower. As a recent ad in WaPo
suggests “life will be within walking
distance.”
In
the meantime, there is also a need to
intelligently tax all Big Box stores based on
the real demand they place on Agency services.
The Retail Service District tax is discussed in The
Shape of the Future, Chapter 30 Box 3:
Multi-Objective Tax Policy. The revenue
collected from Retail Service District tax would
reflect, among other things, the distance
customers have to travel to a store and how many
places offering similar goods and services were
closer to the home (or workplace) of the
shopper. (See End Note
Thirty-eight for a copy of Chapter 30 Box
3.)
Big
Box applications for new or expanded facilities
can be leveraged to generate Affordable and
Accessible Housing and to address other urban
fabric needs generated by the projects. An
example would be putting Affordable and
Accessible Housing Units on top of parking
structures and retail space that is equal to the
number of employees the store hires. That does
not mean all the employees live near the store,
it does mean they could if they so chose.
Affordable and Accessible dwelling units should
be added to the Community inventory equal to the
number of employees. The current practice is to
surround the Big Box with parking lots and
expect workers to find housing even thought
there is none in proximity to the jobs.
Some
can be expected to say: “Wait a minute! We
want the 'convenience' of a Big Box but do not
want housing for workers anywhere near here.”
That is exactly the sort of reaction that
has generated the municipal plans and
regulations that result in dysfunctional human
settlement patterns and the dominance of
Autonomobiles. In the long term, unBalanced
human settlement patterns are not sustainable
and there will be neither quality goods at
affordable prices nor Affordable and Accessible
Housing. (See "The
Role of Municipal Planning in Creating
Dysfunctional Human Settlement Patterns,"
23 January 2002.)
Big
Box Summary
The
viability of a Big Box is based on the desire,
and ability, of large numbers of citizens to
drive long distances to buy large quantities of
consumer goods at what they believe to be
bargain prices.
This
reality plays to genetic proclivities to save
money and to have large stocks of supplies. It
also reflects the fact that citizens do not
understand the cost, in either time or
resources, required to drive to scattered Big
Boxes. In addition, they do not realize the
facility and its support system, in that
location, are also subsidized by Agency
expenditures.
Big
Boxes are the exponents of scatteration. They
guarantee more Autonomobility, longer trips,
more disaggregation for the reasons spelled
out in PART I. This reality will be further
explored in PART IV.
Citizens
say the opposition to Big Boxes is about
“traffic” but they often miss the point. The
discussion must address the distribution of
origins and destinations of travel generated by
existing Big Boxes and those yet to be built.
Scattered, dysfunctional settlement patterns
enable Big Boxes to make money -- and induce
even more Autonomobile travel in the future.
That is why long-term strategies impacting human
settlement patterns should be addressed long
before Big Box applications are submitted.
--
March 24, 2003
End
Notes (26).
It is hard to distinguish between a “Big
Boxes” and the larger stores (also known as
“category killers”) operated by chains such
as Home Depot, Lowe’s, Best Buy, Dick’s,
Staples, Office Depot, and some grocery chains
such as H.E.B. This is especially true if they
are grouped together in a “power center.”
In Europe the all-in-one grocery plus consumer
retail outlets like H.E.B. are called
“hyper-marts.” “Hyper” is a useful way
to describe them. (27).
Reich, Robert B., "Supercapitalism, The
Transformation of Business, Democracy, and
Everyday Life." New York, Knopf, 2007.
The problem with the Reich perspective on Big
Boxes is, as noted later, complete obliviousness
to the impact of location and spacial
relationships of Big Box facilities. Other
than that Mrs. Lincoln... (28).
For reasons spelled out in THE
ESTATES MATRIX, MainStream Media in news
coverage and editorials tend to support any
expansion of retail trade that may expand
advertising revenue. For an opposing perspective
based on the impacts of small Enterprises, see
Mitchell, Stacy, in "Big Box Swindle: the
True Cost of Mega-Retailers and the Fight for
America's Independent Businesses," Beacon
Press, 2006. (29).
The Big Box “load-up-the-car / low
amenity” shopping habits have been introduced
to many by the Agency-subsidized shopping provided in
military commissaries. (30).
When the international credit crisis raised
the threat of a recession in January 2008, Wal*Mart
“chopped prices in bid to lure shoppers.”
Price cuts of 30 percent were reported with more
to come. Wal*Mart must not have been charging
their best price before the reductions.
See “Wal*Mart chops prices in bid to lure
shoppers: No. 1 retailer to offer discounts of
up to 30% on groceries, other items ahead of
Super Bowl weekend; more cuts ahead,” CNN
Money, 29 January 2008. (31).
There is a “non-super” Wal*Mart in
Greater Warrenton-Fauquier that existed before
we moved to the Beta Community six years ago. A
Home Depot outlet subsequently opened next door.
Since Home Depot opened, we have done a survey
of roughly 20 items at both Wal*Mart and Home
Depot to determine if the items were available
at hardware (and other retail outlets) that
existed before Home Depot opened. We checked to
see IF the items (1) are cheaper or (2) there is
a better range of choices. In 15 of the 20
items, it turned out that one of the
pre-existing retail outlets had either a better
price, better variety or better quality for the
same price for the items compared. In several
cases the Big Boxes did not even carry the
needed home / shop / garden / repair item. In
addition, almost all were easier to find. There
is a pattern that emerged in these searches: Big
Boxes do not have parts and supplies to repair
many items but rather stock new units to replace
them. Replacement makes a larger profit and is
“easier” in economic good times. In
addition, Big Boxes benefit from offering delivery /
installation services. For some replacement
items the warranty is void if they do not
install the item. Getting warranty work done is a
three-way battle with installer, Big Box and Big
Box supplier. In
recent months one finds more and more empty
racks for some specific products in the
preexisting Village outlets, perhaps indicating
a decline in the will to compete which is one of
the documented fallouts of pressure from Big Box
retail. Our
survey was aided by candid / off-the-record
discussions with the manager of the Home Depot
whom we happened to meet / seek out during
several searches. He noted a number of
instances when “corporate” decisions
overrode what he believed would serve Greater
Warrenton-Fauquier citizens best and still make
a profit for Home Depot. (Also see books
cited in End
Note 32.) In
the case of Greater Warrenton, the preexisting
retail outlets happen to be located closer to
other retail destinations, making chained trips
more convenient. (32).
If one wants to experience a clear
demonstration of the power of computers to
process data on preferences and push the buyer,
try this: Sign on to Amazon.com and go browsing
for books (or any thing else). Then sign on
again a few hours later and find out how much
Amazon was able to learn about you, your
interests and preferences by what the website
suggests that you might want to buy. “Since
you looked at A, B and C you will surely want to
buy X, Y and Z.” “Those who looked and D, E
and F also purchased U, V and W.” Other
online retail sites are now adopting this
practice. Similar insights come from the coupons
that grocery chains dispense after a sale,
especially if one uses a frequent shopper
“discount” card. Some outlets mail coupons
based on shopping data and many send discount
coupons to those who have not visited a store
recently. For further information on the basics
of push marketing upon which Big Boxes thrive,
see Underhill, Paco: “Why We Buy: The Science
of Shopping.” Simon & Schuster, 1999; and
Satterthwaite, Ann: “Going Shopping: Consumer
Choices and Community Consequences,” Yale
University Press, 2001; Mitchell,
Stacy, in "Big Box Swindle: the True Cost
of Mega-Retailers and the Fight for America's
Independent Businesses," Beacon Press,
2006. (33).
An exploration of Wal*Mart and Greenwash is
beyond the scope of this Backgrounder.
However, a listing of a few recent headlines
provides an overview: “Wal*Mart Aims To Enlist
Suppliers In Green Mission,” WaPo, 25
Sept 2007; “At Wal*Mart, ‘Green’ Has
Various Shades: Environmental Push Earns Mixed
Results; A Way to go till Wal*Mart Goes
Green,” WaPo, 16 Nov 2007; “Working
With the Enemy,” Fast Company,
September 2007. Wal*Mart
is in a very strong position for the reasons
outlined by Reich in Supercapitalism (See End
Note 27 above) but the Enterprise is not
immune to outside pressure: “Wal*Mart Reaches
Out in Self-Defense: Retailer Embraces Political
Activism, Wal-Mart Launches Green Campaign,
Beefs Up Lobbying.” (WaPo, 24 Nov
2007); “Wal*Mart Considers Different Store
Sizes as Rival Emerges” (WaPo, 28 Aug
2007); “Wal-Mart’s New Tack: Show Em
the Payoff” (WaPo, 13 Sept 2007); and
“Wal*Mart Sharpens Vision: EEO Embarks on
Mission of Social Responsibility” (WaPo,
24 January 2008). While
all the headlines from WaPo suggest a
hard nosed look at the reality of Wal*Mart, the
stories are “stories” and all have the
stench of “He Said, She, Said Journalism”
for the reasons outlined in THE ESTATES
MATRIX. (34).
Stacey
Mitchell's book, "Big Box Swindle: the True
Cost of Mega-Retailers and the Fight for
America's Independent Businesses," is all
over this issue. The context of this issue is spelled out
in Reich’s "Supercapitalism" but without any discussion of
the locational impact. For a
plug-in-the-numbers, do-it-yourself Big Box
Impact Calculator, go to http://bigboxevaluator.org (35).
See http://bigboxevaluator.org for the
parameters that go into the self-help Big Box
Impact Calculator. (36).
Fairfax County, VA’s recent sojourn into the
area of “tightening” their Big Box center
regulations provides a classic example of
tinkering with a failed regulatory approach.
The foolishness of the process was highlighted
by the comments of Business-As-Usual agents. One
comment in a post on Bacon’s Rebellion Blog
was especially alarming: “More Big Box
stores are coming to Fairfax County and they
will reduce the traffic.” This statement
violates the laws of physics and logic. This
writer was not just whistling past the
graveyard, he is a one-person band blaring away
with trumpet, organ and drums. (37).
The 10 July 2006 Bacon’s Rebellion column “Burned
Out,” explores the Tipping Point issue for
Fauquier County and the Virginia portion of the
National Capital Subregion. Unfortunately, due
to the size of the jurisdictions and the poor
citizen understanding of the dynamics of
settlement pattern evolution, this process can
go on for decades as evidenced by Fairfax
County, Va., and more recently Loudoun County,
Va. The jurisdiction’s voters have flipped and
flopped from “pro” to “anti”
“growth” over several decades. In
an interesting bit of irony, the supervisor who
was the focus of the “Burned Out” column is
still in office and, in response to the COSTCO
application, was quoted as saying, “It
could be worse.” Indeed, “it” could be
worse. It could be an application for 3.5
million square feet of multi-regional commercial
activity (aka, “super big boxes”) such as
the one recently withdrawn for a site 30 miles
south of the New Baltimore COSTCO site on US
Route 29 in Culpeper County. That site has been
attracting bad proposals for nearly three
decades. The most recent proposal was
withdrawn due to the downturn in the economy and
not due to a move to a more intelligent
allocation of land uses. (38).
Multiple Objective Tax Policy A
sound example of a multiple-objective tax policy
would be a progressive retail service district
tax which would apply to retail sales in
establishments larger than a mom-and-pop/corner
store/specialty boutique. Under
this system, the further away the purchaser
lives (and/or works) from the retail site, the
higher the tax rate on the retailer. This tax
rate variation reflects the fact that the
retailer is relying on a subregional
transportation system to deliver customers. At
the present time, the Autonomobile is used to
access strip centers, ‘regional’ (community
scale) shopping centers and ‘big box/power
centers, as well as the more remote Wal*Marts,
outlet centers and super regional malls (e.g.,
Mall of America). This access creates much
higher costs, but the retailer pays no direct or
indirect charge for wide-area access. Under
a multiple objective tax strategy, the tax would
be lowest on sales to persons who lived or
worked in adjacent neighborhoods. Presumably
these persons could walk and would be encouraged
to do so - perhaps by site design and parking
charges. Even if they did not walk, the travel
distance would be relatively short. There
would be progressively higher rates charged to
those who came from outside the village, and
even higher ones for those outside the
community. The highest rate would be allocated
for those outside the subregion. While these
calculations would be impossible with
hand-cranked tax billing processes of the past,
they are simple given computer-based tax
systems. The
tax could be levied on the purchase (sales tax)
or on the vendor (value-added tax) or both. A
place to start would be a random check of
license plates in Wal*Mart parking lots. Many
retailers already ask for a zip code before they
ring up a purchase and use this information for
their own business purposes. If the zip code
reflected organic human settlement patterns,
this would reinforce Neighborhood identity. Some
offset would be possible to avoid curtailing
beneficial tourism. In a sophisticated system,
the highest tax would be levied on those who
drove past village centers offering the same
services. Of course, all this complication —
and perhaps the tax — could disappear when the
human settlement pattern evolved to be
functional and composed of alpha components. The
short-term objective here would be to generate
tax revenue, which would then be allocated to
those levels of governance responsible for
providing the longer-distance transport access. The
tax would also have the secondary impact of
making it more expensive to drive 30 miles to
buy a quart of motor oil or a carton of Coke.
This would avoid the current subsidy of
mega-retail services (Wal*Marting) that are
judged only on the price of the product, not the
cost of getting the buyer to the site and back.
The multiple-objective tax strategy would level
the playing field for mega-stores that attract
buyers over mega-distances. The
multi-objective tax policy outlined here would
be an important element of a broader consumption
tax strategy. For a detailed development of the
related concept of broad-based consumption
taxes, see Robert Frank’s book "Luxury
Fever." In
Great Britain, there is a complex set of
policies and incentives to support the existence
of a ‘high street’ (shopping venue) in close
proximity to residential enclaves at the
Neighborhood-scale and Village-scale. Of
the fundamental objectives of urban
revitalization outlined in Chapter 30 Box 2,
perhaps none is more important than the
recreation of Neighborhood and Village centers.
In Community after Community, retail service
providers try to position themselves to serve
the entire Community thus gravitating to strip
and remote box centers. --
Chapter 30, Box 3, The Shape of the Future
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