The Shape of the Future

E M Risse


 

A Second Stroll with Katrina

We haven't made much progress preparing New Orleans for another hurricane, but at least we have a clearer idea of what went wrong. Dysfunctional human settlement patterns + Business As Usual governance = disaster.


 

Like Hurricanes Betsy (1965) and Camille (1969), Katrina was NOT the “Big One” that admirers and partisans of New Orleans have been dreading ever since Galveston was decimated in 1900: The hurricane did not touch shore as a Category 5 hurricane, and it never made a direct hit on the Core of the New Orleans New Urban Region. Yet it triggered a Region-wide disaster.

 

Katrina, along with Rita, demonstrated the woeful state of preparation along the Gulf Coast for a major storm event. This dangerous condition was exposed along the Gulf Coast at the Regional, state and municipal levels but especially at the federal level. Katrina also confirmed the warnings that five decades of settlement-pattern scatteration and resource exploitation in the Louisiana wetlands had badly eroded the natural defenses against hurricanes.

 

FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE

 

Bacon's Rebellion published “Down Memory Lane with Katrina” on 5 September 2005. The column was intended to show:

  • There has been extensive discussion about the impact of a major hurricane on the New Orleans New Urban Region and on the Gulf Coast for decades.  This fact is not in dispute.

  • There were far better options than the “Big- Expensive-Wall-Around-a-Large-Area” strategy that was the only alternative offered by the Corps of Engineers and the municipal levy boards. The Big Wall structures failed even though Katrina was not “The Big One.” This is also not in question.

  • If work had started in a timely fashion on the state-wide settlement pattern alternative for hurricane security:

     

    1) Almost all of the damage and loss of life would have been avoided,

     

    2) A more effective levy/pump system protecting a far smaller area could have been completed at a much lower cost

     

    3) Regeneration of natural wetlands protection against tidal surges would have been well underway 

     

    4) All the citizens of Louisiana would have been far better off, not just those who took the brunt of Katrina, but everyone in the state. (See End Note One.)

“Down Memory Lane with Katrina” followed the a theme established in “Fire and Flood,” 3 November 2003 and repeated in “Big (Gray, Brown) Sky,” 23 October 2006 [Add Link]:

Humans and their Agencies are doing a grossly negligent job of managing the relationship between human settlement patterns and the forces of nature. (See End Note Two).

With Global Climate Change now an accepted fact – even the Elephant Clan leadership finally agrees that action is necessary – Fundamental Change in human settlement patterns and Fundamental Change in governance structure to achieve a sustainable trajectory for an urban, technology based civilization is imperative if contemporary society is to survive.

 

THE IMPACT

 

The feedback we received from professionals who went to the Gulf Coast to help on recovery efforts was that “Down Memory Lane with Katrina” provided an eye-opening perspective. According to some, it inspired attempts to do things differently now that the error of past actions should be clear to all. So far as we know, there was no discernable impact on what they or others were able to do once they got to the Gulf.

 

The continuing conflict between the “unique” Louisiana political customs and traditions and intelligent strategies to address future contingencies rages to this date. (See “Collapse,” 8 August 2005.) Two years after Katrina hit the Gulf coast, the citizens are not safe and happy, especially in the New Orleans New Urban Region and especially during hurricane season. (See End Note Three.)

 

Citizens and Households: Tens of thousands of volunteers (many organized by Institutions and others who went on their own) have flocked to the Gulf Coast to offer help.

 

Enterprises: A number of Enterprises, especially those with New Urbanist perspectives, have worked to make a difference – doing well by doing good. (See End Note Four.

 

Institutions: Brookings and other Institutions have worked hard to bring a rational focus on the Gulf Coast “rebuilding” efforts. (See End Note Five.)

 

Agencies: The fourth pillar of a sustainable society – functional governance Agencies - is crippled and continues to fail the citizens it is supposed to represent and protect.

 

The political posturing and excuses are sickening. The intra-Regional conflicts were exacerbated by the conflict between the Donkey Clan occupying the Louisiana capital in Baton Rouge, and the Elephant Clan occupying a dominant position in the Federal District of Columbia. But for the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Gulf Coast debacle would be enough to catalyze a change in dominate political parties in 2008. But what would be the advantage to citizens and Households of changing from Tweedle Dee to Tweedle Dum if the failed strategies and programs that result in dysfunctional settlement patterns are not changed?

 

There are some bright spots but the net result of all these efforts has not been positive, as indicated by the spate of second anniversary features in MainStream Media. (See End Note Six.)

 

The impact of hurricanes on dysfunctional human settlements and on the human-action-impaired natural environment along the Gulf Coast is a Whale on the Beach. (See “Whale on the Beach,” 28 August 2006.)

 

Everyone has their own interpretation of why the whale is there and what to do about it. These “solutions” reflect their particular handful of rotting bulbber left from Katrina. Some of these solutions, especially those "rebuilding as it was," are untenable. None of the "solutions" address the need for Fundamental Change in settlement pattern or Fundamental Change in governance structure. 

 

BEYOND THE MainStream Media STORIES

 

Hurricanes are not new in the Gulf of Mexico. New Orleans was battered during the record-setting storms of the 1780s. It was pounded by uncounted hurricanes before 1780 and well documented ones since. Until early in this century, the Core of the New Orleans New Urban Region was shielded by a protective barrier provided by a healthy wetland between the urban area and the open water of the Gulf of Mexico.

 

The prospect of a major hurricane was the subject of constant discussion, especially after Galveston was wiped out in 1900. That Greater New Orleans was a sitting duck for “The Big One” was not questioned when we worked in Louisiana in the early 1970s. The destruction of protective wetlands by urban development and resource exploitation was well documented at that time. It has grown worse since then. Katrina caught no one by surprise.

 

Just before the current spate of “two-years-later” MainStream Media coverage of the sorry state of affairs in the New Orleans New Urban Region, there was a story in WaPo about the “official” review of Katrina’s impact and the failure of the flood protection infrastructure. (See End Note Seven.)

 

WaPo reported that the Corps of Engineers was completing its Hurricane Protection Decision Chronology (HPDC) and is circulating a draft report titled “Decision-Making Chronology For the Lake Pontchartrain & Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project" (LP&VHPP). That is the formal name of the Corps of Engineers mid-50s project to rebuild, enhance and reconfigure existing levies, pumps, walls and other flood works to protect Greater New Orleans from floods and storm surges related to hurricanes.

 

The Corps carried out the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force study (IPET) to determine “what happened” to the LP&VHPP facilities. That left unanswered the question as to why and how the decisions were made that resulted in a system that failed so catastrophically.

 

The HPDC is the final official step to wrap up the “who-struck-john” on why the LP&VHPP structures failed to withstand an indirect hit from hurricane Katrina. It was a very good idea to make this assessment, and the Corps hired well qualified researchers to do the work. (See End Note Eight.)

 

The draft report is well worth reading. Although it covers only “official documents,” anyone who has experience in Louisiana governance can read between the lines and understand what was going on.

 

LP&VHPP was initiated in 1955 – 50 years before Katrina. A report with recommendations for new/rebuilt levies, pumps, flood gates and walls was issued in 1962 and is the basis for the works that failed in August 2005. LP&VHPP was intended to protect Greater New Orleans from a “design storm.”

 

Quantification of the design storm encompassed the storm's impact given the destruction of the wetland's natural surge barriers, what the design of LP&VHPP facilities needed to be to meet project goals, and how much money would be spent over the 50 years between project inception and facility failure.

 

Hurricanes Betsy (1965) and Camille (1969) added a sense of urgency to the process and changed the information upon which a design should have been based. The details of why intelligent changes were not made in the plans based on new information is detailed in the Hurricane Protection Decision Chronology (HPDC). 

Growing recognition of the destruction of natural flood barriers and attacks on the role of the Corps as the “know-it-all” of flood control complicated the LP&VHPP process. The whole process was made far more complex by the Kafkaesqe context of Louisiana politics.

HPDC presents the 50-year chronology in well documented detail. The report focuses on the morphing of plans due to changes in the design storm, hurricane science, experience with Betsy, a lawsuit over the sufficiency of the environmental assessment process, the debates about the impact of LV&VHPP facilities on buildings in the flood plain on the north shore of Lake Pontchartrain, and many other details. In all this there apparently was never an “official” discussion of the fact that there was an alternative to the Big Walls. The discussion focused on how high the walls should be, where the gates would be, how much the project would cost and who would pay for what parts.

 

A SECOND TRIP DOWN MEMORY LANE

 

Given what we knew from our work in Louisiana documented in “Down Memory Lane with Katrina,” we contacted one of the co-authors of the HPDC report. (See End Note Nine.) We asked if in his work he had seen any reference to anyone who acknowledged that there were human-settlement-pattern alternatives to the Big Walls projects proposed by Corps in the 60s, 70s and 80s?

 

The answer was “no.”

 

After reading “Down Memory Lane with Katrina” the co-author said he would be interested in finding out more. He wondered if we had any “any documents from official reports" regarding ... "human settlement pattern alternatives” to the Big Walls.

 

We doubt that any official reports were made concerning RBA's recommendations. That is not the Louisiana (or the Corps) way of doing business. The reports noted in End Note One are not “official documents,” they are reports submitted to “officials.” We agreed to do what we could to:

1) Get confirmation of what we recalled in “Down Memory Lane with Katrina,” and 

 

2) Locate those who might know of “official” reports or actions.

We e-mailed a former senior staff person in our division at RBA who managed the Louisiana project on a day-to-day basis. (See End Note Ten.) The former project manager read “Down Memory Lane with Katrina” and had no contrary recollections. Over the years, he said, he had lost track of the people who worked for him and with him on the Louisiana project.

 

We reported back to the HPDC author:

  • The good news is that the project manager recalled nothing different from what we spell out in the column and that we had found the documents listed in End Note One. 

  • The bad news is that the project manager does not recall anything else and does not know where a copy of the old slide show or the voice track might be outside of Louisiana. Google turned up no promising leads on the persons listed in the RBA reports either.

The RBA slide show had the real impact and drove home the point that a settlement pattern solution should:

  • Build Balanced Communities on the high ground in the central and northern part of the state

  • Defend a much smaller area in the South from flood and tidal surge, focusing on highest existing ground, including the area that did not flood in Katrina and Rita

  • Help the natural wetlands surge protection regenerate   

The RBA strategy was spelled out in words and color photography supplied by professional advisors and volunteers. The reports listed in End Note One contain some of these graphics but the slide show prepared after the reports were much more effective. The scientists with whom RBA staff worked at Louisiana State University as well as members of environmental groups and the staff of state agencies were among those who supported alternatives to the Corps’ Big Wall solution.

 

The only feasible way to challenge the Big Wall was to file a suit challenging the environmental review process for the Big Wall. As noted in HPDC, the environmental review challenge suit was pivotal. The suit required more work by the Corps, it delayed the project and increased the project cost. The legal action also undercut support for the Big Wall because anyone willing to listen knew there was an alternative. The fact that it involved regenerating the wetland and traditional Bayou fisheries was a major selling point.

 

Those who did not like the idea supported Business As Usual. Many, including members of the Lyndon B. Johnson family, had invested in land for expansion of the footprint of Greater New Orleans. This land was useful only with major flood control projects paid for by the public.

The shrinking support and budget constraints led to inappropriate decisions concerning LP&VHPP facilities, including failure to incorporate new data that weakened these facilities.

WHERE TO FROM HERE?

 

All this in interesting and tragic – especially for those who lost their lives, their livelihoods and their property. At this point there are two issues that are important to consider:

 

First: As pointed out in “Down Memory Lane with Katrina,” the half a million dollars (and much more) was a complete waste since none of the recommendations were implemented, even though they would have saved over a thousand lives, millions of livelihoods and billions of dollars.

 

Second: A case can be made that until there is a critical mass of citizens who understand the need for Fundamental Change in human settlement pattern and Fundamental Change in governance structure, “good planning” may exacerbate bad settlement-pattern decisions.

 

Consider the following:

 

Scientists at Louisiana State University, at non-profit and voluntary environmental organizations and other groups participated in development of the RBA strategy to restructure the settlement pattern of Louisiana. They understood and supported the overarching settlement pattern strategy. This strategy solved the flooding and environmental destruction problems in South Louisiana and enhanced the economic status of the rest of the state. It also directly challenged the Business-As-Usual approach to government support of private land speculation in Louisiana.

 

These participants were aware that there was an alternative to building more Big Walls. In fact, it would be a win-win situation with a smaller areas protected by Really Big Walls and reallocation of development and the pattern of human settlement in Louisiana.

 

The Dutch have proven such a plan can work in an area without hurricanes. By protecting a smaller area (only that necessary to support the Core for the New Orleans New Urban Region with functional settlement patterns) and allowing the natural hurricane defenses to regenerate, the good life could roll on and the only ones to suffer would be the speculators.

 

Knowing there was an alternative added credibility to the environmental assessment attack on the Corps of Engineers of Big Wall plans. However, without a critical mass of support for a real alternative, the net result of this attack was to erode citizen and political support and funds for the Big Walls.

 

Caught between a rock and a hard place, the Corps oversaw a process that converted the Big Walls into “Sorta Big Walls.” These facilities did not withstand Katrina, much less “The Big One.”

 

It’s questionable whether any Big Wall covering a large area without healthy, natural wetlands protection could withstand “The Big One” that is still is on the horizon. The scaled back version obviously collapsed even when Katrina was not “The Big One.”

 

So what did the good planning process with professional/ citizen participation accomplish? It ended up forcing a least-common-denominator, Business-As-Usual “solution.”

 

Does this mean that, until there is a critical mass of citizens who understand the need for Fundamental Change in human settlement patterns and Fundamental Change in governance structure, efforts to address problems such protecting the Core of the New Orleans New Urban Region from hurricanes in fact make the world less safe?

 

A growing number of citizens are opting out. They do not vote, weakening democracy, and they make uninformed decisions eroding free markets. They are expressing frustration, and disillusion with Business As Usual. Partisan political bickering is a threat to governance stability, democratic processes and free markets.

 

Is the failure to solve basic problems, such as protecting citizens from fire and floods, causing the US of A to slip behind other nation-states in protecting democracy and free markets? The data on a number of fronts...

  • The number of citizens who vote

  • The level of satisfaction with “government”

  • The respect for laws and regulations

  • Citizen health and longevity

  • Educational attainment

  • Objective measures of personal freedom

...all document an erosion of those qualities in which citizens believe the US of A should be a leader.

 

We will look for other examples of this potential in the topics explored in Chapter 14 of BRIDGES “What Did I Tell You.” In the meantime, we examine the impact of genetic proclivities in the Postscript to “The Problem With Cars.”

 

-- Sept. 4, 2007

 


 

End Notes

 

(1). “Down Memory Lane with Katrina” was prepared from memory. A recent search found that there are copies of reports prepared for the State of Louisiana in the S/PI library that document what we recalled in 2005. No one challenged our recollections at the time or since.

 

The reports include:

 

"State of Louisiana Growth and Conservation Policy Alternatives" May 1973.

 

The June 1974 five volume set "Elements of a Growth and Conservation Policy." The 1974 volumes are titled:

  • "Community Development"

  • "Environmental Assessment"

  • "Growth Centers" (This report advocates the creation of Planned New Communities in the North and Central part of the state to accommodate development pressures from the Louisiana SuperPort and oil production / refining in the South)

  • "Industrial Diversification"

  • "Approaches and Strategies"

The final effort upon which RBA worked was "Citizen Education." We have a copy of the 40-page workbook developed as part of the Citizen Education effort. The workbook was to be filled out in public education sessions before and after viewing a slide show.  The slide show and workbook are titled "Operation Hindsight: 2020, Policy Development and Strategy for Louisiana." Several “focus group” sessions were held to vet these materials. A full-scale education program was not implemented.

 

Taken together, they these volumes document our recollection in “Down Memory Lane with Katrina” but they are not “official documents,” they were reports submitted to “officials.”

 

(2). The 2003 and 2006 columns explored the impact of hurricanes and floods (2003) and of forest fires on our home town (2003) and in our home region (2006). In case you have not noticed, 2007 is running neck and neck with 2005 for the second worst fire year in recorded history – just behind 2006.

 

 The recent spate of bad fire years in Glacier National Park started when we were working our way through college by fighting fires as noted in “Fire and Flood.” There were bad fire years in 1910, 1929 and in 1934. From 1935 to 1957 the average burn in Glacier National Park was less than 1/10 of one acre. That record blew up in 1958, our second year as a Fire Control Aide. Since then there has been a trend of larger and larger fires.

 

At this time there are three active fires each over 45,000 acres (Skyland, Ahorn and Fool Creek) from 40 miles east to 60 miles southeast of our old home site. As of 29 August 465,843 acres have burned in Montana in 2007. Fairfax County is about 245,000 acres.

 

And it is not just Montana that is on fire. Nearly 7 million acres have burned nation-wide so far this year, including 240,000 acres in Santa Barbara County, Calif. The Zaca fire started 15 miles from our old farm in the Santa Inez Valley. “Fire and Flood” includes a discussion of contemporary “forest fire” management and settlement patterns.

 

(3). Every MainStream Media editor marked his calendar: “Do big story the end of August on Katrina two years later.” Good examples are the coverage in WaPo. Full-color photos and front-page stories on Page One and the front page of Outlook and a book review on 26 August 2007.

 

(4). New Urban News which covers New Urbanist Activities has features on progress and frustrations encountered on the Gulf Coast in every issue.

 

(5). Go to www.brookings.edu/metro for extensive status reports, updates and other materials.

 

(6). Just Google “Katrina two years later.” Read it and weep. We will further expand the four-legged stool (Citizens and Households, Enterprises, Institutions and Agencies) and the demise of the Fourth Estate in the BRIDGES book of TRILO-G. See the definitions of Household,  Enterprise, Institution and Agency in GLOSSARY.

 

(7). Peter Whoriskey, “Report Examines Path to Failed New Orleans Levees” WaPo 11 July 2007.

 

(8). One might think it strange that the Corps would sponsor such an activity. It probably was conceived to reinforce future Corps arguments concerning budget cuts and attacks on pork barrel water projects. For a refreshing view of what is wrong with the whole idea of “flood control,” see “The River” a 1937 Pare Lorentz (federally sponsored education) film now available on DVD from Noxos. You will enjoy the Virgil Thomson sound track. The work of Pare Lorentz makes the point we often repeat: A lot of people understood the path to dysfunctional human settlement patterns was the wrong route a long time ago.

 

(9). We have known Professor Len Shabman for over 20 years. He was one of the four original founders of Friends of Virginia’s Future, he is now retired from Virginia Tech and is on the staff of Resources for the Future. The HPDC report includes a brief bio.

 

(10). Guy Hager was on the RBA Planning and Architecture staff we supervised for four years. He left RBA about the time I did.  He later served as the Director of Planning of Howard County and the Director of the Baltimore Subregion’s MPO. He is now engaged in conservation and recreation work for Institutions in the Baltimore Subregion.    

 

 

 

 

 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ed Risse and his wife Linda live inside the "Clear Edge" of the "urban enclave" known as Warrenton, a municipality in the Countryside near the edge of the Washington-Baltimore "New Urban Region."

 

Mr. Risse, the principal of

SYNERGY/Planning, Inc., can be contacted at spirisse@aol.com.

 

Read his profile here.