Like
Hurricanes Betsy (1965) and Camille (1969),
Katrina was NOT the “Big One” that admirers
and partisans of New Orleans have been dreading
ever since Galveston was decimated in 1900: The
hurricane did not touch shore as a Category 5 hurricane,
and it never made a direct hit on the Core of
the New Orleans New Urban Region. Yet it triggered a Region-wide disaster. Katrina,
along with Rita, demonstrated the woeful state
of preparation along the Gulf Coast for a major
storm event. This dangerous condition was
exposed along the Gulf Coast at the Regional,
state and municipal levels but especially at the
federal level.
Katrina also confirmed the warnings that five
decades of settlement-pattern scatteration and
resource exploitation in the Louisiana wetlands
had badly eroded the natural defenses against
hurricanes. FROM
OUR PERSPECTIVE Bacon's
Rebellion published “Down
Memory Lane with Katrina” on 5 September
2005. The column was intended to show:
-
If
work had started in a timely fashion on the
state-wide settlement pattern alternative
for hurricane security:
1)
Almost all of the damage and loss of life
would have been avoided,
2)
A more effective levy/pump system protecting
a far smaller area could have been completed
at a much lower cost
3)
Regeneration of natural wetlands protection
against tidal surges would have been well
underway
4)
All the citizens of Louisiana would have
been far better off, not just those who took
the brunt of Katrina, but everyone in the
state. (See End
Note One.)
“Down
Memory Lane with Katrina” followed the a theme
established in “Fire
and Flood,” 3 November 2003 and repeated
in “Big
(Gray, Brown) Sky,” 23 October 2006 [Add
Link]:
Humans
and their Agencies are doing a grossly
negligent job of managing the relationship
between human settlement patterns and the
forces of nature. (See End
Note Two).
With
Global Climate Change now an accepted fact –
even the Elephant Clan leadership finally agrees
that action is necessary – Fundamental Change
in human settlement patterns and Fundamental
Change in governance structure to achieve a
sustainable trajectory for an urban, technology
based civilization is imperative if contemporary
society is to survive.
THE
IMPACT
The
feedback we received from professionals who went
to the Gulf Coast to help on recovery efforts
was that “Down Memory Lane with Katrina”
provided an eye-opening perspective. According
to some, it inspired attempts to do things
differently now that the error of past actions
should be clear to all. So far as we know, there
was no discernable impact on what they or others
were able to do once they got to the Gulf.
The
continuing conflict between the “unique”
Louisiana political customs and traditions and
intelligent strategies to address future
contingencies rages to this date. (See “Collapse,”
8 August 2005.) Two years after Katrina hit the
Gulf coast, the citizens are not safe and happy,
especially in the New Orleans New Urban Region
and especially during hurricane season. (See End
Note Three.)
Citizens
and Households: Tens of thousands of
volunteers (many organized by Institutions and
others who went on their own) have flocked to
the Gulf Coast to offer help.
Enterprises:
A number of Enterprises, especially those with
New Urbanist perspectives, have worked to make a
difference – doing well by doing good. (See End
Note Four.
Institutions:
Brookings and other Institutions have worked
hard to bring a rational focus on the Gulf Coast
“rebuilding” efforts. (See End
Note Five.)
Agencies:
The fourth pillar of a sustainable society –
functional governance Agencies - is crippled and
continues to fail the citizens it is supposed to
represent and protect.
The
political posturing and excuses are sickening.
The intra-Regional conflicts were exacerbated by
the conflict between the Donkey Clan occupying
the Louisiana capital in Baton Rouge, and the
Elephant Clan occupying a dominant position in
the Federal District of Columbia. But for the
Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Gulf Coast
debacle would be enough to catalyze a change in
dominate political parties in 2008. But what
would be the advantage to citizens and
Households of changing from Tweedle Dee to
Tweedle Dum if the failed strategies and
programs that result in dysfunctional settlement
patterns are not changed?
There
are some bright spots but the net result of all
these efforts has not been positive, as
indicated by the spate of second anniversary
features in MainStream Media. (See End
Note Six.)
The
impact of hurricanes on dysfunctional human
settlements and on the human-action-impaired
natural environment along the Gulf Coast is a
Whale on the Beach. (See “Whale
on the Beach,” 28 August 2006.)
Everyone
has their own interpretation of why the whale is
there and what to do about it. These
“solutions” reflect their particular handful
of rotting bulbber left from Katrina. Some of
these solutions, especially those
"rebuilding as it was," are untenable.
None of the "solutions" address the
need for Fundamental Change in settlement
pattern or Fundamental Change in governance
structure.
BEYOND
THE MainStream Media STORIES
Hurricanes
are not new in the Gulf of Mexico. New Orleans
was battered during the record-setting storms of
the 1780s. It was pounded by uncounted
hurricanes before 1780 and well documented ones
since. Until early in this century, the Core of
the New Orleans New Urban Region was shielded by
a protective barrier provided by a healthy
wetland between the urban area and the open
water of the Gulf
of Mexico.
The
prospect of a major hurricane was the subject of
constant discussion, especially after Galveston
was wiped out in 1900. That Greater New Orleans
was a sitting duck for “The Big One” was not
questioned when we worked in Louisiana in the
early 1970s. The destruction of protective
wetlands by urban development and resource
exploitation was well documented at that time.
It has grown worse since then. Katrina caught no
one by surprise.
Just
before the current spate of
“two-years-later” MainStream Media coverage
of the sorry state of affairs in the New Orleans
New Urban Region, there was a
story in WaPo about the
“official” review of Katrina’s impact and
the failure of the flood protection infrastructure. (See
End
Note Seven.)
WaPo
reported that the Corps of Engineers was
completing its Hurricane Protection Decision
Chronology (HPDC) and is circulating a draft
report titled “Decision-Making Chronology For
the Lake Pontchartrain & Vicinity Hurricane
Protection Project" (LP&VHPP). That is
the formal name of the Corps of Engineers
mid-50s project to rebuild, enhance and
reconfigure existing levies, pumps, walls and
other flood works to protect Greater New Orleans
from floods and storm surges related to
hurricanes.
The
Corps carried out the Interagency Performance
Evaluation Task Force study (IPET) to determine
“what happened” to the LP&VHPP
facilities. That left unanswered the question as
to why and how the decisions were made that
resulted in a system that failed so
catastrophically.
The
HPDC is the final official step to wrap up the
“who-struck-john” on why the LP&VHPP
structures failed to withstand an indirect hit
from hurricane Katrina. It was a very good idea
to make this assessment, and the Corps hired
well qualified researchers to do the work. (See End
Note Eight.)
The
draft report is well
worth reading. Although it covers only
“official documents,” anyone who has
experience in Louisiana governance can read
between the lines and understand what was going
on.
LP&VHPP was initiated in 1955
– 50 years before Katrina. A report with
recommendations for new/rebuilt levies, pumps,
flood gates and walls was issued in 1962 and is
the basis for the works that failed in August
2005. LP&VHPP was intended to protect
Greater New Orleans from a “design storm.”
Quantification
of the design storm encompassed the storm's
impact given the destruction of the wetland's
natural surge barriers, what the design of LP&VHPP
facilities needed to be to meet project goals,
and how much money would be spent over
the 50 years between project inception and
facility failure.
Hurricanes
Betsy (1965) and Camille (1969) added a sense of
urgency to the process and changed the
information upon which a design should have been
based. The details of why intelligent changes
were not made in the plans based on new
information is detailed in the Hurricane
Protection Decision Chronology (HPDC).
Growing
recognition of the destruction of natural flood
barriers and attacks on the role of the Corps as
the “know-it-all” of flood control
complicated the LP&VHPP process. The whole
process was made far more complex by the Kafkaesqe context of
Louisiana politics.
HPDC
presents the 50-year chronology in well
documented detail. The report focuses on the
morphing of plans due to changes in the design
storm, hurricane science, experience with Betsy,
a lawsuit over the sufficiency of the
environmental assessment process, the debates
about the impact of LV&VHPP facilities on
buildings in the flood plain on the north shore
of Lake Pontchartrain, and many other details.
In all this there apparently was never an
“official” discussion of the fact that there
was an alternative to the Big Walls. The
discussion focused on how high the walls should
be, where the gates would be, how much the
project would cost and who would pay for what
parts.
A
SECOND TRIP DOWN MEMORY LANE
Given
what we knew from our work in Louisiana
documented in “Down Memory Lane with Katrina,”
we contacted one of the co-authors of the HPDC
report. (See End
Note Nine.) We asked if in his work he had
seen any reference to anyone who acknowledged
that there were human-settlement-pattern alternatives to the Big
Walls projects proposed by Corps in the 60s, 70s
and 80s?
The
answer was “no.”
After
reading “Down Memory Lane with Katrina” the
co-author said he would be interested in finding
out more. He wondered if we had any “any
documents from official reports" regarding
... "human settlement pattern
alternatives” to the Big Walls.
We
doubt that any official reports were made
concerning RBA's
recommendations. That is not the Louisiana (or
the Corps) way of doing business. The reports
noted in End Note One are not “official
documents,” they are reports submitted to
“officials.” We agreed to do what we could
to:
1)
Get confirmation of what we recalled in
“Down Memory Lane with Katrina,” and
2)
Locate those who might know of “official”
reports or actions.
We
e-mailed a former senior staff person in our
division at RBA who managed the Louisiana
project on a day-to-day basis. (See End
Note Ten.) The former project manager read
“Down Memory Lane with Katrina” and had no
contrary recollections. Over the years, he said,
he had
lost track of the people who worked for him
and with him on the Louisiana project.
We
reported back to the HPDC author:
The
RBA slide show had the real impact and drove home
the point that a settlement pattern solution
should:
The
RBA strategy was spelled out in words and color
photography supplied by professional advisors
and volunteers.
The reports listed in End Note
One contain some of these graphics but the slide
show prepared after the reports were much more
effective. The scientists with whom RBA staff
worked at Louisiana State University as well as
members of environmental groups and the staff of
state agencies were among those who supported
alternatives to the Corps’ Big Wall solution.
The
only feasible way to challenge the Big Wall was
to file a suit challenging the environmental
review process for the Big Wall. As noted in
HPDC, the environmental review challenge suit
was pivotal. The suit required more work by the
Corps, it delayed the project and increased the
project cost. The legal action also undercut
support for the Big Wall because anyone willing
to listen knew there was an alternative. The
fact that it involved regenerating the wetland
and traditional Bayou fisheries was a major
selling point.
Those
who did not like the idea supported Business As
Usual. Many, including members of the Lyndon B.
Johnson family, had invested in land for
expansion of the footprint of Greater New
Orleans. This land was useful only with major
flood control projects paid for by the public.
The
shrinking support and budget constraints led
to inappropriate decisions concerning LP&VHPP
facilities, including failure to incorporate
new data that weakened these facilities.
WHERE
TO FROM HERE?
All
this in interesting and tragic – especially
for those who lost their lives, their
livelihoods and their property. At this point
there are two issues that are important to
consider:
First:
As pointed out in “Down Memory Lane with
Katrina,” the half a million dollars (and much
more) was a complete waste since none of the
recommendations were implemented, even though
they would have saved over a thousand lives,
millions of livelihoods and billions of dollars.
Second:
A case can be made that until there is a
critical mass of citizens who understand the
need for Fundamental Change in human settlement
pattern and Fundamental Change in governance
structure, “good planning” may
exacerbate bad settlement-pattern decisions.
Consider
the following:
Scientists
at Louisiana State University, at non-profit and
voluntary environmental organizations and other
groups participated in development of the RBA
strategy to restructure the settlement pattern
of Louisiana. They understood and supported the
overarching settlement pattern strategy. This
strategy solved the flooding and environmental
destruction problems in South Louisiana and
enhanced the economic status of the rest of the
state. It also directly challenged the
Business-As-Usual approach to government support
of private land speculation in Louisiana.
These
participants were aware that there was an
alternative to building more Big Walls. In fact,
it would be a win-win situation with a smaller
areas protected by Really Big Walls and
reallocation of development and the pattern of
human settlement in Louisiana.
The
Dutch have proven such a plan can work in an
area without hurricanes. By protecting a smaller
area (only that necessary to support the Core
for the New Orleans New Urban Region with
functional settlement patterns) and allowing the
natural hurricane defenses to regenerate, the
good life could roll on and the only ones to
suffer would be the speculators.
Knowing
there was an alternative added credibility to
the environmental assessment attack on the Corps
of Engineers of Big Wall plans. However, without
a critical mass of support for a real
alternative, the net result of this attack was
to erode citizen and political support and funds
for the Big Walls.
Caught
between a rock and a hard place, the Corps
oversaw a process that converted the Big Walls
into “Sorta Big Walls.” These facilities did
not withstand Katrina, much less “The Big
One.”
It’s
questionable whether any Big Wall covering a
large area without healthy, natural wetlands
protection could withstand “The Big One”
that is still is on the horizon. The scaled back
version obviously collapsed even when Katrina
was not “The Big One.”
So
what did the good planning process with
professional/ citizen participation accomplish?
It ended up forcing a least-common-denominator,
Business-As-Usual “solution.”
Does
this mean that, until there is a critical mass
of citizens who understand the need for
Fundamental Change in human settlement patterns
and Fundamental Change in governance structure,
efforts to address problems such protecting the
Core of the New Orleans New Urban Region from
hurricanes in fact make the world less safe?
A
growing number of citizens are opting out. They
do not vote, weakening democracy, and they make
uninformed decisions eroding free markets. They
are expressing frustration, and disillusion with
Business As Usual. Partisan political bickering
is a threat to governance stability, democratic
processes and free markets.
Is
the failure to solve basic problems, such as
protecting citizens from fire and floods,
causing the US of A to slip behind other
nation-states in protecting democracy and free
markets? The data on a number of fronts...
-
The
number of citizens who vote
-
The
level of satisfaction with “government”
-
The
respect for laws and regulations
-
Citizen
health and longevity
-
Educational
attainment
-
Objective
measures of personal freedom
...all
document an erosion of those qualities in which
citizens believe the US of A should be a leader.
We
will look for other examples of this potential
in the topics explored in Chapter 14 of BRIDGES
“What Did I Tell You.” In the meantime, we
examine the impact of genetic proclivities in
the Postscript to “The Problem With Cars.”
--
Sept. 4, 2007
End
Notes
(1).
“Down Memory Lane with Katrina” was prepared
from memory. A recent search found that there
are copies of reports prepared for the State of
Louisiana in the S/PI library that document what
we recalled in 2005. No one challenged our
recollections at the time or since.
The
reports include:
"State
of Louisiana Growth and Conservation Policy
Alternatives" May 1973.
The
June 1974 five volume set "Elements of a
Growth and Conservation Policy." The 1974
volumes are titled:
The
final effort upon which RBA worked was
"Citizen Education." We have a copy of
the 40-page workbook developed as part of the
Citizen Education effort. The workbook was to be
filled out in public education sessions before
and after viewing a slide show. The slide
show and workbook are titled "Operation
Hindsight: 2020, Policy Development and Strategy
for Louisiana." Several “focus group”
sessions were held to vet these materials. A
full-scale education program was not
implemented.
Taken
together, they these volumes document our
recollection in “Down Memory Lane with
Katrina” but they are not “official
documents,” they were reports submitted to
“officials.”
(2).
The 2003 and 2006 columns explored the
impact of hurricanes and floods (2003) and of
forest fires on our home town (2003) and in our
home region (2006). In case you have not
noticed, 2007 is running neck and neck with 2005
for the second worst fire year in recorded
history – just behind 2006.
The
recent spate of bad fire years in Glacier
National Park started when we were working our
way through college by fighting fires as noted
in “Fire and Flood.” There were bad fire
years in 1910, 1929 and in 1934. From 1935 to
1957 the average burn in Glacier National Park
was less than 1/10 of one acre. That record blew
up in 1958, our second year as a Fire Control
Aide. Since then there has been a trend of
larger and larger fires.
At
this time there are three active fires each over
45,000 acres (Skyland, Ahorn and Fool Creek)
from 40 miles east to 60 miles southeast of our
old home site. As of 29 August 465,843 acres
have burned in Montana in 2007. Fairfax County
is about 245,000 acres.
And
it is not just Montana that is on fire. Nearly 7
million acres have burned nation-wide so far
this year, including 240,000 acres in Santa
Barbara County, Calif. The Zaca fire started 15
miles from our old farm in the Santa Inez
Valley. “Fire
and Flood” includes a discussion of
contemporary “forest fire” management and
settlement patterns.
(3).
Every MainStream Media editor marked his
calendar: “Do big story the end of August on
Katrina two years later.” Good examples are
the coverage in WaPo. Full-color photos
and front-page stories on Page One and the front
page of Outlook and a book review on 26 August
2007.
(4).
New Urban News which covers New Urbanist
Activities has features on progress and
frustrations encountered on the Gulf Coast in
every issue.
(5).
Go to www.brookings.edu/metro for extensive
status reports, updates and other materials.
(6).
Just Google “Katrina two years later.”
Read it and weep. We will further expand the
four-legged stool (Citizens and Households,
Enterprises, Institutions and Agencies) and the
demise of the Fourth Estate in the BRIDGES book
of TRILO-G. See the definitions of Household,
Enterprise, Institution and Agency in
GLOSSARY.
(7).
Peter Whoriskey, “Report Examines Path to
Failed New Orleans Levees” WaPo 11 July 2007.
(8).
One might think it strange that the Corps
would sponsor such an activity. It probably was
conceived to reinforce future Corps arguments
concerning budget cuts and attacks on pork
barrel water projects. For a refreshing view of
what is wrong with the whole idea of “flood
control,” see “The River” a 1937 Pare
Lorentz (federally sponsored education) film now
available on DVD from Noxos. You will enjoy the
Virgil Thomson sound track. The work of Pare
Lorentz makes the point we often repeat: A lot
of people understood the path to dysfunctional
human settlement patterns was the wrong route a
long time ago.
(9).
We have known Professor Len Shabman for over 20
years. He was one of the four original founders
of Friends of Virginia’s Future, he is now
retired from Virginia Tech and is on the staff
of Resources for the Future. The HPDC report
includes a brief bio.
(10).
Guy Hager was on the RBA Planning and
Architecture staff we supervised for four years.
He left RBA about the time I did. He later
served as the Director of Planning of Howard
County and the Director of the Baltimore
Subregion’s MPO. He is now engaged in
conservation and recreation work for
Institutions in the Baltimore Subregion.
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