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The
federal government recommendation last week that
New Orleans residents raise their homes at least
three feet higher may help tens of thousands make
a decision on whether to rebuild almost eight
months after Hurricane Katrina. The flood advisory
estimates for once-in-one- hundred-year floods in
levee-protected areas are supposed to clarify
which structures qualify for additional government
aid and lower-cost flood insurance. But what if
this turns out to be just another example of
making the disaster fit the plan?
Trying
to accommodate a challenge neatly within an
existing plan amounts to little more than wishful
thinking, even when it involves something like
transportation that is totally predictable. But
instead of engendering adequate preparation and a
vigorous response, flawed thinking can create a
nightmare when a disaster occurs. That was one of
the major findings of the U.S. House of
Representatives Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to
Hurricane Katrina, a panel headed by Virginia Rep.
Tom Davis, R-Fairfax, that issued its report in
mid-February.
Entitled
"A Failure of Initiative," the report
decried what it called a self-renewing failure of
initiative creeping into the federal government
that leads to a failure in leadership and denial
of the need to change. "Many government
officials," the Davis report states in one
conclusion, "continue to stubbornly resist
recognizing the fundamental changes in disaster
management are needed." And in another,
"(W)e have to stop waiting for the disaster
that fits our response plan" and get
"more order, more urgency, more coordination,
and more initiative" in place. The report
defines "initiative" as the "power
or ability to begin or follow through
energetically with a plan task; enterprise and
determination."
What
the Select Committee found in nine public
hearings, endless interviews and briefings and a
review of more that half a million pages of
documents was something completely different:
Local, state and federal government agencies
failed to meet the needs of the residents of
Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama. The specifics
are even more damning.
There
are some positives to build on, the Select
Committee concluded, including the accuracy and
timeliness of National Weather Service and
National Hurricane Center forecasts that prevented
further loss of life and the heroic rescue and
supply efforts of the Coast Guard. But there is
also the cold statement that DHS and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) stood waiting
for requests, while an "alphabet soup"
of HSOC (Homeland Security Operations Center),
RRCC (Rapid Response Coordination Center), JFOs
(Joint Field Offices), PFOs (Principal Federal
Officials) and IIMG (Interagency Incident
Management Group) confused one another.
"We
repeatedly tried to determine how government could
respond so ineffectively to a disaster that was so
accurately forecast," the Davis report
states. Some of the answers: Did not prepare
adequately, no common definition of "special
needs," inability to communicate, subjective
decisions, confusion, uncertainty, red tape, poor
planning and pre-positioning of supplies.
The
Select Committee report characterizes many of the
problems as "information gaps," and,
though not tasked with making specific remedial
recommendations, stated the obvious solution: More
information available to the right people at the
right place at the right time.
The
committee's general
guidance for the future? Make people, not politics
the priority. Base disaster response on knowledge,
not rumor. Ensure that risk communications are
consistent, accurate, clear and delivered
repeatedly through multiple methods.
Current
and former New Orleans residents trying to decide
whether to rebuild finally have some information
on how to rebuild. But how many homeowners can
afford the $40,000 for the first foot and $8,000
to $12,000 for each additional foot that raising a
house costs on top of everything else? How long a
wait will there be if tens of thousands attempt to
start those projects at the same time? What do
potential renters, in what was a city of renters,
do for affordable housing?
Voters
in New Orleans and former residents have the
opportunity through elections up to and on April
22 to select local leaders who can incorporate and
implement lessons learned. But what options are
going to be open to leaders in a politically
charged, no-tax, risk-adverse culture? As the
Select Committee report makes clear, "There
is no Tommy Lee Jones character that comes in a
takes charge of ... well ... everything."
And
finally, there is the most persistent problem.
"Officials at all levels seemed to be waiting
for the disaster that fit their plans, rather than
planning and building scalable capacities to meet
whatever Mother Nature threw at them." Until
the public demands harder, more direct looks at
all challenges, starting with disasters, and
initiative and competence from their leaders in
meeting the challenges, the next disasters are
just waiting to happen.
--
April 17, 2006
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